

# Influence of Institutions and Actors on the Reform of Implementation Management

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University of Zagreb

Faculty of Political Science

Anka Kekez Koštro

**INFLUENCE OF INSTITUTIONS AND  
ACTORS ON THE REFORM OF  
IMPLEMENTATION MANAGEMENT: A  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL  
SERVICES IN CROATIA**

DOCTORAL THESIS

Zagreb, 2018



Sveučilište u Zagrebu

Fakultet političkih znanosti

Anka Kekez Koštro

**UTJECAJ INSTITUCIJA I AKTERA NA  
REFORMU IMPLEMENTACIJSKOG  
MENADŽMENTA: KOMPARATIVNA  
ANALIZA SOCIJALNIH USLUGA U  
HRVATSKOJ**

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(Kaasch and Stubbs, eds, 2014), 'Making Policy Move: towards a politics of translation and assemblage' (Clarke, Bainton, Lendva and Stubbs, 2015), and 'Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslav Socialism' (Archer, Duda and Stubbs, eds, 2016). He has recently completed two research projects on Local State Capture in Croatia and on Child Poverty and Household Coping Strategies.

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The aim of this dissertation is to describe and explain the variation in the reform of implementation management in Croatia by looking at various social services. While the reform was based on principles of effectiveness, efficiency and participation in one segment of those services, in the other segment it was used for development of partisan patronage networks. While combining comparative strategy with the process tracing method, the dissertation focuses on six social services and relies on interviews with policy actors, official documents and statistical data to map and explain different reform outcomes.

By using comparable case strategy, dissertation identifies two factors that led to differences in implementation of reformed social services and affected the capacity of political parties to use social policy reform as an instrument of patronage. Sufficiently institutionalized setting in which services were provided prior to the reform, with both dense working procedures and professional standards, reduces the ability of political parties to integrate political patronage into implementation management. In the case of a minimal or non-existent institutional setting, the involvement of service beneficiaries or actors advocating their interests constrains possibilities for party patronage.

While employing the process-tracing method, the dissertation uses the notion of political metagovernance as a conceptual starting point and crafts a causal mechanism that can account for the distortive impact of partisan patronage on the reform of service provision. By analysing the case in which comparative analysis indicated distortions in the service provision, it reveals how the patronage-driven political executive inspired by network-based forms of governance failed to move traditional service provision into novel implementation mode but overly politicized the role of metagovernors instead while using the reform for the selective distribution of public funding and employment of party supporters as service providers.



## SAŽETAK NA HRVATSKOM JEZIKU

Svrha ovog doktorskog rada je analizirati ishode reforme javnog menadžmenta u Hrvatskoj razmatrajući implementaciju socijalne politike. Dok se u jednom segmentu socijalnih usluga reforma temeljila na principima djelotvornosti, štedljivosti i sudjelovanja građana, u drugom segmentu se iskoristila za omogućavanje stranačkog pokroviteljstva. Doktorat uspoređuje šest socijalnih usluga koje su bile obuhvaćene reformom, a jednu dodatno istražuje analizom procesa. Obje analize temelje se na intervjuima s akterima uključenima u dizajn i provedbu izabranih usluga, službenim dokumentima te na dokumentima i službenim podacima vezanima za provedbu izabranih socijalnih usluga.

Komparativom analizom izabranih usluga, doktorat pokazuje da je uslijed reforme došlo do različitih oblika implementacijskog menadžmenta te identificira dva činitelja koji su doveli do razlika u implementacijskom menadžmentu izabranih usluga i koji su utjecali na mogućnost političkih stanaka da koriste reformu upravljanja za pružanje socijalnih usluga u svrhu političkog pokroviteljstva. Razvijen institucionalni okvir u kojem su usluge bile pružane prije reforme, karakteriziran gustim procedurama i profesionalnim standardima, pokazao se kao činitelj koji umanjuje mogućnost političkih stanaka da političko pokroviteljstvo ugrade u menadžment pružanjem javnih usluga. U uslugama u kojima je taj okvir bio nedostatno razvijen, uključenost samih korisnika u dizajn i pružanje usluge i/ili postojanje aktera koji zagovaraju i/ili štite interese korisnika pokazao se kao ograničavajući činitelj za stranačko pokroviteljstvo.

Uz primjenu metode analize procesa, doktorski rad iskoristio je koncept političkog meta-upravljanja kao temelj za izgradnju kauzalnog mehanizma kojim se može objasniti način na koji je stranačko pokroviteljstvo negativno utjecalo na reformu upravljanja pružanjem usluga i pervertiralo je. Analizirajući slučaj u kojem je komparativna analiza ukazala na prisutnost "pervertiranog", politički opterećenog upravljanja pružanjem usluge, doktorat pokazuje mehanizam kojim je izvršna vlast politizirala reformski proces i iskoristila ga za favorizirajuću alokaciju javnih sredstava te zapošljavanje članova i podražavatelja stranke na vlasti.

**Key words:**

Public Management Reforms, Implementation Management, Social Services, Croatia, Party Patronage, Institutions, Actors, Political Metagovernance, Comparable Case Strategy, Processes

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## **List of abbreviations**

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| EU     | European Union   |
| HDZ    | Croatian Democratic Union  |
| IMF    | International Monetary Fund  |
| MFVAIS | Ministry of the Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity |
| NPG    | New Public Governance  |
| NPM    | New Public Management  |
| NWS    | Neo - Weberian State   |
| OECD   | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development                     |
| PWD    | Persons with disability  |
| RIA    | Regulatory Impact Assessment   |
| SDP    | Social Democratic Party  |
| UNDP   | United Nations Development Program   |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund   |
| USAID  | United States Agency for International Development                         |
| WTO    | World Trade Organization   |



# CHAPTER ONE

## INTRODUCTION

The study of public management and policy reforms is often divided between literature which traces different reform practices in developed, Western democracies, and that which addresses reforms in other contexts, including new democracies and countries in transition and post-conflict societies. Of course, any attempt to break down this distinction has to deal with the fact that the 'prevailing conditions' in different societies are very different. This means that reforms implemented in one setting can never be merely transplanted to another, without the specific historical legacies and political agency rendering the effects of these reforms very different. At the same time, models developed in one context do have an impact, albeit not always the desired one, when implemented elsewhere. In the end, understandings of real reform efforts can refine and elaborate models of the reform process and be relevant in a broader range of societies.

This dissertation aims to address what occurs in a young democracy such as Croatia in which the initial conditions of reform processes were to a large extent shaped by cumbersome transition and slow consolidation that were followed by a high level of political party penetration in state institutions and the public sector. As the patronage-driven strategy of the incumbents guided many executive decisions regarding the arrangements for provision of various public services, this dissertation asks what happens with policy implementation and service delivery when public management reforms 'meet' the politicized policy-making context. While focusing on services provided in the field of social policy, the dissertation seeks to describe, analyse and explain variations in reform results and to identify specific conditions that can account for the persistence of patronage practices within the reform processes.

The introductory chapter proceeds as follows. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 set the stage for the dissertation by briefly describing how political conditions have shaped public sector reforms in Croatia and elaborates on the problem of uneven reform results that has been evidenced in Croatian social policy. Next, section 1.3 elaborates on the research question(s) and the level of scientific ambition, and section 1.4 provides the overview of methodological approaches that are used to answer research questions. Finally, section 1.5 outlines the structure of the dissertation.

## 1.1 Politics and public sector reforms in Croatia

Since the country's independence, Croatian politics has been dominated by strong divisions based on symbolic issues revolving around the definition of statehood, interpretations of history and the role of religion and tradition in contemporary Croatian society (Šiber 2001; Zakošek and Čular 2004; Zakošek 2008; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; Henjak 2017). Even though these divisions were, in the first half of the 1990s, somewhat overshadowed by the atmosphere of state-building and war, they kept their prominence and shaped both the identification of voters and patterns of party competition. Due to that, and due to the combined effects of a strong semi-presidential system of government and an electoral system that produced majoritarian governments, partisan competition in the 1990s was characterized by bi-polarity in which the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) acted as the dominant right-wing party while successfully competing with several opposition parties, none of whom could gain the support of more than one third of centre-left voters.

In January 2000, after the death of Franjo Tuđman in December 1999, HDZ lost parliamentary elections for the first time to a Social Democratic Party (SDP)-led coalition of six parties which soon introduced a parliamentary system of government and an electoral system based on a mix of constituency and proportional representation. After these institutional changes, partisan competition consolidated into two multi-party blocs formed around HDZ on the one side and SDP on the other side, reflecting dominant ideological and identity divisions in society (Zakošek and Čular 2004; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; Henjak 2017).

With divisions between the two main political blocs fuelled by issues of history, religion and symbolic values, economic interests were never clearly articulated and never became the main subject of political contestation (Zakošek and Čular 2004; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013; Dolenc 2013b). This is not to say that economic and distributive issues were not electorally relevant. Poor economic performance, perception of incompetence and corruption, were relevant in terms of elections, but only in terms of driving mobilization or demobilization of support for government and opposition parties (Henjak 2008, 2011). In such a setting, parties were not held accountable for the policy outcomes they delivered but rather for how well they represented the expressive preferences of their voters. Even when parties had bad records of policy delivery or a record of using a policy for their own ends, the likelihood of electoral

punishment was increased only when a persistent stream of scandals and obvious negative outcomes became impossible to hide (Henjak 2017). All this created political conditions where parties are incentivized to use public policy and public management processes not to achieve collectively desired outcomes, but rather to highlight symbolic issues and send signals to their electorates that they support and implement their values.

The second, and for this dissertation even more important, issue which shapes conditions for public sector development in Croatia is the nature of Croatian political parties, or—to be more precise—of the party that has, thus far, governed Croatia for 20 out of 27 years of the country's independence. HDZ was formed in 1990s as a party with a clear objective of achieving independence from Yugoslavia through peaceful means. The party was also formed in a setting where everything was pointing to the likelihood of the process of resolution of the Yugoslav crisis turning into a long one, very likely ending in conflict.

This resulted in a party which established a strong hierarchical organization, with decision-making centralized at the top and with a wide network of territorial organizations covering every municipality and possibly every settlement (Čular 2005; Nikić Čakar 2013; Nikić Čakar and Čular 2017). After strong party organization was established, it needed to be maintained. The only way it could be maintained was to use government patronage at the national and local level to employ party activists of this large party organization in the public sector (Čular 2001; Henjak, Zakošek, and Čular 2013). This created a sort of a vicious cycle for HDZ where the state was used to support strong party organization through patronage and strong party organization was in turn used to support the electoral base and deliver electoral support.

Patronage in the form of public sector jobs, contracts and partnership agreements, combined with privileged access to policy benefits, was also used to support clientelistic groups that were organized in numerous and influential alliances, and were mostly recruited from the ranks of transition losers: participants in the war and war-disabled persons; families of war casualties; displaced persons; refugees; political prisoners; and emigrants from the ex-regime. These alliances and groups were, in turn, reinforcing a partisan message, or were sometimes acting as a proxy to advocate for something the party could not do itself (Kasapović 2001; Dolenc 2013a; Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). In the system of party patronage thus created, the party organization together with party affiliated groups were thus used to mobilize electoral support

on the ground or to provide representation of some segment of a society constituting the electoral coalition of the HDZ. When in power, other parties could not use this mechanism to the same extent, but parties with extensive organization did have incentives to use it to a degree in public companies and in local government.

The distortion of the effectiveness of democratic accountability mechanisms and the need to preserve or spread patronage practices within the public sector, among others, during the 1990s, resulted in a further strong centralization of the system of governing which disrupted the legacy of local self-governance inherited from socialism, and after 2000 acted as a platform for the development and reform of public sector organizations. The beginnings of the 1990s were marked by a strong politicization of public administration, with purges of 'unfit' judges and senior civil servants, mostly on the basis of national and party membership criteria.

After 1993, the politicization and growth of civil service positions were accompanied with limitation of the space for professionalism, the etatisation of public services that used to be provided by former local self-governing units and the establishment of a new regional self-governance (county) system with limited powers (Koprić 2008, 2009). The latter was designed as a counterbalance to historical regional (semi-) autonomous units that represented a 'logical' decentralizing framework and as a counterbalance to the power of urban centers which, on the whole, were less prone to support the ruling party, HDZ. Political elites then justified the break with socialist polycentric governance by arguing that the centralization of the state structure was necessary for the process of accomplishing independence and building a state (Petak 2006; Koprić 2016).

The sea-change, at least in terms of the general political climate regarding public sector reforms, came with the new millennium and the first shift of power which demarcated the beginning of a deeper democratization process and opened the space for the change of structures and processes within the public sector. One of the first of these changes was launched in 2001 with an ambitious “decentralization package” that was meant to devolve some parts of educational, social and health services to counties and cities (Perko-Šeparović 2001; Petak 2006, 2012). In this top-down reformist initiative, however, the central government failed to boost the fiscal and governing capacities of regional and local governments which, in turn, demonstrated a reluctance or inability to handle decentralized services (Petak 2012). Moreover, even though

the announcements of reform of the local governance system highlighted the devotion to comprehensive decentralization, this, as well as subsequent reform initiatives, were not substantiated by corresponding territorial re-organization nor by the investments in local and regional development. As a result, the Croatian state structure is still a form of qualified centralization with only a modest transfer of responsibility to a rather limited number of local units (Koprić and Đulabić 2017).

In 2004 Croatia was granted EU candidate status, and administrative reform became a part of the long-lasting accession process. Within that process, after regaining power in 2003 and holding it until the end of 2011, HDZ supported the transfer of management reform models and practices that were promoted and partly conditioned by the most relevant supranational actors. The modernization and professionalization of the civil service was promoted by the European Union and its member states, which led to the establishment of the civil servant training system, the improvement of administrative procedures and the adoption of a new legal framework enshrining the integrity, status and ethical standards of the civil service (Koprić et al. 2014; Marčetić 2013).

On the other hand, reform in the direction of greater efficiency, encouraged by the World Bank, insisted on the rationalization of the system (Pičuljan 2006). Even though it failed to foster the introduction of performance-related salaries, it paved the way for the establishment of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and strategic planning procedures. Several projects that led to the rather troublesome development of the current Croatian RIA framework were run by the government, but were at the same time heavily supported and inspired by USAID, UNDP, World Bank and, later on, the OECD and the European Union. (Petak and Petek 2010; Kekez 2016).

It was not until 2008 that reform objectives and mechanisms became part of a national strategic document<sup>1</sup>, which, among others, envisioned the integration of strategic planning and RIA toolkits into the budgeting and legislation cycles as well the introduction of public tendering

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<sup>1</sup> Strategija reforme državne uprave za razdoblje 2008.–2011. 2008. Vlada Republike Hrvatske

into the recruitment of top civil servants. Despite a general hesitation in the implementation of envisioned reform measures, the mentioned analytical tools have gradually - although still with very limited effects - become part of governing practices (Kekez 2016). On the other hand, the implementation of provisions restricting political discretion over appointments tackled only the top of the patronage iceberg and were very short-lasting (Koprić et al. 2014; Koprić 2016).

Moreover, as the recruitment of civil servants and implementation of examinations prescribed by adopted civil service laws were highly politicized, their operationalization was left to ministries and other state or local executive bodies responsible for hiring their own personnel (Koprić 2011; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016). In that way, despite the fact that in the last 15 years the Croatian public administration was constantly undergoing changes, the reform was driven by externally motivated and fragmented efforts, which therefore provided only limited and incoherent results.

## **1.2 The problem of uneven reform results in social services**

Lack of continuity and intrinsic motivation to improve governance practices was also reflected in the reforms that tackled the management of social services, as a core element of public administration (Koprić 2011). Croatian reform of arrangements for the provision of social services, left largely unchanged since the socialist times, started after the election in 2000 and was induced by the Europeanization process and assistance provided by international actors such as the World Bank and UNDP (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2007). Additional implementation reform incentives also originated from the changes in the socio-economic environment such as the ageing population, change of structure and role of the family within society, which created a need for novel solutions in the provision of social services (Dobrotić 2016b). The pressure was also mounting to introduce new forms of management due to the change of goals and instruments of social policy which – as a consequence of Europeanization – began to, discursively at least, focus more and more on the social inclusion of users (Petek 2011; Stubbs and Maglajlić 2012).

