|Parallel abstract (English)|| |
In this paper the author analyses the misuse of the security and intelligence system in the Republic of Croatia. After defining the initial situation, in which the security and intelligence system of Croatia began to take shape, the author scrutinizes the development and reforms made since the first multiparty elections to the year of 2015. This paper is divided into three main parts, inextricably linked with civil intelligence system, based on major changes being made in the security and intelligence sector of Croatia.
In the first part of the paper, the author defines major issues influencing the processes of creation and development of the security sector in the early years of Croatian independence.
Second part emphasizes the difference between the first period of development in the sense of higher transparency, more developed parliamentary oversight, the creation of an independent body consisting of expert civilians to aid the Croatian Parliamentary board for National Security and Internal Affairs. Finally, the author uses the last part to show that progress and time do not necessarily go hand in hand, pointing out a major setback made by the Croatian government by passing the Security Agency Law in 2006., which obstructed the parliamentary oversight of the Security Agency. As a solution to a wide variety of issues concerning national security and the security agency per se, the author suggests transformation of semi-presidential to a parliamentary system in which the President of the State would be elected within the parliament among his/her peers and his/her role would be exclusively limited to non-executive actions and ceremonial dealings. Only this way, claims the author, is it possible to ensure stability and professionality within the security sector, implement democratic oversight and in turn, develop a safe environment.