Various reformist packages affected services targeting all major social groups including older people, persons with disability, and children. The proclaimed objectives of the incumbents were: greater effectiveness, efficiency and, to an extent, equity. Whilst a ‘crowded playground’

(Arandarenko and Golicin 2007) of international actors emerged, there was general agreement on the needed reform and of the importance of decentralisation, diversification of providers (so-called 'de-etatisation), and community-based services and social planning. While the diversification of service delivery arrangements involved the promotion of non-governmental not-for-profit and, to an extent, for-profit, actors as service designers and providers, the introduction of bottom up planning was meant to lead to the transformation of institutional long-term care arrangements and the creation of alternative, community-based, modes of care provision. In a sense, this combined an emphasis on the introduction of competition in service provision with a focus on the design of more humane, people-centered services, at least at the level of rhetoric (Stubbs and Maglajlić 2012; Kekez-Koštro, Urbanc, and Salaj 2013).

At the level of practice, however, the reformist efforts were impeded as a result of the reluctance of elected officials to lead any policy or management changes that could undermine the existing patterns of clientelistic exchange with chosen target groups of specific social policies (Stubbs and Zrinščak 2015). Moreover, the reform process and results were also undermined by efforts invested by national and local politicians in spreading clientelistic networks across policies which were considered the appropriate platforms for the capture of public jobs, contracts, and partnership agreements, and for the consequent transformation of party members and supporters into providers of various public services (Hoffmann et al. 2017).

More than a decade after they were introduced, many reform packages in the provision of social services can be judged as having had limited and uneven results, and to have generated a number of unintended and unexpected consequences. Preliminary research (Kekez-Koštro, Urbanc, and Salaj 2013; Kekez 2014) which mapped the results of reform even indicated that while in some services the results that were there may have been a consistent adaptation of different reform principles, in others, on the other hand, the ruling party used reform for the distortion of implementation in line with patronage practices.

### **1.3 The research question and the level of scientific ambition**

This dissertation is an attempt to characterize and explain empirical variations in modes of implementation of different social services within the context of public management reforms in a patronage democracy. Given the initially documented differences in reformed implementation management of Croatian social services, three sub-questions are posed:

1. What kinds of implementation modes were produced by the reform of social services in Croatia?
2. Which factors can account for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform resulted in and, more specifically, for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management?
3. How does the clientelistic capture of service reform work?

The first research question addresses the effects that management reform can have in the governance context marked by politicized allocation of appointments and jobs in the public sector. By documenting and characterizing different modes of implementation that the reform of Croatian social services resulted in, we can describe the effects of management reform in a clientelistic policy-making context.

The second question addresses the factors most influential in shaping the process and results of management reform and, even more specifically, in preventing or enabling the occurrence of patronage practices in the reform process and resulting implementation mode(s). The ambition here is to deliver a causal explanation of the variation in reform results, with focus on the conditions that could be correlated with that variation.

The third question addresses the causal mechanism at work in the clientelistic distortion of reform processes and results. The aim is to move beyond simply describing a pattern of regular association between reform conditions and results in specific services, and thus open up the black box of causality to explain exactly how, in specific conditions, reform that is run by patronage-driven politicians can lead to the distortion of implementation in line with those patronage practices.



## 1.4 The use of qualitative methodological approach

In finding answers to posed research questions, this dissertation uses mixed-method design and combines approaches within the broad and eclectic field of qualitative methodologies. The overview of methodology used in the dissertation draws on the categorization, recently offered by Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst (2016b), which locates qualitative approaches in a two-dimensional conceptual field (see Figure 1). On the first dimension, approaches are categorized in relation to their ontological positions on the continuum between the holistic and particularistic pole. On this continuum, holism represents “the presumption that the interaction of units are strongly influenced by entire web of interaction, (...) and particularism signifies the claim that the individual units and their interaction traits are the sole or at least the main determinants of those interactions” (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a, p. xxi). In holism the whole thus has an ontological status on its own, while in particularism it is primarily conceived as a product of particular elements and their interplay.

The positioning of approaches on the second dimension refers to their differences in the basic epistemological principles. Within this dimension, one pole is represented by the principle of conceptual and theoretical coherence which is considered as the essential criterion in interpretative research approaches. The criteria which Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst see representing the opposing pole on this dimension is the principle of correspondence, often aligned with quantitative research and related positivistic “assumption that the truth of knowledge can be established in it fits with or correspondence to ‘objectively existing’ external reality” (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a, p. xxi). This criterium, as Blatter, Haverland and Hulst show, also functions as the underlying principle for qualitative approaches such as the comparative case strategy and qualitative comparative analysis.




Figure 1 Categorization of qualitative methodologies

Source: Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst (2016: xxi).

To find out the results of the service reform and the reasons for their occurrence, I will employ the comparable case strategy which seeks to specify factors or independent variables (X) that exhibit a causal power on an outcome (Y) while understanding causation as a regular pattern of association between X and Y (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Marini and Singer 1988). The key assumption of this approach is that regular conjunction between X and Y exists in the specified population of similar cases and works independently of other causal forces (Brady 2008; Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a).

This strong particularistic ontology is combined with a commitment to verify if the predicted hypothetical relationship between X and Y corresponds with empirical evidence, or to build the explanation of the causal relationship. While the explanation development occurs primarily through a theory-driven inductive strategy, the hypotheses on the relationship between X and Y in the deductive path can be derived from social science theories or can reflect the contested argumentation in the epistemic community (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a; George and Bennett 2005).

When tackling complex phenomena whose occurrence can hardly be explained by one independent variable, both inductive and deductive approaches in comparative case strategy can be facilitated by means of configurational or typological theorizing. According to George and Bennet (2005, p. 235), typological theory is:

a theory that specifies independent variables, delineates them into the categories for which the researcher will measure the cases and their outcomes, and provides not only hypotheses on how these variables operate individually, but also contingent generalizations on how and under what conditions they behave in specified conjunctions or configurations to produce and effect. We call specified conjunctions or configurations of the variables “types”.

In an inductive path, often taken in the early stages of a research of complex problems, a researcher aims to build a typological theory by conducting an empirical analysis of cases, but it does so within an existing theoretical framework. In a deductive path, a researcher also starts with the theoretical framework, but they specify it by assembling relevant theories and variables whose interaction can account for the particular type or types of outcome. These two paths, nevertheless, are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, depending on research goals or stages, many research projects combine inductive with deductive means of developing typological theories. Typological theorizing is also used in many research projects for the integration of comparative strategy with the within-case analysis; this in turn enables structured iteration between cases and theories (George and Bennett 2005; Diering 1979; Ragin 2014; Rihoux and Ragin 2008).

In order to describe the kind of implementation modes produced by the reform of social services in Croatia and explain the prevention or occurrence of patronage practices in the reformist initiatives and resulting implementation mode(s), this doctoral research constructs a typological theory and uses it deductively to design and structure the comparison of similar cases. The sequence in which I address the first two sub-questions (the first being “what” and the second one “why”) will enable me to approach the explanation of service management reform results in a configurational manner. The initial identification of distinctive modes of implementation that the service reform resulted in will enable me to start out with a Y-centered perspective while tracing back the configuration of factors (Xs) that may account for the variation in reform results. In this research path, cases will be decomposed into their theoretically meaningful components while the predicted hypothetical patterns of association between modes of implementation (Y) and causal factors X(s) will be verified and inferences made through the combination of cross-case perspective and within case complexity.

To find out how the clientelistic capture of reform works, a case (of course, if identified) in which comparative analysis indicates the occurrence of clientelistic reform capture will be further studied with the employment of causal process-tracing. In this single case method, the aim is to specify the temporal sequence and the causal mechanism that takes X to produce Y (Blatter and Haverland 2012; Bennett and Checkel 2014). The causal mechanisms here function as a specific type of causal configurations - a set of interlocking parts transmitting causal forces in a causal relationship between X and Y (Glennan 1996, 2002; Bunge 1997).

By focusing on causal mechanisms instead on variables that can be ruled out with comparative analysis, this approach moves away from the regularistic understanding of causality (Beach and Pedersen 2013). However, it does not fully depart from the particularistic ontology since the overall functioning of the mechanism is conceived as a sequential work of its parts. As such, causal process tracing can be aligned with the ontology that is positioned between the particularistic and holistic pole (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016a).

This qualitative approach takes the middle position also in respect to the underlying epistemological principles. The process-tracing logic and techniques can therefore be used to test if the theoretically-generated mechanism corresponds with empirical evidence and if it can be generalized within bounded context, but it can also be used to deepen the understanding of the relationship between factors of influence and outcomes (Blatter, Haverland, and Hulst 2016b; Beach and Pedersen 2013). As shown in Table 1, the theory-testing variant of process-tracing is applicable to situations in which the correlation between X and Y has been established and in which researchers have existing conjectures about the plausible mechanism or are in the position to derive the mechanism from existing theories and insights.

In situations in which the correlation between X and Y has been established, but researchers are in the dark regarding the potential mechanisms linking the two and cannot generate it from existing theory, they can use process-tracing to build a plausible hypothetical causal mechanism whereby X is linked with Y. Theory-building process-tracing can also be employed in situations in which researchers know the outcome (Y), but are unsure about its causes (X). The goal of such studies is then to uncover plausible causes and induce the causal mechanism. In addition, this methodological approach is correspondingly often used to explain a particular puzzling historical outcome by developing a minimally sufficient explanation in a single-case study (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

Table 1 Three variants of process-tracing: key features

|  | Theory-Testing  | Theory-Building  | Explaining-Outcome  |
|--|---|--|---|
| Purpose of analysis—research situation | <i>Situation one</i><br>Correlation has been found between X and Y, but is there evidence that there exists a causal mechanism linking X and Y? | <i>Situation two</i><br>Build a plausible causal mechanism linking X:Y based on evidence in case | <i>Situation three</i><br>Explain particularly puzzling historical outcome by building minimally sufficient explanation in case study |
| Ambitions of study                     | Theory-centric  | Theory-centric   | Case-centric  |
| Understanding of causal mechanisms     | Systematic (generalizable within context)   | Systematic (generalizable within context)  | Systematic, nonsystematic (case-specific) mechanisms and case-specific conglomerates  |
| What are we actually tracing?          | Single, generalizable mechanism   | Single, generalizable mechanism  | Case-specific, composite mechanism that explains the case   |
| Types of inferences made               | (1) Parts of causal mechanism present/absent<br>(2) Causal mechanism is present/absent in case  | Observable manifestations reflect underlying mechanism   | Minimal sufficiency of explanation  |

Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 21).

Even though both theory-building and outcome-explaining variants of process-tracing aim to develop the explanation for an outcome, the one produced through the latter variant includes not only systematic, but also non-systematic (case-specific) parts of the mechanism. Due to that, while the mechanism crafted through theory-building process-tracing is intended to be generalizable in an explicitly bounded context, the explanation offered by the outcome-

explaining variant cannot be detached from the case and the method can function only in stand-alone single case studies. On the other hand, both the theory-testing and theory-building variant of process-tracing are not intended to stand alone, but to contribute with their comparative advantages in the mixed-method studies which specify systematic elements of causal relationships (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

As the theorization on pathways through which the capture of service reform can occur in a clientelistic policy-making context is yet to be established, the comparative strategy in this mixed-method study will be complemented with the theory-building variant of process-tracing. The theorization and empirical investigation will be guided with the help of the framework developed by Beach and Pedersen (2013), illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2 Theory-building process-tracing

Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 17).



The theoretical framework and an a personal theoretical lens to be presented in the upcoming chapter will be used to structure the collection of wide-ranging empirical records in step 1, all of them related to the reform and provision of social service identifiable by comparative analysis as the case of a clientelistic capture. In step 2, the collected empirical evidence will be used to make inferences about manifestations of a plausible underlying causal mechanism that, in specific conditions, links the patronage-driven interest of politicians with the capture of the service reform and its results. Nevertheless, in this step, the empirically-based clues about the manifestation of this mechanism will be detected and accessed in the light of existing theories and insights. As Beach and Pedersen highlight (2013, 17-18)

Evidence does not speak for itself. Theory-building often has a deductive element in that scholars seek inspiration from existing theoretical work and previous observations...existing theory can be conceived as a form of a grid to detect systematic patterns in empirical material, enabling inferences about observable manifestations.

After structured analysis of the material collected, and after several iterations between collecting the “facts” of the case and inferring the existence of the mechanism’s observable manifestations, the empirical analysis will be concluded in step 3, with the secondary leap from observable manifestation towards the inference on the existence of parts of a plausible hypothetical mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013).

## **1.5 The structure of the dissertation**

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical framework and the model for the empirical analysis. After the overview of existing approaches, the chapter elaborates my own theoretical framework for the study of the results, of influential factors and of the process of the social service reform in a clientelistic policy-making context. Chapter 3 presents the research design, the case selection procedure, as well as the methods employed for data collection and analysis.

Chapters 4 and 5 contain the empirical analysis divided into two parts: in the first three sections of chapter 4, I study the effects that the management reform had on the provision of Croatian

social services. By combining within-case and cross-case analyses, I seek to characterize modes of implementation that were produced by the reform of selected social services. In the last section of chapter 4, I further investigate the selected services in order to validate and modify the proposed explanation of factors whose combination accounts for the presence or absence (prevention) of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management and for the variation in reform outcomes.

By building on the findings from the comparative study, in chapter 5 I select a service in which reform led to the most evident clientelistic distortion of implementation management. By using process-tracing techniques, I address the causal mechanisms through which, in a clientelistic policy-making setting, the reform governed by patronage-driven politicians can lead to distorted implementation, in line with patronage practices. Finally, chapter 6 provides overall conclusions.

## CHAPTER TWO

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As set out in the introductory chapter, this dissertation poses a three-part research question: ‘What kinds of implementation modes were produced by the reform of social services in Croatia; what factors can account for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform resulted in, and for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management; and how does the clientelistic capture of the reform work?’ This chapter presents both a theoretical framework and my own theoretical lens that will guide the empirical analysis.

The chapter is structured as follows: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 draw on existing theories and insights to provide an overview of three dominant public management reform doctrines and their ideal-type effects on public policy implementation. Section 2.3 synthesizes theories and evidence from public administration and public management, as well as public policy and comparative politics strands of literature whilst discussing numerous forces that can be at work in driving, guiding and restraining management change. Section 2.4 brings in the perspectives of governance theory and elaborates the public management process in the light of the metagoverning role that that political and administrative leaders can play in it. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 draw on existing literature’s predictions and offer specific theoretical angles for the study of results, influential factors and the process of the social service reforms in clientelistic policy-making context. These theoretical frames of reference are, then, operationalized in section 2.7.

#### **2.1 Public management reform models**

The growing complexity of collective problems and social needs aligned with pressures for cheaper and better public services have placed public management concerns high on political agenda in recent decades; all of this also generated a substantial amount of academic inquiry and thinking about the subject (Kettl 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Even though the quest to redefine the nature and role of the public sector in many democracies in North America and Western Europe in particular has led to often ambiguous and incoherent reform paths, it

sponsored three big reform paradigms that affected the study and reality of both public policy and public administration.

The first reform path was inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) thinking in the 1980s, and this sponsored a shift of the study and practice of public administration away from its traditional focus on organizational structure and behavior towards a more management-centered one (D. Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Lane 2000; Aucoin 1995). As a general doctrine, NPM envisioned effective, efficient and better-quality public services by proposing the replacement of hierarchy as the central coordinating mechanism with markets as well as the importation of businesslike concepts, values and tools into the functioning of public bureaucracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). For the real life of public administration and policy-making, NPM served as a whole set of not always mutually aligned reform strategies that were opening the public sector to more competition – both within and outside of government (Hood 1991; Pollitt 1995; Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; S. P. Osborne 2010).

From the administrative perspective, NPM implied the emphasis on responsiveness to service users and supplementation of input-based control typical of traditional public administration, only with output-based measurement and management (Hood 1991; Pierre 2012). The shift from adhering to arbitrary rules to achieving results was aligned with the introduction of more flexible forms of work into the public sector, as well as of a more disaggregated organization of service provision. Benchmarks, performance-related pay, organizational specialization and other private-sector management practices were not just promoted as efficient steering tools, but also as means for inducing public sector organizations and employees to compete against each other to provide better and cheaper services (Pollitt 1995; Grand and Bartlett 1993; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; S. P. Osborne 2010).

In order to foster internal, but also external competition, NPM proposed the separation of policy formation and policy implementation, steering the provision of a large portion of services towards private, non-governmental actors and relatively autonomous agencies within the public sector (Peters 2011; Pierre 2012). For policy design and implementation strategies, this implied the reduction of vertical control over the implementation process and the replacement of traditional hierarchical or bureaucratic policy tools such as regulations and public enterprises

by mainly market-based tools (Hood 1991; D. Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Ferlie et al. 1996). Selling public enterprises or their shares to the private sector was hence considered as a way to reduce the size and cost of the public sector by NPM promoters. In addition, by expanding the outsourcing of goods and services and public-private partnerships, this was presented as a logical consequence of efforts by the public sector to enhance not only the NPM-emphasized efficiency and effectiveness, but also flexibility and access to private-sector innovation, technology and expertise (Kettl 2010; Farneti, Padovani, and Young 2010; Ponomariov and Kingsley 2008; Hartmann and Patrickson 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

By organizationally distancing the implementation from policy-makers and by steering it toward “an arm’s length” away from organizations – or even away from public sector organizations – NPM has stimulated the efficiency and flexibility of the public service, but has at the same time worsened the problems of effectiveness and coordination of public policies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Lane 2000; Kettl 2000; Peters 2011; Pierre 2012; S. P. Osborne 2010). In dealing with the latter effects, governments became more and more aware during 1990s that leaving it to the discretion of the market system was just not enough (Hill and Hupe 2014). This implied that the privatization and initial elimination of rules in some policy areas needed to be accompanied by new regulation designed to protect public values (De Bruijn and Dicke 2006; Héritier 2002).

By means of outsourcing and via other NPM-inspired practices, governments were suggested to use the embedded market approach in which they were not only providing funds, selecting services to be outsourced, codifying criteria for the selection of providers and specifying terms of contracts, but were also monitoring providers’ operative conduct and endorsing policy outputs. In this way, despite of the NPM-introduced reduction of governmental control over the implementation process, it did not abandon the reliance on central steering throughout its evolution (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Hill and Hupe 2014).

A more substantial move away from the top-down practice and understanding of public management and public policy occurred during the 1990s with the second and still ongoing reform wave, recently labeled as the New Public Governance (S. P. Osborne 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Peters 2011), which searched for solutions to policy problems based on the inclusion of a wider spectrum of actors in the implementation processes, thus endorsing more

interactive forms of governance. Throughout its development, New Public Governance (NPG) broadened the goals of the network model while envisioning an improved effectiveness and democratic quality of public services. That is, NPG emerged from the network approach that moved the study and practice of public administration away from its focus on organizational and institutional changes within the public sector, towards the focus on changes in relations between the government and other actors (Klijn 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

A better inter-organizational coordination of policy design and delivery, as well as more informed and flexible solutions to complex policy problems were all to be reached by replacing hierarchies and markets as the central steering mechanisms with a networks of actors stemming from the government, market and civil society (Klijn 2012; Christensen and Læg Reid 2012). This reliance on networks in NPG is accompanied with the idea of working in partnerships toward producing joint results and with stress on citizen participation in both policymaking and delivery (Peters 2011; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Reliance on partnerships, it is considered, induces knowledge-sharing throughout the policy process, while co-production with citizens and their associations enables an injection of citizen values and priorities in the design and delivery of public services (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012; Ostrom 1996; Pestoff and Brandsen 2013).

Unlike NPM which applied competitive contracts to foster governmental flexibility without really abandoning a state-led approach, NPG endorsed the establishment of much more horizontal relationships between governmental and other social organizations (Klijn 2012; Peters 2011). The level of authority shared through this new relationship may vary, but even with the moderate inclusion of citizens in the governing process—like the one that comes with mere consultations—NPG is meant to enhance the legitimacy of governmental decisions and eases its implementation (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). To ensure intrinsic cooperation and participation, instead of precise specification of outputs and conduction of monitoring, NPG focuses on the building of trust, relations, and social capital (Hansen 2007; Hill and Hupe 2014; Klijn 2012; Agranoff 2007).

NPM and NPG, with an abundance of variations in the existing labels for the former, are often presented as two alternative general reform models in scholarly discussions. Many country- or area-specific models originating from empirical research or theoretical innovation are often

subsumed under or correlated with one of these two conceptual hubs. However, as the comparative research on reform results shows, reforms in many Northern and Western European countries can hardly be correlated with paradigms behind either of the two big models (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). These countries have proven to follow a modernisation path which does not imply distancing the public sector from the bureaucratic nature of governance and of the hierarchy of the traditional model of bureaucratic power. Even though continental modernizers have sometimes been qualified merely as guardians of the “status quo” or as stragglers reluctant to abandon the notion of the “old” hierarchy, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) see their path as a distinctive reform model and label it as the Neo-Weberian State (NWS).

The label itself expresses the conciliatory nature of this model which seeks to offer a solution of the tension between the quest for modernization and a devotion to preserve valuable Weberian foundations of public services such as “assumptions of a positive state, a distinctive public service and particular legal order” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011:120). For NWS modernizers the main task is thus to find a way to combine traditional values of public administration with new virtues of efficiency, responsiveness, flexibility and adaptability. This, from the policy perspective, implies not just reaffirmation of the role of the state as a driving force in facing challenges of modern society, but also the shift from rule following toward the holistic focus on meeting citizens’ needs. The NWS-inspired solutions to citizens’ needs can occasionally rely on the employment of market-based tools, but their core strength is in the professionalism and in the quality of the services which are designed and provided by the state. The incorporation of citizens’ perspectives in state-centered policy solutions in this reform model is meant to be ensured through the addition of participatory elements in decision-making, as well as in service delivery (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2008; Mazur and Kopycinski 2017).

Modernization of the Weberian administrative tradition, on the one hand, implies the renewal of the role that administrative law has “in preserving the basic principles pertaining to citizen-state relationship, including equality before the law, privacy, legal security and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of the state actions” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). This renewal, nevertheless, should not undermine the respect for the authority of administrative regulations and procedures, but it should stipulate the combined focus on inputs and results in the management of resources within government. In the combination of both ‘Weberian’ and ‘neo’

sides, NWS model seeks to preserve the distinctive status and the culture of public service, while simultaneously fostering the creation of citizens-oriented and professional bureaucracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2008; Lynn 2008).

The simultaneous existence and influence of these three distinctive reform models, whose key features are summarized in Table 2, indicates that with the start of the new millennium governments did become aware of the need to distinguish between what they are and what they are not able to achieve; between what society can legitimately expect from them and what it cannot; and between what might be left to the market and what are areas in which the government should retain full responsibility (Hill and Hupe 2014).

Table 2 Public management reform models: key features

|                               | <b>Traditional Public Administration</b> | <b>New Public Management</b>                                | <b>New Public Governance</b>                                  | <b>Neo-Weberian State</b>                       |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| <b>Main goal:</b>             | Legitimacy and compliance                | More effective, efficient and better-quality public service | More legitimate, inclusive, flexible and effective government | Modernized Weberian tradition of public service |
| <b>Coordinating mechanism</b> | Hierarchies                              | Markets   | Networks  | Hierarchies                                     |
| <b>Management style</b>       | Bureaucratic                             | Post-bureaucratic, competitive                              | Post-competitive, collaborative                               | Professional-bureaucratic                       |
| <b>Key management tool</b>    | Rules and input-based tools              | Benchmarking and other output-based tools                   | Public participation and trust                                | Rules in combination with outputs               |
| <b>Key Policy Tool</b>        | Direct provision by government           | Contract-out to private entities                            | Co-production with citizens and their associations            | Professional and inclusive direct provision     |

Source: adapted from Howlett, Kekez, and Poocharoen (2017: 489).



Although the three big reform models have induced the creation of different management and policy tools, or of different arrangements of older instruments as means of surmounting existing policy problems and improving policy outcomes, what they have in common is the focus on action (Hill and Hupe 2014; Howlett, Kekez, and Poocharoen 2017). This focus is characterized as a fundamental characteristic of government transformation into governance and of an entry into, as Hill and Hupe (2014) call it, the contemporary governance paradigm.

## **2.2 Ideal-type results of public management reform**

As a consequence of the parallel influence of the above-described reform models, the contemporary age of governance—if using the term in the sense of the contemporary phase in the evolution of Western government (Hill and Hupe 2014)—is marked by a wide range of practices with the existence of multiple governance modes, rather than of a single one (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Accordingly, Pierre and Peters (2000) developed three scenarios in which three big reform models lead to these corresponding modes of governance in Western democracies: "reasserting control": "letting other regimes rule"; and "communitarianism, deliberation and direct democracy". Along a similar line, Hill and Hupe (2014) recognize three modes of governance which follow the threefold distinction between hierarchy, market and networks and which can be aligned with the aforesaid big reform models.

The first mode is the one of governance by authority, in which the government takes the role of a CEO while focusing on government regulation and on issuing orders. The second mode is labeled as governance by transaction, with the main stress on the creation of a framework within which other actors may carry out activities and government can evaluate them. In this mode, it is the government that takes the role of a regulator and complements it with the role of inspector as vertical connections become looser. The third mode is governance by persuasion, when government acts as a chairman by fostering participation of other actors in the policy process.

The plurality of governance modes is especially evident in the implementation of public policies and delivery of public policy. So as to demonstrate this, Hill and Hupe (2014) elaborated 'enforcement', 'performance' and 'co-production' as modes of implementation congruent with the three reform doctrines, and the corresponding governance modes. By conceptualizing implementation as the management of the process leading to the realization of policy

expectations or goals, Hill and Hupe (2014) showed how each of the three implementation modes implies distinctive management activities at different action scales (see Table 3). Modes of implementation thereby differ in the management of the policy process (at the system scale), the management of inter-organizational relations (at the scale of organizations), and in the management of internal and external relations (at the scale of an individual) (Hill and Hupe 2014, p. 186).

Table 3 Modes of implementation in the context of management reforms

| <b>Background reform model</b>                   | <b>Neo-Weberian state</b>  | <b>New Public Management</b>   | <b>New Public Governance</b>                                       |
|--|--|--|--|
| Fitting governance mode                          | Governance by authority  | Governance by transaction  | Governance by persuasion   |
| Fitting governance role                          | ‘CEO’  | Regulator and Inspector  | ‘Chairman’   |
| <b>Fitting mode of implementation</b>            | <b>‘Enforcement’ (Management via inputs)</b>   | <b>‘Performance’ (Management via outputs)</b>                                  | <b>‘Co-production’ (Management via outcomes as shared results)</b> |
| <b>Operational activities</b>                    |  |  |  |
| <i>Managing policy process</i>                   | Making mandates explicit   | Creating ‘interfaces’  | Appealing for responsibility                                       |
| <i>Managing inter-organizational relations</i>   | Creating clarity on tasks and competences<br>Taking care of sufficient resources<br>Enhancing motivation and internalization | Enhancing contract compliance<br>Enhancing and maintaining service orientation | Realizing partnerships<br>Enhancing professionalization            |
| <i>Managing (internal and external) contacts</i> | Realizing compliance to standard operating procedures<br>Leadership and training on the job                                  | Rewarding target compliance  | Organizing response  |
| Central management mechanism                     | Rules  | Contract   | Trust  |

Source: with adaptation from Hill and Hupe (2014: 187).

In the enforcement mode which is congruent with the NWS doctrine and governance-by-authority, the central government maintains monopoly over public services, and operational activities are managed within a hierarchical setting. With managerial reliance on inputs, management of the policy process is focused on the assignment of explicit mandates for the implementation of a particular policy. These mandates are, in the management of inter-organizational relations, further clarified and substantiated with sufficient resources. With hierarchical vertical connections and rules as a central management mechanism, management of inter-personal contacts is focused on internalization of regulations, and standard operating procedures. Compliance with the rules is ensured through provision of leadership and training on the job (Hill and Hupe 2014; Hupe and Hill 2007). Nevertheless, in the NWS-inspired modernization of resources management within the government sector, strict reliance on rule-following in this implementation mode is to a limited extent complemented by the focus on achievement of results and on meeting citizens' needs (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2008).

The NPM doctrine and the governance-by-transaction mode give to implementation management the performance perspective in which output-based performance management becomes central. For policy process management, this implies the emphasis on the creation of a framework and interfaces for competitive contracting of public services production (Hill and Hupe 2014). While the given framework enables arrangements with various private, public or non-profit contractors, relations with the selected ones are defined through contracts specifying not only costs, but also performance targets and output standards (English and Guthrie 2003; Pierre and Peters 2000; Pollitt 2003). Within this setting, the management of inter-organizational relations is oriented towards ensuring contract compliance. Along the same line, the management of interactions implies the reliance on results-oriented personnel management and the creation of incentives for the prevalence of service orientation (Hill and Hupe 2014; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Thomann, Hupe, and Sager 2017).

Lastly, the NPG model and governance-by-persuasion are operationalized through a co-production mode that places focus on collectively defined outcomes whose achievement relies on synergy between different levels of government, as well as public and non-public actors (Hill and Hupe 2014; Alford 1998; Poocharoen and Ting 2015). At the system level, co-production implies managerial activities through which a government enables a meaningful

participation of other actors in the implementation process. At the level of inter-organizational relations, these activities are followed by the management of the networks created, but also by nurturing concrete manifestations of implementation partnerships.

Achieving synergy rather than competitiveness among participating actors is fostered by the use of trust and shared values as the principal management mechanisms. The same mechanisms are also employed at the individual level in which co-production is materialized through focus on professionalization in the management of internal contacts and the adoption of a user-centred approach in managing external contacts (Hill and Hupe 2014). The latter includes the engagement of citizens in design and delivery of a professionally produced service. In this manner, via their input, citizens may contribute not only to a service which they personally, but also preform activities complementary to the core mission of the service-providing organization (Brandsen and Honingh 2015).

The multiple-scale approach on implementation management proposed by Hill and Hupe (2014) corresponds with the contextualized working of reform processes which can result in both congruous and incongruous modes of implementation in practice. This means that more than one mode may be prevalent in a single state. Moreover, Hupe and Hill (2014) themselves point out that multiple modes of operational governance can be present in one policy area, or even in one specific policy in which, e.g., the performance mode on the individual street-level of implementation can co-exist with the enforcement mode of inter-organizational relations.

In addition, simultaneous focus on actors, activities and scales of action (system, organisation and individual) enables a systematic and process-oriented exploration of implementation management which goes beyond the contestation between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives on policy implementation (Hill and Hupe 2014, 2006). Preoccupied with ways to face “what they regard as defects in the implementation process, both perspectives concern themselves with efforts to increase the capacity to steer the policy processes, either from the top or the bottom” (Hill and Hupe 2006, p.571).

On the contrary, the focus on implementation management lowers the risk of being trapped in the analysis of a success or a failure in the achievement of expected policy goals. It also provides a basis for theory-driven and yet contextual explanations in which the implementation process

is conceived as the dependent variable in the public management reform process. In this respect, this dissertation treats the aforementioned three modes of implementation as the ideal-type forms of results of a management reform. They are used as a heuristic device and thus form a grid with the purpose to detect and characterize empirical variations of the dependent variable.

### **2.3 Forces behind the public management reform**

Goals and management tools introduced either by means of one reform or by a fusion of more reform models undoubtedly have significant impact on implementation modes that the public management reform can result in. Nevertheless, the choice of a particular model and its materialisation into implementation modes in practice also is also determined by numerous forces that can be at work in driving, guiding and restraining management change (Christensen and Lægreid 2012).

After the analysis of public management reforms in 12 Western democracies, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) offered the public management reform framework (see Figure 3) in which they apply a top-down approach to the reform process by attributing executive politicians and/or senior civil servants a key role in conceiving and executing the change of public management. Although it is central for the adoption of a specific reform package, elite decision-making is surrounded by three large groups of factors, including the background socio-economic influences, political pressures and features of administrative system. It is the interplay between these factors that shapes the decisions of the policy-making elite and, consequently, leads to different paths and results of management change.

The first group of factors includes the effects of global economic forces and national socio-demographic aspects that provide incentives for politicians and civil servants to look for ways of easing the strain on the system. The second cluster of factors concerns structural and dynamic elements of the political system. While the former refers to general features of a system, such as the type of executive government, the latter encompasses the influx of management reform ideas combined with the pressure from citizens and party-political ideas. In taking a broader view, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) attribute the upsurge of reforms in the last 30 years to socio-economic factors and to the supply of management reform ideas. On the other hand, political system actors, particularly groups with a vested interest in the status quo, can act not only as

sources of incentives, but may also demonstrate a lack of interest for management reform, or even recalcitrance to change. Resistance to change can also originate from the third group of factors which encompasses cultural, structural and institutional characteristic of the administrative system, often proven difficult to transform in more than merely incremental ways.

The overview of forces behind the public management reform in this section draws on Pollitt and Bouckaert's conceptualization of three groups of influential factors (see Figure 3). In the section ahead, specific factors within each group are elaborated through the lens of existing theories, but also based on evidence from public administration and public management, public policy and comparative politics strands of literature.




Figure 3 A framework of public management reform: focus on factors

Source: Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011: 33).



### **2.3.1 Forces behind the reform: focus on socio-economic factors**

The group of factors represented in Box A of Figure 3 involves diverse socio-economic forces that usually function as background conditions or drivers of public management reform. On a more general level, this cluster of factors entails mainly structural socio-economic features of a society such as population size and structure or macro-economic cycles and features, which do have an influential, although not a defining role in setting the climate for public management reform. On a more specific level, among other structural socio-economic features, Pollitt and Bouckaret (2011) identify global economic forces (Box B of Figure 3) and socio-demographic change (box C in Figure 3) as the background pressures which can have distinctive impact on public administration in a country.

The influence of economic globalization is the most determining factor for the initiation of public management reforms. This can be perceived as the response to the effects of a country's exposure to international economic upturns and downturns, or as the solution to problems induced by economic competition and market pressure (Christensen and Lægheid 2012). The globalization of capital markets and the intensification of international trade and competition over the past few decades has only limited the scope of macro-economic measures that national governments can employ when addressing unemployment and other social risks, but also encouraged the quest for lighter bureaucratic burdens on the private sector and for more competitiveness of the public or semi-public firms. After the global economic crisis of 2008, when democracies all over the globe faced severe imbalances of public budgets, the call for public sector reform became more and more widespread and often associated with the demand for restrictions in public spending (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

The latter demand, as emphasized by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), is often challenged or counterbalanced with the need to address social risks amplified by the same economic crises or induced by changes in the pattern of life and in the definition of social rights in modern societies. While the first group of risks primarily refers to job insecurity, unemployment and poverty, the latter two groups most notably entail the increased share of elderly people in our populations, changed family structure with more single-parent or single-person households and a broader scope of social rights granted to different segments of population including children,

persons with disability, minorities, etc. Even though each of these socio-demographic changes had a different prevalence in different countries, in many developed and young democracies they resulted in the rise of demand for public services and transfers in the social, health and educational policies.

The economic and socio-demographic background pressures described do function as a strong impetus for the initiation of management and policy reforms, but at the same time have a merely indirect impact on patterns of change. This indirect impact is achieved through foreground socio-economic policy and political priorities (Box D of Figure 3) which reflect the background pressures and the pursuit of which can have decisive effects on the way the public sector is organized and managed. Devotion to the fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence criteria in many EU member states, for example, was often followed by downsizing or reshaping welfare policies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In most cases the later was achieved not only through redefinitions of their elements, of eligibility or the coverage of social services and transfers, but also through reorganization of the ways in which services were managed and provided. Among other formats, savings were sought via pluralization of service providers or a stronger reliance on voluntary inputs of communities and citizens in service delivery. The focus on public debt control as a macro-economic policy priority thereby affected not only a state's welfare measures, but also its state apparatus mandated with the delivery of these measures.

The striving for public-expenditure cuts or for the increased competitiveness of the public sector—both of which are aligned with the NPM-thinking—have quite often provoked reform in public administration practices, as well as in the implementation of public policies, but they did not straightforwardly lead toward NPM-inspired reforms in most countries. In a climate of budget cuts, the need to address high unemployment rates or the growth in the number of retired persons during the last decade often provided strong incentives for many governments to seek reform strategies to enable them to ease the strains on the state apparatus while maintaining the quality of public services. The timing, scope, content and the fate of these strategies, nevertheless, varied significantly from country to country and in many countries was to a large extent shaped by the interplay between another two elements: political and administrative clusters of influential factors (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Christensen and Lægreid 2012).

### **2.3.2 Forces behind the reform: focus on political factors**

A second cluster of factors that can have a decisive influence not only on the emergence management reform, but also on its course entails structural and dynamic features of the political system represented by Box of Figure 3 (including Boxes K, G and H). Among structural, constitutional and more general functional characteristics, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) identify the state structure and the nature of the executive government as those with the biggest impact on the speed and the scope of management reform. Their comparative research has shown that in highly centralized and unitary states (e.g. UK or New Zealand) in which the decision-making power of central government is not shared with other tiers or bodies of government, management reforms tend to have a broader scope and a more uniformed character than those reforms conducted in decentralized states, be it unitary or federal ones. In contrast, reforms in highly decentralized states (e.g. Germany, Australia and Belgium), often resemble experimental reform sites as different entities or tiers of government tend to diverge not only in their aspirations, but also in the adopted paths or management reform timing (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Schröter and Wollmann 1997; Halligan and Power 1992; Brans, Visscher, and Vancoppenolle 2006).

State structure and the constitution usually act in combination with the nature of executive government at the national level, a feature illustrative for the principles by means of which a political system operates, as well as of habits of government. Ranging from majoritarian principles associated with single-party governments or governments with bare majority, toward consensual conventions linked with minority cabinets or grand coalitions (Lijphart 1984, 2012), the nature of executive government can significantly affect the process and the results of management reform. Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) comparison of the reform process led by majoritarian systems (Australia, Canada, New Zealand until 1996 and the UK) with the ones conducted in consensual regimes (Finland, Italy and the Netherlands) showed that the form of the political executive affects not only the leeway that the executive can have when launching the reform, but it also has an impact on the stability of the reform process and its potential to induce the sense of 'ownership'.

Whilst deep and swift changes proved to be most politically feasible for majoritarian governments in centralized countries, managerial novelties adopted by single-party government were not necessarily considered legitimate by public servants supposed to implement them, nor were they necessarily maintained after the party that promoted them lost power. On the other hand, new managerial values and ideas—particularly those inspired by NPG—adopted through the consensus of diverse political entities and interests proved to have a smaller scope, but stronger prospects for internalization and sustainability in the implementation phase. In the middle of those two extremes, there is also a mixed category with countries that, for example, have an intermediate political regime (e.g. France) and are qualified with moderate scope and speed of reform, or that have an extensively decentralized state structure (e.g. Germany) which can outweigh the leadership of a strong or homogenous executive in carrying out the uniformed reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 2017).

By setting the boundaries for politically feasible management change, state structure and the nature of executive government jointly determine the ability of political and administrative leaders for swift or decisive adoption of reforms. When affecting elite decision-making, nevertheless, these two structural features of the political system act in combination with its more dynamic counterparts. For Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), the most noteworthy among them is the influx of new management ideas (Box F of Figure 3), pressure from citizens (Box G of Figure 3) and party-political ideas (Box H of Figure 3). In the interplay between ideational and political factors, decisions made by political and administrative leaders are the most straightforwardly influenced by political ideas of the ruling party – or parties. Even though such ideas may derive from a specific ideology or political agenda developed by party activists, they are in practice often driven by inputs from the electorate and molded by management advice that decision-makers are exposed to.

As public management reform has become a fashionable topic of inquiry over last three decades, management advice to the political executive is not only provided by senior public servants or political advisors, but also by academic specialists, independent consultants, business corporations, think tanks and other types of reform entrepreneurs. The role of diverse reform intermediaries has become even more prominent during the 1990s with the internationalization of management reform and consequent engagement of various international organizations such as the OECD, World Bank, IMF, WTO and the EU in the provision of

management ideas and advice. Among them, the OECD and its Public management service (PUMA) stipulated substantial inter-country borrowing among prosperous democracies of Europe, Australasia and North America, while the IMF and World Bank have been influential advice-providers for governments of many a young democracy (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002).

For governments in transitional societies, international bodies often acted as the sources of external pressure and providers of myths on most appropriate reformist ideas and tools. During the 1990s these myths mostly endorse the imitation of NPM reforms originating from Anglo-Saxon countries, but after the 2000s the ideological domination of managerialist approach was challenged by the emergence of myths inspired by other management doctrines (Christensen and Lægreid 2012; Sahlin-Andersson 2001). In the post-communist EU member and candidate states, significant role was played by the EU which, often in cooperation with OECD or World Bank, provided support for management reform through technical assistance (the OECD SIGMA program) or through various funding schemes. By aligning membership conditionality with the creation of a legal framework to enshrine a stable and professional administration, the EU was also directing Central and Eastern European governments toward the adoption of reform models prevalent in continental Europe. EU conditionality, however, was effective only till the accession was granted, while in candidate countries it was often counterbalanced by political disinclination toward civil service legislation and concurrent disposition toward businesslike reform approaches (Verheijen 2012; Dimitrova 2002).

Although the proposal or validation of reform strategies seldom gets in the prime focus of public discussions, advocacy campaigns or media front pages, citizens can still generate the relevant and, on occasions even vital, pressure for management change. On a more general level, such pressure can be exerted by expressing dissatisfaction with the speed, flexibility, equity and other standards of services provided or financed by the state. To function as the driver of reform, citizens' discontent need not be - and it is often not - accompanied by specific proposals for change; it also need not be communicated directly to the decision-making elite. Local or national political representatives can act as effective messengers in such cases, while media or civil society organizations may reinforce citizens' pressure and articulate reform suggestions.

As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) highlight, the strength of citizens' pressure often increases with the incidence of chance events (Box I of Figure 3) such as scandals, disasters and accidents, as such occurrences tend to shift the focus of public attention towards the quality, equity or accountability issues in public management. By shedding light on the dysfunctionalities of existing governance regimes, such events may even trigger a wider public outcry for management reforms.

Whilst citizens can generate important reform stimuli in their general electorate role, in the role of target population for specific public policies, they can also affect party-political ideas on reforms that may be adopted within particular policy areas. Politicians and, more importantly, elected officials, have various incentives when engaging in the policy process, but two motives among them are the most prominent. One of them is to govern design and implementation of public policies that will assist them in their (re)election, and the other is to accomplish effectiveness in addressing widely-acknowledged public problems (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997). Access of target group(s) to sources of political power such as votes, money, and propensity of a group to mobilize and act—if regarded in the light of potential electoral implications—is of vital importance as it stimulates political parties to develop those policy and management ideas which provide political opportunities and discourage them from actions aligned with political risks.

In competitive party democracies, the interplay between pressure from citizens-voters and party-political ideas is most vividly reflected in strategic linkages that politicians and parties develop with citizens in general or with subsets of citizens as those target populations of specific public policies. As they have the potential to either boost or undermine the process and the effects of management reform, the types of strategic linkages and their implications for public management reform, as evidenced by different strands of literature are summarized in Table 4 and elaborated in the text that follows it.

Table 4 Types of citizen-politician linkages and their implications for management reform

|   | <b>Strategic citizen – politician linkages</b>  |   |   |  |
|---|---|---|---|--|
|   | <i>Programmatic valence policy competition</i>  | <i>Programmatic policy competition</i>  | <i>Clientelistic policy competition</i>   | <i>Clientelistic patronage</i>   |
| <b>Focus of electoral mobilization strategy</b>               | General electorate  | Target populations of specific policies   | Target populations of specific policies   | Individual citizens  |
| <b>Contingency of exchange and modes of party competition</b> | No contingency, politicians compete by demonstrating own abilities to successfully provide public goods                           | Spatial or directional competition based on indirect unconditional exchange   | Competition based on conditional and direct exchange  | Allocation of valuable and rare goods as the reward for loyalty or payments for past political support   |
| <b>Nature of goods offered to voters</b>                      | Collective goods that are favored by and accessible to the whole polity   | Club goods that are typical part of (re)distributive policies)  | Club goods mainly in a form of highly selective benefits  | Private goods, primarily appointments and jobs in the public sector  |
| <b>Implications for public management reform</b>              | Mobilization of public opinion for the public management change may induce politicians to demonstrate of commitment to the reform | Politicians are inclined to support adoption of management reforms, especially in policies highlighted by their programmatic strategy | Reformist initiatives are often countervailed with reluctance of politicians and groups with a vested interest in the preservation of high political discretion | Widespread patronage generates resistance to management reform, and can even incentivize politicians to engage in the politicized re-engineering of reform ideas |

Source: elaborated by author based on Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Cruz and Keefer (2015), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), Kopecký et al. (2016), Chandra (2007), Grindle (2012), Peters (2010b).

When appealing to the general electorate, politicians tend to mobilize voters by promising them successful delivery of collective goods favored by and accessible to the whole polity. In this mode of strategic linkages, which Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) refer to as the programmatic valence policy competition, politicians compete not by promising different packages of preferred public goods, but by demonstrating own abilities to successfully provide them. Such electoral mobilization strategy is mainly focused on the salient issues such are the employment, national security, monetary stability, or national health care. Nevertheless, mobilization of public opinion for public management change may induce politicians to appeal to citizens by demonstrating commitment to a more accountable, effective or hospitable public administration (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

When the mobilization strategy is focused on target populations of specific policies, on the other hand, the goods being offered to voters have the nature of club goods which include, but are not limited to, differential access to social insurance benefits, tax schemas and other, categorical social benefits. Club goods are typically part of redistributive policies providing benefits to one and imposing burdens to other categories of citizens. When developing voter mobilization strategy focused on such goods, politicians can choose between a programmatic or a clientelistic linkage with targeted constituencies. The choice of the former, which Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) refer to as the programmatic policy competition, implies spatial or directional competition with other parties based on the offer of distributive policies targeting voters with different policy preferences. The choice of the clientelistic strategy, on the other hand, implies party competition based on conditional exchange. Politicians thus offer the provision of of highly selective benefits to targeted groups of citizens and expect political support in the form of votes or various contributions to political party in return.

When becoming office incumbents, parties that have opted for the programmatic path will frame the design and implementation of policies to achieve indirect exchange with their constituencies while hoping that policy outcomes will ensure sufficient support for the re-election of their party. In the application of rules guiding the distribution of benefits and costs, party preferences of policy implementers and beneficiaries will not affect their status. Clientelistic office holders, on the other hand, will engage in the formulation and implementation of policies mainly to ensure the conditions for direct and contingent exchange with their clients. By favoring ambiguous rules to allow them significant discretion over the



implementation process, they try to maintain the large leeway for politicized tailoring of benefits to the needs of targeted citizens whose voting behavior can be predicted and monitored (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Piattoni 2001).

The choice between these two strategies can significantly affect the fate of the public management reform. As evidence from studies encompassing both large and smaller samples of countries suggests, political systems in which public sector reforms were evaluated as more or less successful are characterized by the prevalence of programmatic parties (Cruz and Keefer 2015; Geddes 1996). In countries ruled by parties that tend to opt for the clientelistic mode of electoral mobilization, on the other hand, reformist initiatives are often countervailed by the reluctance of politicians and groups with a vested interest in the preservation of high political discretion (Cruz and Keefer 2015; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). By analyzing evaluations of World Bank public sector reform loans in over 100 countries, Cruz and Keefer (2015) even evidenced the smallest chances of success for those reform meant to increase the transparency of public sector financial management.

Additionally, public management reforms efforts can be significantly undermined by a particular kind of clientelistic practices referred to as the party patronage in which allocation of valuable, rare and private goods occurs in retail transactions to individual citizens who receive those goods as a reward for loyalty or payments for past support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 2007). Even though the wide list of goods that can be exchanged through this type of citizens-politicians linkage encompasses public service projects and contracts, personal rewards and gifts, as well as privileged access to medical care, land or housing, a more precise definition limits the concept to its most widespread form which refers to the politicized allocation of appointments and jobs in the public and semi-public sector (Kopecký and Spirova 2011; Kopecký et al. 2016). In its latter meaning, party patronage is closely linked with the phenomenon labeled by public administration literature as the politicization of civil service which in its most dominant interpretation refers to the replacement of merit-based criteria with political ones in the recruitment and management of public servants (Peters and Pierre 2004; Dahlström and Niklasson 2013; Rouban 2012).

When strictly bound to politicization of civil servants' careers and activities, however, patronage neither has to be clientelistic, nor does it directly lead to illegal or corruptive practices. Public jobs allocated through patronage may undoubtedly be used as a resource for vote-buying and building the network of loyal party supporters. On the other hand, it can also function as a management tool used by political leaders to gain or maintain control over the state apparatus and public policies. Political appointees can therefore be placed or employed in core civil service, state-owned companies, agencies or even in organizations contracted by the government not just to receive a reward for their political support, but also to guarantee the design and implementation of public policies that will correspond with politicians' aims (Kopecký and Spirova 2011; Kopecký et al. 2016).

These two motivations can function both separately and combined and, as recent research on patronage conducted in 22 countries demonstrated, the pattern of patronage tends to be linked to its scope (Kopecký et al. 2016). In political systems in which politicization is limited to senior positions in civil service, patronage is mainly motivated by the desire to control the bureaucracy so that political appointees act as high-ranked intermediaries between politicians and the state apparatus. On the other hand, in polities characterized by substantial politicization which spreads wide across and deep into state institutions, patronage tends to simultaneously function as a control and electoral resource. Political appointees in such systems mainly act as parts of a network of political activists and supporters which penetrate the state apparatus, while enabling the party not only to pursue its policy goals, but also to capture state resources for clientelistic purposes (Kopecký et al. 2016).

Clientelistic deals through which jobs are given to political allies are widespread in countries with high levels of economic inequality and job instability, with the latter exhibiting the tendency to amplify the value of public employment. The inclination to engage in patronage practices of this type can nevertheless be found among political actors in most advanced democracies, at the local level in particular, and it can lead to ethically problematic or even illegal practices (Rouban 2012; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Keefer 2007). Patronage-driven elected officials have been argued to need opportunities for retail transactions and are consequently incentivized to engage in the distortion of policy design and implementation (Ruth forthcoming; Chandra 2007). Proven to be a highly adaptive strategy of electoral mobilization, patronage can not only generate resistance to management reform, but can even incentivize

politicians to engage in the re-engineering of reform ideas and tools so as to fit in their rent-seeking needs (Grindle 2010, 2012; Peters 2010b).

### **2.3.3 Forces behind the reform: focus on administrative factors**

While political system actors, particularly groups with a vested interest in the status quo, can act not only as sources of incentives, but may also demonstrate a lack of interest or recalcitrance for management reform, resistance to change can also originate from the administrative group of factors represented by Box K for Figure 3. This broad group of factors entails cultural, structural and institutional characteristic of the administrative system in which the reform takes place, and which often proves difficult to transform in more than merely incremental ways (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

Cultural features primarily refer to the dominant philosophy and beliefs of administration gradually institutionalized into historical-cultural traditions while constraining or directing pathways of management reforms (March and Olsen 1989; Christensen and Læg Reid 2012). Administrative traditions differ among countries, and even among sectors and organizations in a single country, but over the course of the past 30 years some general patterns of their impact on management reforms were distinguished (Christensen and Læg Reid 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). While the pragmatic administrative culture of Anglo-American countries (Australia, New Zealand, UK and USA) proved to be a conducive context for the far-reaching reforms inspired by the NPM doctrine, the legalistic traditions of Continental European and Scandinavian countries served as better ground for the incremental modernization of traditional bureaucracies either with managerial (e.g. France, and later on, Belgium and Germany below the federal level) or more participatory (e.g. Finland, the Netherland) tools (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Peters 2010b).

Lower levels of enthusiasm for sweeping reformist initiatives were also evidenced among Southern European countries (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) in which new management ideas had to be reframed in order to fit the legalistic thinking. Reformist initiatives in these countries were primarily inspired by managerial ideas and tools, but modernization was impeded with the formalism and the politicization of administration (Ongaro 2009; Christensen and Læg Reid 2012). The potential of administrative tradition to undermine reform efforts was

even more prominent in developing countries, such as those in Africa and in parts of Latin America, in which the functioning of a highly legalistic bureaucratic apparatus is not supported by an appropriate cultural infrastructure. As civil sector politicization in such regimes, a phenomenon dubbed by Fred Riggs (Riggs 1964) as ‘prismatic’ administrations, tends to be followed by a the mismatch between the rules-in-form and the rules-in-use, the reforms were rarely implemented as formally announced (Peters 2010b).

The combination of politicization and administrative ‘double talk’ also constrained the enforcement of reform packages adopted in post-communistic states of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union during 1990s and 2000s. Bureaucracies in communistic systems of governance primarily functioned as executive machines of communistic parties and thus developed and maintained extensive formal structures, but lost large portions of impersonality and authority (Peters 2010b; Verheijen 1995). Following the initiation of transition, post-communistic administrative systems were left with the lack of policy-making capacities and a damaged reputation in the society. In the states of Central/East Central Europe such legacy seriously undermined EU-conditioned attempts to depoliticize civil service and model its architecture after traditional European bureaucracies, while in most states of former Soviet Union it allowed for the occurrence of troubled cohabitation between performance-based and law-based approach.

The former Yugoslav states were an exception from this pattern, as the notion of professional civil service was preserved there. Such legacy of the socialist administrative system made these states more confident in public sector solutions and more receptive toward administrative models and modernization approaches prevailing in Continental European countries. However, the conducive conditions for the consisted incremental change of formalized civil service systems in the Western Balkans countries were often countervailed with the tradition and the practice of civil service politicization due to which--just like in other transitional states—political leaders displayed low interest in any changes that could decrease their ability to interfere into public sector employment (Verheijen 2012).

The second feature of the administrative system that can have significant effects on the management reform is its structure. As a rather general concept, the administrative structure most broadly refers to the way relationships work between politics and administration, and

within different elements of administrative organization. While both sorts of relationship are considered a product of deliberate and strategic design, they are also heavily conditioned by historical-cultural traditions, which can make them more or less conducive for the adoption of new management ideas (Dahlström 2012; Whitford 2012). In countries in which one or two ministries have decisive power, such as the Ministry of Finance and the State Service Commission in New Zealand or the Treasury in the UK, reforms could include large-scale changes of the existing administrative structures and practices. Such a scenario, on the other hand, was hardly possible in countries with a more fragmented administrative structure (e.g. the Netherlands or Germany) in which no single ministry or any other agency at the national level could lead the reform process as the unified action center (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

As to the relations between politics and administration, in systems in which the carriers of top civil servants are integrated with those of executive politicians, such as is the case with the French *grand corps*, the reform content and path tend to be jointly shaped by politicians and their mandarins. In this kind of a structure, however, reform ownership need not necessarily be shared by the middle or lower level echelons of administration, where public officials feel little association with top civil servants and their political principals. The gap between mandarins and rank-and-file public officials and the consequential problems in reform implementation tend to be larger in countries qualified with the above-discussed politicization of top civil service positions.

More conducive conditions for continuity of the reform process, on the other hand, can be found in countries such as Canada, New Zealand or the UK, qualified by the separation of the carrier paths of politicians and top servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The limitation of political influence and stability of top civil service posts, however, can also bring setbacks in the form of conservative attitudes towards the management change and a limited scope of related experience. In such scenarios, with a lack of consonance with the highest strata of the state apparatus, politicians tend to bypass it by relying extensively on the workings of a new intermediate category of political advisors (Peters and Pierre 2004; Aucoin and Savoie 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

Finally, on a more operative level, traditions and structure tend to reflect themselves in personnel regulation and institutionalized norms of various public service professions. On a street level, labor conditions and rules under which public officials operate embed their discretion, but at the same time, they structure the standard procedures in which operative situations are handled (Hupe and Hill 2007). This institutional dimension of administrative system tends to be built up over the years and create a tangle of interlocking rules and standard operating procedures, which can be very difficult to fundamentally reduce and revise. Management reforms looking for efficiency gains through technological modernization of the ways in which public officials handle operative situations will involve substantive investments in staff and equipment, or might even face resistance of staff or their unions before changes are carried through (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

Despite all sorts of material, human or time-related costs they might involve, and despite “potentially formidable obstacles to radical or rapid changes, reform processes are launched, and frequently do make an impact” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, p. 43). In Pollitt and Bouckaert’s framework (2011), the process through which reforms are launched and adopted most notably refers to the choice of specific content of the reform package (Box L of Figure 3) and the governing decisions through which the selected content is being turned into public management and policy implementation practice (box N in Figure 3). The following section addresses how this particular process might unfold, and which specific governing activities it might involve.

## **2.4 Public management reform process as a metagovernance process**

The framework of management reform developed by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) presents an open schematic and heuristic tool that can accommodate a specific empirical contexts and a variety of more specific theories and causal explanations for different outcomes of management reforms. Moreover, due to its twofold focus on the factors affecting the management reform and the process through which the reform unfolds, the specification of elements within the framework can seek to account for not just ‘why’, but also ‘how’ public management reform leads to specific outcomes.

In the attempt to do the latter, the dissertation draws on Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) top-down conceptualization of the reform process and focuses on the key role that political and administrative leaders have in the initiation and execution of management change. The process through which new management ideas are turned into implementation practice is conceived here through the governance theory lens. Decisions of the elites on structure and process changes in the public sector are, as Figure 4 shows, subsumed under the concept of metagovernance which "in its most basic and general (but also most eclectic) sense, denotes the governance of governance" (Jessop 2011, p. 106).

The basic conceptualization of metagovernance relies on the distinction between three levels of governance, among which metagovernance refers to the second- and third-level ones (Kooiman 2003). The exercise of the third level governance, which is also referred to as the constitutive governance, includes fundamental decisions about the setting in which policy formation and implementation takes place. These decisions are meant to affect decision-making on policy content as well on about organizational arrangements for its delivery (Hill and Hupe 2014; Ostrom 2007).

Within this setting, the second-level governance, also known as directional governance, provides the conditions for the "formulation and decision-making about collectively desired outcomes" (Hill and Hupe 2014, p. 129). The actual management of a process leading to the realization of these goals then in turn occurs at the level of operational governance shaped by the structure and the content designed at the two higher levels of governance (Hill and Hupe 2014).




Figure 4 A Framework of public management reform: focus on the process

Source: elaborated after Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) and Hill and Hupe (2014).



When applied to the management reform process, the political and administrative exercise of constitutive governance implies the fundamental decisions about the initiation of governance reform and constitution of a structure in which policy formation and implementation take place. Decisions made at this highest level of governance involve the creation or a change of the general principles guiding and justifying the ways in which governance occurs and governors act. In the reform process, the modification of the normative framework is followed by the choice between different reform models and, with models corresponding, between governance modes (Kooiman 2003; Jessop 2011; Meuleman 2008; Torfing et al. 2012). Even though the creation of a setting by default implies the decisions about the design of institutions on a system scale, political and administrative leaders employ their metagovernor capacities at organizational and individual loci of political-societal relations. This includes not only the explication of mandates and codification of the (inter)organizational setting, but also interaction with individuals implementing or benefiting from a policy on the street-level scale (Hill and Hupe 2014; Howlett and Ramesh 2016).

Within the normative and material structures created by the constitutive governance, the directional governance involves decision-making about the incorporation of an adopted reform package in the formulation of specific policy goals and tools. The metagoverning task at this level includes not only the integration of reformist principles, goals and tools into the policy-making framework and policy design, but also hands-on efforts through which metagovernors engage in reflexive (re)design of policy and management tools promoted by adopted reform model and the corresponding governance mode (Jessop 2011; Kooiman 2003; Torfing et al. 2012). The ways in which political and administrative metagovernors will approach the exercise of directional governance depends, among other things, on the ideal roles that different reform models assign to elected politicians and civil servants (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Kooiman 2003). Key features of these ideal-type roles are indicated in Table 5.

Table 5 Directional governance in three reform models: roles for politicians and mandarins

| Model | Role for political leaders  | Role for administrative leaders  |
|-------|---|--|
| NPM   | Strategic goal setting  | Autonomous managers authorized to establish performance framework and choose specific kinds of policy tools. |
| NWS   | Traditional - takers of authoritative decisions, both big and small | Technical experts and professional implementers of governing decisions made by political leaders.            |
| NPG   | Driving force behind consensus based policy solutions               | Network managers and partnership leaders   |

Source: with adaptation from Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011:169).

When metagoverning is inspired by the New Public Management paradigm, elected officials are supposed to keep authority over goal-setting in their directional governing efforts, but also to enable administrative leaders to act as autonomous governors while making decisions about policy content as well as about its implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Klijn 2012; S. P. Osborne 2010). The logic of the parallel stimulation of effectiveness and efficiency in this model is intertwined with the empowerment of public managers and with authorizing them to define performance indicators, choose or favour specific kinds of policy tools and stipulate functional devices for monitoring the implementation of public policies (Peters 2011; Pierre 2012; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In the NWS model, by contrast, executive politicians are left with the traditional role and envisioned as the key decision-makers in both strategic and operative matters. In such a setup, top civil servants are expected to ensure the implementation of governing decisions adopted by their political principals. When performing this task, they are supposed to foster professionalism and high technical expertise (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

By fostering this interactive character of governing, NPG complicates the picture by removing politicians away from the substance of government policy and giving them primacy over the facilitation of a collaborative process – that which should generate common interest and solutions (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). In this new role, executive politicians are stipulated to relinquish the idea of dominating and controlling the policy-making process and to command

actors to come up with a particular solution, but are invited to act as facilitators and the driving force behind a network of multiple stakeholders (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Agranoff and McGuire 2004; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). In this reform model, the political exercise of directional governance is complemented with the administrative endeavor to turn created networks and partnerships into smoothly functioning mechanisms for consensus-based formulation of policy solutions (Sørensen and Torfing 2009, 2016; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).

These sets of roles represent only the ideal-type versions of metagoverning exercise as envisioned by the three general reform paradigms. Nevertheless, decisions made by elites can be inspired by particular reformist principles and ideas, but are also dependant on numerous socio-economic, political and administrative forces discussed in the previous section which drive, restrain and guide management change. Due to that, the metagoverning choices are rarely pure reflections of ideal-type models in practice, but are frequently assemblages of contextualized combinations of ideas promoted by different reform models (Dean 2009). Moreover, as studies of reform processes have evidenced, while administrative leaders tend to struggle with the fulfilment of metagoverning tasks, politicians are often reluctant to confine themselves to the roles assigned by the models or are even ready to engage in the conversion of reform strategies when being determined to keep control over the public sector (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Peters and Pierre 2004).

## **2.5 The model of public management reform in a clientelistic context**

In order to account for the variation of outcomes in the reform of social service delivery in Croatia, this dissertation uses the elements of Pollitt and Buckaert's (2011) public management reform framework by emphasizing the centrality of elite decision-making while at the same seeking to identify structural and dynamic factors enabling or constraining political executives in carrying out their version of the reform. In crafting the explanation for the reform outcomes, the dissertation adopts an actor-centered institutional perspective which seeks to explain governing choices and outcomes by focusing on policy-making institutions but treats the effects of institutional conditions as contingent upon actors and their interaction, as well as upon socioeconomic structures and policy legacies (Scharpf 1997, 2000).

Actor-centered institutionalism, to be more specific, treats global economic forces and socio-demographic change affecting the socioeconomic structures and policies as accountable for the creation of challenges to which policy-makers may have to respond. These responses are driven by the dimensions of collective problems that need to be addressed, but the actual course of policy and management action is then influenced by political-administrative institutions and institutional rules. Among all these rules, formal institutional rules are the ones with the most significant effect and they impose limitations on the repertoire of permitted courses of actors' actions (Scharpf 1997, 2000). The effects of substantive prohibitions imposed by such rules are further complemented by the less general rules defining "the constellations of actors that may participate in the adoption and implementation of policy responses and their permissible modes of interaction" (Scharpf 2000, p.775).

Within this repertoire, the actual choice between permissible actions is affected by institutional rules which give structure to incentives by referring to self-interest of governments, political parties, mandarins, interest groups and other collective actors involved in decision-making processes. However, there rational choice inspired predictions in actor-entered institutionalism can be complemented with by hypotheses focusing on the possible effects of institutionalized norms and role obligations on an actor's strategies (Scharpf 1997, 2000; Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Moreover, actors' strategies and interacting choices are assumed to be proximate causes of policy responses and are, accordingly, "treated as a theoretically distinct category— influenced but not determined by the institutional framework within which interactions occur " (Scharpf 2000, p. 771).

While drawing on the actor-centered institutional framework, this dissertation attributes the upsurge of management reforms in Croatian social policy to growing demographic and socio-economic pressures and the influx of new management ideas promoted by various international actors. In a causal model of service management reform in Croatia (see Figure 5), these elements from Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2011) groups of socio-economic and political factors are considered as relevant forces at work in initiating the change, but not as influential factors in preventing or enabling clientelistic capture of reformed services or in selecting the direction of the actual transformation of service management. The features of the political and administrative system and interaction between political actors and citizens are, on the other hand, treated as the factors that generated variation in implementation modes that the reform

resulted in. Nevertheless, among all of these factors, the model pinpoints the key features of national politico-administrative regime from the relevant institutional and dynamic features of the specific policy setting in which services were delivered prior to the reform and in which management reform actually took place. While the former are treated as scope conditions, the latter ones account for the prevention and occurrence of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management and the variation in the reform outcomes.




Figure 5 Model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context

In the model, the socialist and transitional legacy of civil sector politicization and state domination by a single party whose strong and wide territorial organization needed to be maintained through patronage are conceived as the conditions not merely discouraging political leaders from investments in systematic management change, but also incentivizing them to engage in clientelistic capture of the reform process. The politicization of top civil service positions, the persistence of the administrative ‘double talk’ and the dominant - often majoritarian - position of one party in the government are also considered as conditions that have, along with the centralized state structure, provided the political executive with considerable latitude for the adoption, dismissal or misuse of particular reform paths. It is further assumed that the given latitude was enhanced by the decentralized job placement system which restrained the capacity of the national legal framework to prevent the integration of patronage practices into services undergoing management change. Nevertheless, while allowing the plurality of institutionally permissible recruitment options, the same system created the space for variation in the reform results across different institutional settings for service provision.

As the body of civil sector politicization studies shows, civil service systems in which recruitment function is performed by ministries or subnational bodies provide politicians with more opportunities for the employment of partisans than the systems in which centralized personnel organizations are in charge of hiring public servants (Peters 2010; Meyer-Sahling 2006; Meyer-Sahling and Jáger 2012). Nonetheless, the degree of political discretion provided by the national civil service framework in a particular sector or an institution can be reduced with the rules institutionalizing operative conduct and providing incentives for the participating actors. Moreover, the incentives and disincentives provided by rules can be complemented with professional norms and standards of behavior shared within public institutions; the recruitment function may even be delegated to professional bodies and independent civil service commissions (Grindle 1997; Leonard 2010; Kopecký et al. 2016; Meyer-Sahling 2006; Peters 2010). Even in systems in which top civil service positions are politicized, the ability of political parties to penetrate deep into the structures of state institutions can be limited by the “dense web of formalized standards and procedures that serve to ensure the professional ethos of the civil service” (Meyer-Sahling 2006, p. 700).

When this line of argumentation is used to address the reform of social services provision in Croatia, the corresponding expectation is that the existing procedures and standards would pose limitations to political pressures for control over reform process and its results in services provided in a sufficiently formalized implementation setting prior to the reform. In the politico-administrative systems qualified by a frequent usage of ‘double talk’, however, the formal rules are not necessarily practiced in ongoing situations and are thus not the most adequate representations of rule-ordered action (Peters 2010b).

To account for this challenge, the social service implementation reform model in Croatia draws on the strand of institutional studies which highlight the analytical potential of the concept of rules-in-use. These set of rules, also labeled as the working rules, may or may not be formalized, but are necessarily referred to when actors are asked to explain or justify own actions (Ostrom 2007). In line with that, the model identifies working procedures and establishes professional standards as features of the institutional setting for service provision whose presence or absence constrained or enabled political parties in the development of clientelistic practices within the provision of social services and led to diverse reform paths in social services.

Had the provision of social services been institutionalized with dense working procedures and well-established professional standards before the reform, it is argued that executive politicians would have a limited ability to decisively run the service management reform and would need to invest considerable energy if trying to overtake implementation with the scope of establishing patronage practices. In this way, the existing institutional setting for service provision would offer constraints for the political capture and discourage political actors from rapid or comprehensive service management reform. In line with that, the model predicts that in services characterized by a well-established institutional setting, meta-governors will perceive and use reform primarily as a way to ease the strains of the welfare system. Accordingly, new management ideas will be embedded into existing implementation practice incrementally and consistently and the resulting implementation mode will represent a modernized version of the mode that was prevailing prior to the reform.

On the other hand, in services characterized by minimal or nonexistent working procedures and professional standards prior to the reform, the implementation setting can be considered as lacking institutional constraints for the politicization of reform process and results. In such cases,

it is argued, whether or not and to what extent politicians will be incentivized to misuse reform for patronage purposes can be explained by their re-election calculus. As Schneider and Ingram (1993 and 1997) claim, an important part of the re-election calculus is the anticipation of the ways in which target population(s) of a certain policy will respond to this policy, as well the ways in which others will perceive the target group and its claim/rejection of its entitlement to benefits or burdens.

In clientelistic policies, even though ‘clients’ engaged in this exchange as the recipients of jobs, contracts or positions are likely to accept and comply with a clientelistic bargain, those real clients – the target group of public policy used for patronage purposes – are most likely to disapprove of the clientelistic capture. The success of this disapproval, if regarded in the light of its potential electoral implications, depends partly on the political power of the target group itself (constructed as votes, money, and propensity of the group to mobilize and act), but also on the extent to which others reject or support content and management of benefits or costs being directed towards that target (Schneider and Ingram 1997).

In other words, in order to reduce attractiveness of patronage strategy for the ruling party, citizens targeted with policy under reform need be able to politically mobilize or to have strong advocacy groups promoting their wellbeing and deservingness. The model predicts that while the presence of empowered individuals and/or organizations that represent the interest of a target population will discourage political capture of the service reform, the lack of pre-existing working rules will enable comprehensive (re)design of arrangements for the service provision. As a setting with such institutional and dynamic features political leaders will be incentivized to appeal to service beneficiaries with the offer of a programmatic package based on innovations in social service provision, service will have the best chances to result in a novel mode of implementation that would consistently reflect the reformist ideas.

In services marked by a minimal or non-existent institutional framework and politically weak and non-represented target groups, the transformation of implementation management may be used to enhance political control over implementation. Free from limitations of institutional rules and pressures of a politically potent target group, the political executive will have no constraints or disincentives to swiftly and decisively lead the reform while pursuing rent-seeking interests of a ruling party. The model predicts the reform to be led primarily by political leaders



and include the comprehensive transformation of implementation management in which reformist ideas will be introduced selectively in order to enable political interference in implementation management. Moreover, the argument being proposed in this dissertation is that principles and mechanisms of public management reform can even be modified and merged with the patronage practices in such services. In this way, new management ideas presented by reform promoters as a means to improving policy implementation can be misused for easier employment of party supporters as service providers and reform can therefore result in a novel implementation mode distorted by patronage practices.

## **2.6 Building the causal mechanism of captured metagovernance**

The causal model identifies conditions that could account for the variation of reform results in Croatia, but it only takes a very general look at the pathways through which the reform unfolded and led to different implementation modes. While the mechanisms through which the two uncaptured modes of implementation emerged could be understood with reliance on the existing theories and studies of meta-governance, the captured pathway and its outcomes are still rather puzzling. In seeking to unpack the causal mechanism through which management reform could be used as a route to turn service provision into opportunities for the employment of party supporters as service providers, the dissertation identifies New Public Governance as reform path most prone to for political capture.

Even though the traditional and Neo-Weberian models of bureaucratic power have often been criticized for their rigidity, they offered a straight line of accountability combined with the rule of law and predictability. It may not always work like that in practice, but it is understandable and clear in principle (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In its quest for more governmental flexibility, New Public Management brought market providers onto the accountability map, but it did not abandon the reliance on the central steering of public services (Klijn 2012). By favoring contracts over command and specification of performance indicators over assignment of explicit tasks, however, it took away the role of the chief executive from the government and assigned it the entrepreneurial one, but gave novel authority to state managers, regulators and inspectors in their oversight and control (Hill and Hupe 2014; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Sørensen 2012).

By contrast, the usage of trust instead of contracts or rules as key management mechanisms logically led NPG toward the invalidation of state oversight functions. In addition, the endorsement of complex implementation networks and partnerships converted the assignment of responsibilities into an extremely difficult task, to say the least (Klijn 2012). With such underlying properties, NPG in itself holds the potential to blur out accountability and offer politicians – and other strong actors – with a space to edge away from regulatory and other institutional constraints (Papadopoulos 2007; Hansen 2007; Pierre and Peters 2005).

In a contexts qualified by the prevalence of consensual and decentralized governing conventions or the presence of pressure from the democratic public, networks and partnerships can be metagoverned by means of soft institutional forms so as to represent an asset instead of a threat to democracy (Sørensen 2013; Ansell, Sørensen, and Torfing 2017). However, as this dissertation claims, the reliance on soft steering may be turned into the possibility for the political capture of the implementation management should the metagoverning role be performed by politicians incentivized to engage in rent-seeking action.

In order to craft explanations of how the latter, the captured outcome, may be possible, the dissertation focuses on the role of politicians in metagovernance processes through which NPG-inspired reform ideas are turned into implementation practice. In doing so, in what follows below (see Table 6), it builds on the existing theorization of higher orders of governance and elaborates the activities on the scale of the system, the organisation or the individual entailed by political metagovernance when it is inspired by NPG thinking. After being operationalized, the elaboration is used as a conceptual grid in the building of the causal mechanism that can account for the captured version of reform results.

Table 6 Political metagovernance inspired by New Public Governance thinking

| Action scale        | Action level of political metagovernance                          |   | Operational governance   |
|---------------------|---|---|--|
|                     | Constitutive governance   | Directional governance                                  |  |
| <i>System</i>       | Initiating institutional (re)design and creating governance arena | General rule-making and endorsement of policy content   | Collaborative policy implementation and co-delivery of public services |
| <i>Organization</i> | Devolving mandate and codifying the (inter)organizational setting | Participating in the negotiated decision-making process |  |
| <i>Individual</i>   | Fostering internalization of core norms and values                | Ensuring acceptance and interactive rule application    |  |

Source: elaborated by author based on Hill and Hupe (2014), Sørensen and Torfing (2016), Papadopoulos (2016), Kooiman (2003).

When constitutive governance as the highest-order governance is inspired by NPG reformist thinking, it is guided with the aim of structuring more or less institutionalized governance arenas that will reflect NPG’s vision of a more inclusive, flexible and effective public management (Kooiman 2003). The actual constitution of governance arenas need not be the result of a strategic institutional design as they can also be created by societal actors, but it has to be substantiated with sufficient legitimization. In both cases, democratically elected politicians—alongside citizens themselves—act as the most convincing source of authorization. In a top-down creation of governance arenas, political leaders are the ones setting the NPG reform on the agenda and proposing allocation of some policy functions to local communities and societal actors. In a more bottom-up process, political metagovernors are those who enhance the legitimacy of self-organizing networks by granting them with rule-making authority (Papadopoulos 2016; Sørensen and Torfing 2016).

When acting as metagovernors, not only do politicians share authority with networks and partnerships, but are also securing the integrity and representativeness of the resulting governance arrangements. The fulfilment of the first of these two democratic principles implies that the government has devolved the explicit mandate and has committed administrative resources to empowered decision-makers (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Fung and Wright 2003).

The adoption of the second principle can be considered accomplished if the new governance arena is constituted and functioning in a way which reflects the diversity of stakeholder interests. Even though the NPG endorses the usage of soft-management tools in the actual management of networks and partnerships, the overly flexible constitution of the governance arena and its mandate may challenge the policy-making capacity of authorized actors (Papadopoulos 2016).

Moreover, the lack of appropriate procedures for selecting representatives of stakeholder interests and for balancing power asymmetries between them may lead to domination of the policy-making process by unrepresentative local elites (Papadopoulos 2016; Hysing and Lundberg 2015; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). In order to ensure democratic safeguards against such scenarios, political metagovernors engage in designing the (inter)organisational setting in which collaborative policy-making will take place, with the task of framing fundamental conditions and procedures that will not only guide authorization and its potential withdrawal, but will also determine the eligibility of actors acting as implementers and beneficiaries of a policy (Papadopoulos 2016; Hill and Hupe 2014; Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Ostrom 2007).

The codification of the interactive arena and the relations within it can nevertheless properly influence policy-making only if it is based on a rich and diversified problem diagnosis and if internalized by individual members of a political community. To attain this cause, political leaders need to persuasively communicate their constitutive decisions and substantiate them with reasoning derived from face-to-face interaction with public employees, citizens and other stakeholders. In this hands-on task, political action can be complemented—though not replaced—by the expertise and managerial activities taken on by leaders of public administration and public-sector employees (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; Hill and Hupe 2014).

Within the setting inspired by NPG thinking, the aim of directional or second-order governance is to provide a framework and foster an interactive formulation of policy content that will operationalize NPG's quest for mobilization and empowerment of local communities and users. In order to ensure the legitimacy of decision-making premises of collaborating actors and their alignment with the overall goals of the government, political actors need to define fiscal, legal and discursive conditions that will frame the joint strive toward policy outcomes. At a later stage of policy formation, there are also the legitimizing results of negotiations characterised

by the acceptance or rejection of trade-offs between different policy outcomes and, as a consequence, of endorsing the proposed solution (Sørensen and Torfing 2016).

The important ingredients of this hand of metagovernance are the accountability procedures which function as the defining milestones for collaborative policy formation while simultaneously ensuring the scrutiny of elected bodies and affected constituencies over the consequent implementation process and its results. This implies that even if executive politicians are expected to steer collaborative implementation by leaving space for discretion of participants in governance arena, in the exercise of directional governance, however, they still need to stipulate the functional devices for the monitoring of the arena's operative conduct and the endorsement of its outputs (Papadopoulos 2016; Bovaird and Loeffler 2016; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Jessop 2002).

After ensuring the framework for policy-making, political metagovernors engage in shaping decision-making about collectively desired outcomes by negotiating policy content with other participants in the interactive arena and by persuading uncooperative participants to act within the NPG policy-making premises. Politicians can enhance their influence gained through participation in a negotiated policy-making process by empowering civil servants and making them responsible for the facilitation of collaborative interaction and the management of created networks and partnerships. NPG suggests that this managerial aspect of directional governance should be focused on the building of trust, reciprocity and social capital, which will act as essential components of interorganizational relations in the implementation of negotiated policy content (Sørensen and Torfing 2016; S. P. Osborne, McLaughlin, and Chew 2010; Klijn 2010; Peters 2010a; Agranoff and McGuire 2004).

Last but not least, politicians are providing the important input for easier implementation of a new policy by communicating the negotiated solution and its normative background to the general public (Sørensen and Torfing 2016). The acceptance of a policy content by its beneficiaries is a general prerequisite for successful implementation with the equal weight in state-based, market-based or collaborative arrangements. In collaborative implementation, however, those demands associated with the fulfilment of this prerequisite are weighted with an NPG-inspired devotion to user-empowerment and a holistic approach in addressing their needs (S. P. Osborne 2010).

The alignment with NPG's principles is only possible if users are enabled to provide inputs for operational decisions made by employees of organizations that provide services and contribute to their directional decisions on a situation-bound rule application (Hill and Hupe 2014). For political metagovernors this implies that the promotion of a policy should also include invitation for co-productive design and delivery of public services. By placing more trust in decisions made by users and communities, and by ensuring the transparency of such decisions, politicians can also foster development of creative relationships with implementing actors in which communication flows in both ways (Bovaird and Loeffler 2016; Pestoff 2009; Voorberg, Bekkers, and Tummers 2015).

## **2.7 Operationalization of the causal model and the initial causal mechanism**

The threefold research question guided the design of research activities towards three consequent phases that were conducted in order to:

1. describe what kind of an implementation mode (or modes) were produced by the reform of social services in Croatia,
2. validate and modify the proposed explanation of factors and conditions whose combination accounts for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform resulted in and, more specifically, for the presence and absence of clientelistic capture of the reformed service management, and
3. build a plausible causal mechanism through which reform led by patronage-driven politicians can lead to distortion of implementation by patronage practices in services qualified with a non-existent or minimal institutional setting and weak or unrepresented beneficiaries.

As to the first phase, in the documentation and analysis of the reform results—which is treated as the dependent variable—implementation mode as the key concept— was regarded as prevailing in the actual management of a process leading to the realization of policy goals. Such management encompasses activities on the system, on an organizational and individual action scale (Hill and Hupe 2014). In line with that, the operationalization of reform results focused

on the social policy implementation a decade after the reform was initiated and it employed indicators looking for actors, management mechanisms and operational activities with the locus on individuals, organizations, and the systems composed. The collection and analysis of data in the first phase was thus guided by the following specific questions:

1. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of the policy process?
2. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of inter-organizational relations?
3. Who are the actors and what are the activities prevalent in the management of (external and internal) inter-personal contacts?
4. What role does the government take in the implementation management of the service and what are the central and adjutant management mechanisms?

The specific modes of implementations that the Croatian management reform could result in were neither *a priori* theorized nor operationalized, but were left to be documented and identified through the empirical research. The analysis of collected empirical evidence was, nevertheless, guided by Hill and Hupe's conceptualization of the modes of implementation which correspond with reformist strategies. Their elaboration of the operative was entailed by 'enforcement', 'performance' and 'coproduction' perspectives on the implementation management and it informed the creation of a provisional list of indicators. This list structured the process of data collection and analysis, but was used in an open manner so as to enable an informed formation of data driven insights.

In the second phase—the operationalization of the explanation for the variation in reform outcomes—focus was placed on the two factors that the causal model identifies as the ones that could account for diverse reform paths in Croatian social services. The first factor concerns the degree of institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform, whereas the second deals with the power and representation of the population that is the target group of a policy. As shown in following figure (Figure 6), the operationalization of the first among the two factors was done through indicators which take into consideration the following:

1. Formal rules and regulations,
2. Working rules and standard procedures, and
3. Professional codes or bodies.

The second condition that refers to power and representation of the target group was operationalized through indicators encompassing:

1. The presence of an active individual or groups of users in service design or delivery, and
2. The involvement of domestic or international organizations that promote the interests of service beneficiaries.

The service was considered as having a well-established institutional setting if the provision of service was institutionalized through a dense web of working rules and standard operating procedures prior to the reform. This implies that the existing rules-in-form were referred to by actors engaged in service delivery when they were asked to describe standard practices and the ratio of their operative decisions. As the incentives given by working rules in this kind of setting could have been complemented by the effects of professional norms, the presence of professional codes or the engagement of professional associations in the management of service provision were also considered as indicators of sufficient institutionalization of service provision. The services in which formalized rules or the institutionalized professional norm were scant and were not referred to in actors' descriptions of implementation practices were considered as minimally institutionalized.

Furthermore, service beneficiaries were considered as influential or represented if, prior to the reform itself, the policy that the service was a part of was marked by the presence of an active individual or groups of users and by the involvement of domestic or international organizations that promote the interest of service beneficiaries. If both of these characters were missing, service users were regarded as politically weak and unrepresented.






Figure 6 Operationalization of a model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context

Such operationalization resulted in the following working hypotheses.

Working hypothesis 1:

In social services formerly provided in a well-established implementation setting, ruling parties will have limited ability and incentives to integrate patronage practices into service provision and reform principles will be incrementally and consistently integrated into existing implementation management.

Working hypothesis 2:

In services with a prior minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision, the activity of service beneficiaries and heavy involvement of actors advocating their interests constrain the use of reform for development of party patronage practices within the service provision.

Working hypothesis 3:

In services with prior minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision and with politically weak and unrepresented target population, there is a space for political capture and distortion of the reform process and new management tools with patronage practices.

In the third phase, as illustrated in Figure 7, the non-existent or minimal institutional setting and weak or unrepresented beneficiaries were considered as policy-specific conditions in which patronage-driven interest of executive politicians (X) can lead to distortion of implementation with patronage practices (Y) within the general context of public management reforms in a patronage democracy. The theorized metagoverning role which executive politicians can exercise in the conditions conducive for the adoption and realisation of NPG-inspired reform was used as a heuristic device for the crafting of a mechanistic explanation of the captured version of management reform.




Figure 7 Focusing and bounding process-tracing study

In order to structure the theory-building process, the existing explanations were re-conceptualized into a causal mechanism being comprised of parts in which, as illustrated in Figure 8, ENTITIES engage in *activities* to bring about the outcome. Entities “are engaging in activities (the parts of mechanism –i.e. toothed heels), while activities are producers of change, or what transmits causal forces through the mechanism (the movement of wheels)” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 49).




Figure 8 A mechanistic conceptualization of causal mechanism

Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 50).

The conceptualisation activities of NPG-inspired constitutive and directional governance on the system, as well as the organizational and individual action scale were thus re-conceptualized and operationalized as a mechanism comprised of set six parts: 1) Institutional (re)design, 2) Reforming the (inter)organizational setting, 3) Fostering internalization of core values and norms, 4) General rule-making for policy-making, 5) Reshaping the policy content, and 6) Interactive rule application.

The resulting mechanism, illustrated in Figure 9, was used as a form of grid guiding structured collection and analysis of empirical material.




Figure 9 Political metagovernance as a causal mechanism

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN

This chapter provides the research design overview and the methods used to select cases, collect and analyze data. Section 3.1 unfolds the procedures and the criteria for case selection in both the comparative and the process-tracing part of this mixed-method study. Section 3.2 elaborates the process and techniques used for data collection, with section 3.3 continuing with the overview of the processing of data collected by using qualitative data analysis. Three subsections of the section 3.3., then, provide a more detailed account on the steps and procedures used for the qualitative data analysis in each of the three consequent phases of the research.

#### **3.1 Overview and case selection**

In the comparative part of this mixed-method research, a focused comparison was achieved through the most similar cases design based on Mill's method of difference in outcomes (Teune and Przeworski 1970; Gerring 2007; George and Bennett 2005). When it is used in a confirmatory mode (hypotheses-testing), the most similar system design relies on the comparison of at least a pair of cases and uses theory and propositions as a template with which to compare the empirical results. If the results predicted are confirmed by data in comparative analysis (e.g. if X then Y) and, what is more, if the expected contrasting results are confirmed for the reasons predicted (if NOT X then NOT Y), then the replication may be claimed (Yin 2003; Seawright and Gerring 2008). In the purest form of this research design, the selected cases are similar in all aspects except in the outcome (Y) and causal factors (X). As regards practical application, this implies the selection of cases with a similar context and the consequent checking of value or types of the X and Y outcome (Gerring 2007; Landman 2008).

In this study, the similarity among researched cases was controlled through case selection procedures, whilst data collection and analysis was focused only towards the dissimilar factors and towards those which can explain the differences in the social service reform results. The

cases selected were identified as similar given the presence of reform drivers, the relation to the change of environment and the goals of specific social policies, as well as on the presence of reform “packages” promoted by international organisations. Research focus on social policy implementation implied the emphasis on services instead on transfers. Namely, services require more complicated forms of operational activities and management reform thus reflects upon them more strongly. As illustrated in Figure 10, cases were selected from a whole universe of social services targeting populations included in the domain of the Croatian Ministry of Social Policy and Youth that was coordinating the overall social policy at the time of data collection and analysis. These populations are:

- 1) The elderly in need of care,
- 2) Children and families at risk,
- 3) Persons with disability,
- 4) Adults with mental health problems,
- 5) Drug and alcohol addicts,
- 6) Victims of domestic violence,
- 7) Victims of trafficking,
- 8) Asylum seekers,
- 9) The homeless, and
- 10) Youth.

In order to extract those services with a similar background, it was important to focus on the ones with a primary social character in its narrow meaning, which signifies a primary focus on vulnerable social groups and the primacy of social sector. This implied the exclusion of youth policy as well as of policies in which the social dimension is just complementary to the work of other sectors, primarily the judiciary and the police sector, such as is the case with services addressing victims of domestic violence and victims of trafficking. The similarity was also enhanced by focusing on services with a national scope and a clear service design that implies the exclusion of services for the homeless and asylum seekers. While the policy for the homeless is not designed as nationwide policy, but with services designed and implemented in some localities only, the policy for asylum seekers still does not have clearly defined services and it functions primarily as a pilot project with a rather small scope of beneficiaries.




Figure 10 Summary of the case selection procedure



The selection among the five remaining policies was undertaken given the similarity of services based on the presence of changes in the policy environment, in relation to demographic and social-economic challenges, along with significant changes in the frames of policy goals and instruments which target a specific population. Both changes increased the demand falling on state- provided services and the administrative reform presents a way to ease the strains of the welfare system. Additionally, similarity in relation to reform drivers implied the supply of the administrative reform idea in the services selected. This refers to the inclusion of social services in some reform packages that were introduced during the 2000s and mainly promoted the reform toward devolution, deetatisation and deinstitutionalisation.

Preliminary interviews with social policy actors, analysis of documents and review of existing research reports indicated that policies for elderly in need for care, children and families at risk and persons with disabilities were characterized by the presence of these factors in the year 2013, whilst this was not the case with the policy for adults with mental health problems and policy for drug and alcohol addicts. Finally, to enable a feasible comparison of implementation modes of social services that the reform resulted in (Y), the research encompassed the most relevant and the most substantial (in relation to funds and scope) social services provided within the three policy fields characterized by the presence of reform drivers. These services include the following:

1. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for the elderly,
2. Home care for the elderly,
3. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for children without parental care,
4. Supervision of parental care for families at risk,
5. Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities, and
6. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities.

To ensure an empirically plausible and focused collection and analysis of data, the services selected that were treated as the unit of the analysis, were bound on the definition provided by relevant domestic regulatory and strategic documents (see Table 7).

Table 7 Definition of selected services

|  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Accommodation in homes and foster homes for the elderly.</p>              | <p>The accommodation service is a service of care outside one's own family, which is consumed as institutional care in homes or other legal entities, or as non-institutional care in a foster family, a foster home, organised housing or in a community of housing units. Accommodation can encompass the following services: housing, meals, care, health care, social work, psychosocial rehabilitation, physical therapy, work therapy, work activities, active leisure, education, , depending on the established needs or choices of users. The service is also often referred to as the long term care (Social Care Act).</p> |
| <p>Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities</p> | <p>or in a community of housing units. Accommodation can encompass the following services: housing, meals, care, health care, social work, psychosocial rehabilitation, physical therapy, work therapy, work activities, active leisure, education, , depending on the established needs or choices of users. The service is also often referred to as the long term care (Social Care Act).</p>  |
| <p>Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities</p> | <p>as the long term care (Social Care Act).</p>   |
| <p>Home care for the elderly</p>   | <p>The home care is a non-institutional service designed to assist older persons in their everyday activities in their home. The service includes assistance in the following areas: personal hygiene, housework and shopping, basic health care, cooking, psychosocial support and mediation in exhibiting various rights (Catalog of Rights and Services in Social Care).</p>   |
| <p>Personal assistant for persons with disabilities</p>                      | <p>Personal assistance is a non-institutional service designed to assist persons with the hardest mode and rate of disability. The service includes assistance with personal hygiene and living space maintenance, traveling and work-related activities, assistance and accompaniment to social activities, daily support in upbringing the user's children and, in general, assistance in activities of daily life, depending on the physical needs of the user (Catalog of Rights and Services in Social Care).</p>  |
| <p>Supervision of parental care for families at risk</p>                     | <p>Supervision of parental care is a measure for the protection of the rights and well-being of the child. It involves psychological and social support to parents for which Centers for Social Welfare have identified mistakes and shortcomings in their parenting or the need for particular care in the upbringing of the child (Family Act).</p>   |

The selection of a case to be studied through process tracing study was build upon prior cross-case analysis. After the analysis of empirical evidence from all six cases indicated one service - home care for elderly- with presence of distorted variant of co-production implementation mode (Y) together with the underdeveloped institutional setting and politically weak target population (scope conditions) and patronage-driven decision of executive politicians (X) , that case was chosen for further investigation through process-tracing method. The focus of the further investigation in this case was, as illustrated in Figure 11, on the mechanism through which the capture of reform took place.




Figure 11 Illustration of case selection criteria in the process tracing study

### 3.2 Data Collection

In order to develop converging lines of inquiry and triangulation, interviews as the main sources of evidence were combined with documents and official statistical data related to the reform and the implementation of the chosen social service. The selection of these three types of sources and the actual collection of data was guided by operationalization of the casual model of service management reform in a clientelistic policy-making setting (see Figure 6) and the causal mechanism of political metagovernance (see Figure 9).

Whilst following the classification offered by Beach and Pedersen (2013), sources were selected that could provide the following types of evidence: (1) pattern evidence, (2) sequence evidence, (3) trace evidence, and (4) account evidence. The characteristics of each of these four types of evidence are presented in the Table 8, while the tables following it provide for the elaboration of the specific types of evidence used in order to document the dependent variable (Table 9), measure the predictions of the causal model (Table 10) and so as to build the causal mechanism of captured metagovernance (Table 11).

Table 8 Types of evidence and sources of data aligned with them

|                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| <b>Account evidence</b>  | This type of evidence deals with the content of empirical material, be it document or an oral account of what took place, given in an interview.  |
| <b>Pattern evidence</b>  | This type of evidence relates to the prediction or revealing of a statistical or another pattern in the data.   |
| <b>Sequence evidence</b> | This type of evidence deals with the temporal and spatial chronology of events.   |
| <b>Trace evidence</b>    | The type of evidence whose mere existence provides proof that a part of the predicted causal relation or mechanism exists. For example, the existence of the official minutes of a meeting, if authentic, provides for strong proof that a meeting actually did take place. |

Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013: 175-180).

Table 9 Types of evidence used to document the dependent variable

| Indicators  | Type of evidence used to document the dependent variable  |
|---|---|
| Actors and activities prevalent in the management of the policy process.                              | Documented using pattern evidence from official statistics, and account evidence from interviews with participants and documents adopted by the government and its ministries.  |
| Actors and activities prevalent in the management of inter-organizational relations.                  | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by ministries and organizations mandated with the management of service provision. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence from official statistics.  |
| Actors and activities prevalent in the management of (external and internal) inter-personal contacts. | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by ministries and organizations that are mandated with the management of service provision.   |
| The role that the government takes in the implementation management of service.                       | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by ministries and organizations that are mandated with the management of service provision.   |
| The central and adjutant management mechanisms.   | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by ministries and organizations that are mandated with the management of service provision. Account evidence here is complemented with the trace evidence in the form of documents that materialise the particular management mechanism (e.g. contracts or code of ethics). |

Table 10 Types of evidence used to measure predictions of the causal model

| Indicators  | Type of evidence used to measure factors and process predicted by the model of public management reform in the clientelistic context  |
|---|---|
| The degree of institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform: formal rules and regulations.  | Measured using trace evidence in the form of documents institutionalizing the service provision. Trace evidence here is complemented with the account evidence from interviews.   |
| Degree of institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform: working rules and standard procedures.   | Measured using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the ministries and organizations engaged in the service provision. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence from official statistics or secondary data sources. |
| Degree of institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform: professional codes or bodies.  | Measured using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the ministries and organizations engaged in the management of service provision.   |
| The power and representation of service beneficiaries: presence of active individual or groups of users in service design or delivery.  | Measured using account evidence from interviews with participants and reports produced by the governmental or non-governmental actors. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence form official statistics or secondary data sources.  |
| The power and representation of service beneficiaries: involvement of domestic or international organizations that promote the interest of service beneficiaries.               | Measured using account evidence from interviews with participants and reports produced by the governmental or non-governmental actors. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence from official statistics or secondary data sources.  |
| The process of management change: elite decisions on the reform content and roles they take in the process in which the adopted content is turned into implementation practice. | Documented using sequence evidence dealing with the chronology of the reform process and account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the government and its ministries.   |

Table 11 Types of evidence used in crafting the mechanism of captured metagovernance

| Parts of mechanism   | Type of evidence used to build causal mechanism of captured metagovernance   |
|--|--|
| Part 1: Institutional (re)design                           | Documented using sequence evidence dealing with the chronology of the reform process and account evidence from interviews with participants and documents adopted by the government and its ministries.  |
| Part 2: Reforming the (inter)organizational setting        | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the ministries and organizations mandated with the service provision management. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence from official statistics and sequence evidence dealing with the temporal and spatial chronology of the reform process. |
| Part 3: Fostering internalization of core values and norms | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the government and ministries.  |
| Part 4: General rule-making for policy-making              | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the ministries and organizations mandated with the management of service provision.   |
| Part 5: Reshaping the policy content                       | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the ministries and organizations mandated with the management of service provision. Account evidence here is complemented with pattern evidence from official statistics and sequence evidence.   |
| Part 6: Interactive rule application                       | Documented using account evidence from interviews with participants and (both external and internal) documents produced by the government and ministries.  |



In line with the study design, interviews were conducted in two phases, with the first being a part of a comparative and the second one of the process-tracing study. Interviews were conducted on the sample of 80 participants, selected on the basis of their active engagement in the service provision and variations in the position on the action scale of implementation management. In relation to the latter criteria, participants were divided into:

1. Actors conducting activities at the scale of the system, including political officials and civil servants in the ministry, researchers and consultants, representatives of umbrella organisations of associations for selected target groups and representatives of international development agencies and ombudsman offices.
2. Actors active on the organisational scale, including political officials and civil servants in regional and local government, managers in Centers for Social Welfare, public and private and non-profit organizations providing the services selected.
3. Actors engaged in the implementation on individual scale, including coordinators of service provision teams, street-level workers and service beneficiaries.

Semi-structured interviews<sup>2</sup> were framed in accordance with the indicators used to document the variable (Table 9), measure predictions of the causal model (Table 10), as well as to document parts of the causal mechanism (Table 11). They were conducted in different country regions in its individual form with 74 participants, while 3 group interviews encompassed 6 participants. Interviews were conducted by the author of the dissertation mostly at participants' work places, with the first phase encompassing the period between July 2013 and April 2014, and the second one the period from June to November 2015. With participants' approval, all interviews were recorded while ensuring the privacy and confidentiality of transcripts<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Interview protocols for both stages of the interviewing process are provided in Appendices B and D.

<sup>3</sup> Statements of Ethics for both stages of the interviewing process are provided in Appendices C and E

Summaries of interviews conducted in both stages, together with the labels assigned to each interview, are provided in Table 12 and Table 13.

Table 12 Summary of interviews conducted in the first phase

| <b>Scale</b>  | <b>Type of participants</b>  | <b>Numb.</b> | <b>Location</b>     | <b>Interviews' labels<sup>4</sup></b> |
|---------------|--|--------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>SYSTEM</b> | Assistant Minister   | 1            | Zagreb              | 1                                     |
|               | Managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy – Head of Sectors and Head of Departments | 7            | Zagreb              | 2 -8                                  |
|               | Senior civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy – Advisers                                    | 3            | Zagreb              | 9-11                                  |
|               | Junior servants in Ministry of Social Policy- Referents  | 1            | Zagreb              | 12                                    |
|               | Representatives of umbrella organisations of associations for senior citizens, children and PWD  | 4            | Zagreb and Dalmatia | 13-16                                 |
|               | Researchers and consultants  | 5            | Zagreb              | 17-21                                 |
|               | Representatives of international development agencies and ombudsman offices                      | 3            | Zagreb              | 22-24                                 |

<sup>4</sup> The groups of interviews with managers of organisations providing the service, coordinators of service provision and service beneficiaries included one group interview each.

Table 12 con't Summary of interviews conducted in the first phase

| <b>Scale</b>        | <b>Type of participants</b>   | <b>Numb.</b> | <b>Location</b>                                      | <b>Interviews' labels</b> |
|---------------------|---|--------------|--|---------------------------|
| <b>ORGANIZATION</b> | Political officials in regional and local government  | 2            | Dalmatia and Slavonia                                | 15-16                     |
|                     | Senior civil servants in regional and local government  | 5            | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Northern Croatia         | 27-31                     |
|                     | Managers in non-profit and religious organisations that are providing services for elderly, persons with disability or children | 11           | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Northern Croatia, Istria | 32-41                     |
|                     | Managers in homes for elderly, persons with disability or children without parental care  | 6            | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia                           | 42-47                     |
|                     | Managers in Centres for Social Welfare  | 3            | Zagreb, Dalmatia                                     | 48-50                     |
| <b>INDIVIDUAL</b>   | Coordinators of service provision teams in public, non-profit and private organisations   | 7            | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia                           | 51-56                     |
|                     | Direct service providers in public, non-profit and private organisations  | 6            | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Istria and Kvarner Gulf  | 57-62                     |
|                     | Service beneficiaries   | 6            | Zagreb, Dalmatia, Slavonia                           | 63-67                     |

Table 13 Summary of interviews conducted in the second phase

| Scale               | Type of participants   | Numb. | Location              | Interviews' labels |
|---------------------|--|-------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| <b>SYSTEM</b>       | Managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy – Head of Sectors and Head of Departments     | 1     | Zagreb                | 68                 |
|                     | Senior civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy – Advisers  | 1     | Zagreb                | 69                 |
|                     | Researchers and consultants  | 1     | Zagreb                | 70                 |
| <b>ORGANIZATION</b> | Political officials in regional and local government   | 1     | Dalmatia and Slavonia | 71                 |
|                     | Senior civil servants in regional and local government   | 2     | Dalmatia and Slavonia | 71-73              |
|                     | Managers in non-profit and religious organisations that are providing home care services for elderly | 1     | Slavonia              | 74                 |
|                     | Managers in homes for elderly  | 1     | Dalmatia              | 75                 |
| <b>INDIVIDUAL</b>   | Coordinators of home care teams  | 1     | Dalmatia              | 76                 |
|                     | Home care provider   | 1     | Dalmatia              | 77                 |

The interviews in the second stage of the interviewing process were designed so as to complement and deepen accounts collected through the first stage. Due to that, five of them were conducted with actors interviewed in the first stage, but this time around with a protocol primarily addressed towards the reform process of the home care for the elderly.

The documents collected include regulative acts and programmatic documents referring to the services selected. Moreover, as the summary presented in Table 14 shows, to ensure insight into implementation activities, the documents collected and analyzed encompassed guidelines for implementers, tenders and open call documentation, as well as monitoring and evaluation reports related to service provision.

Table 14 Summary of collected documents<sup>5</sup>

| <b>Type of document</b>                      | <b>Examples</b>  |
|--|--|
| <b>Strategic and programmatic documents</b>  | Program of Development of Services for the Elderly within the System of Intergenerational Solidarity 2008-11. 2007. Government of the Republic of Croatia.   |
| <b>Laws</b>                                  | Social Care Act, NN 157/13, 152/14   |
| <b>Bylaws and standards</b>                  | Quality standards for social services in social protection area. 2013. Ministry of Social Policy and Youth.  |
| <b>Operative documents</b>                   | Open Call for Units of Regional/Local Self-administration to Engage in the Implementation of the Program of Intergenerational Solidarity. 2011. Ministry of Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity. |
| <b>Informative and promotional materials</b> | Catalogue of Rights and Services in Social Care. 2013. Government of the Republic of Croatia.  |
| <b>Internal documents</b>                    | Statement/clarification by a senior civil servant to the Minister of Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity on the home care programs.  |
| <b>Monitoring and evaluation reports</b>     | Report on the implementation of the National Strategy for Creating Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 2007-2015 for the 2012. 2013. Ministry of Social Policy and Youth.                        |

<sup>5</sup> List of all documents with their original labels in Croatian is provided in Appendix A

Findings from the analysis of these two sorts of qualitative data sets were complemented with the results of the descriptive statistical analysis applied on official data available referring to the implementation of selected services. Table 15 presents the key types of sources that the data was collected from.

Table 15 Summary of sources used for collection of statistical data<sup>6</sup>

| <b>Type of source</b>  | <b>Example</b>  |
|--|---|
| <b>Annual Statistical Reports published by the Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy, former Ministry of Social Policy and Youth</b> | Annual Statistical report on Homes and the Social Care Users in 2013. 2014. Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social Policy   |
| <b>Faculty of Political Science database on election results in Croatia</b>  | Results of elections for county and municipal governments in 2009.  |
| <b>Internal databases created for the monitoring of service provision</b>  | Data on approved grants for personal assistants in 2012. 2012. Ministry of Social Policy and Youth  |
| <b>Monitoring reports and secondary data sources</b>   | Initial Report of the Republic of Croatia on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 2011. Government of the Republic of Croatia. |

<sup>6</sup> List of all sources with their original labels in Croatian language is provided in Appendix A

### **3.3 Data Analysis: an overview**

Qualitative data analysis is the contextualized feature of a research process that cannot be separated from the conceptual problems that the research is analyzing in relation with data collected (Gibson and Brown 2009). In this dissertation research, data analysis was planned and conducted as integrated with the conceptualization of a research problem, integrated into the research design and related to actual data collection. The key data analysis steps thus followed the canons of comparative and process-tracing research approaches.

The quest for rich empirical insight meant to enable answers to posed research questions resulted with the collection of a substantial amount of qualitative information in the form of over 500 pages of interview transcripts, numerous documents and ancillary materials, all collected during field work. In order to avoid data overload and to enable later data retrieval, data processing was integrated with data collection as the analysis was taking place in parallel with the field work. Over this process, data retrieved from documents collected early in the research, as well as the initially conducted interviews was condensed and analyzed immediately.

Early qualitative data analysis, it is considered, informs and energizes the fieldwork while the interaction is ongoing between the processing of existing data and designing strategies for the collection of new data (Miles and Huberman 1994). Insights gained through the early analysis were used to identify participants of interviews, documents or sources of statistical data not initially sampled, but proved to be valuable sources of evidence during the field work. Also, early analysis enabled the identification of gaps in the initial cycle of data collection, with these insights used as guidance for the improvements of the protocols for semi-structured interviews.

While taking place in parallel with the interaction with data collection, data analysis was conducted through three congruent flows of activity illustrated in Figure 12. When conceived as a cyclic process, data analysis involves transparent and systematic data reduction and consequent (inductive or deductive) analysis and interpretation of patterns in the coded data. Over this process, data display by means of matrices, graphs, charts or networks is often used to enhance the drawing and verification of conclusions (Miles and Huberman 1994).




Figure 12 Data analysis cycle

Source: Miles and Huberman (1994:12).

The foundational activity in this data analysis cycle is the data reduction through which qualitative information is made manageable and retrievable. It is a process in which data encompassed in the documents or in interview transcripts is selected, bound, simplified, abstracted and transformed into manageable units. When used for structured analysis, such as the ones conducted with comparative or process-tracing methods, data reduction is initiated with the activities of segmenting data into coding units with descriptive or inferential information. Those units are then assigned with a meaning through a coding process. Codes that emerge are then categorized into the coding scheme that serves as an important tool for pattern-seeking and claim verification of claim (Miles and Huberman 1994).

In practice, coding units can encompass chunks of varying sizes or nature. While in the textual type of data these chunks can refer to words, sentences, paragraphs, speech turns or even topics, in this dissertation paragraphs were accessed as the most applicable choice for the structured analyses envisioned by both the comparative and the process-tracing strategy. Data in the form of paragraphs was segmented into coding units by means of the NVivo, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software package that enabled for a faster and more comprehensive handling of the large amount of data collected in the field work. The choice of paragraphs as the coding units was followed through consistently over the entire data analysis process and it was, as illustrated in next two figures, applied on both documents and interview transcripts.






Figure 13 Illustration of data segmentation in the analysis of an interview in NVivo




Figure 14 Illustration of data segmentation in the analysis of a document in Nvivo

After the segmentation of the units, they were assigned with the codes which refer to “tags or labels for assigning the meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study” (Miles and Huberman 1994, p.53). By enabling data retrieval and management, qualitative data analysis codes function as key safeguard tools against the data overload. Moreover, when the coding procedure is applied via data analysis software, codes foster structured analysis by enabling not only the view on the coded segment of text within its context, but also outside that context. In the latter, the decontextualized, view option, a segment is pulled together with other units tagged with the same code (Bazeley and Jackson 2013).

Figure 15 illustrates the way in which the segmented paragraphs of analyzed documents and interviews in this dissertation were assigned with the codes in Nvivo. As both the comparative and the process-tracing study were designed to combine deduction with induction, codes assigned to units varied in their level of abstraction. By drawing on Miles and Huberman’s (1994) approach to qualitative data analysis, the three types of codes were used:

1. Descriptive codes as the most inductive codes usually used to attribute a class of phenomena to a segment of a text
2. Interpretative codes that reflect a researcher’s understanding of data; and,
3. Pattern codes as a more inferential type of codes explaining data in the light of frameworks, theories and models.

The illustrative examples of all three types of codes are provided in Figure 16.




Figure 15 Illustration of the coding process done in NVivo




Figure 16 Code types and examples

Source: Paré (2017).

When the codes created – be it descriptive, inferential or descriptive – are organized, they are awarded hierarchical and thematic families and categorized in the coding scheme. The coding scheme enables a structured analysis and is used as important tool, even a grid, guiding a researcher to detect systematic patterns in coded data or verify hypothesized claims.

The examples and the elaboration of steps in which these three code types were applied and categorized in the coding scheme of the three consequent phases of this dissertation research are provided in the following subsections.

### 3.3.1 Data Analysis: describing variation in modes of implementation

In the first stage of the study, aimed at describing what kind of an implementation mode (or modes) were produced by the reform of social services in Croatia, the collected qualitative data was processed, with a qualitative cross-case analysis preceded by within-case analyses (Miles and Huberman 1994) While the within-case analysis mounted to provide in-depth insight into implementation management of the service selected, comparison across cases enabled the clustering of similar implementation practices into joint modes of implementation. To enable this in a preparatory analytical step, data from interview transcripts and documents was segmented with the NVivo software into codes resembling indicators used for operationalization of the dependent variable, as shown in figure below.




Figure 17 Data segmentation in the first stage of the research

Segmented data was then coded with the use of a provisional scheme of pattern codes organized hierarchically in a list of thematic families. The provisional coding scheme presented in Table 16 was inspired by the Hill and Hupe's threefold distinction between 'enforcement',

‘performance’ and ‘co-production’ modes of implementation and conceptualisation of activities that each mode entails in the management of the policy process, inter-organisational and interpersonal activities. The scheme also included codes that were to enable the coding of data units which could not be aligned with theory-driven, pattern codes.

Table 16 Describing variation in modes of implementation: the initial coding scheme

|  |
|--|
| Implementation activities                                      |
| Managing of the policy process (system level)                  |
| E- Making mandates explicit                                    |
| P- Creating framework for contracting                          |
| C- Evoking joint responsibility                                |
| I - Data on system scale management for inductive coding       |
| Managing inter-organizational relations (organizational level) |
| E -Providing resources and assignments                         |
| P- Enhancing contract compliance                               |
| C- Realizing partnerships                                      |
| I – Data on organization scale management for inductive coding |
| Managing interpersonal contacts (individual level)             |
| E- Realizing compliance  |
| P- Service orientation   |
| C- User empowerment  |
| I- Data on individual scale management for inductive coding    |
| Management mechanism   |
| E-Rules  |
| P-Contracts  |
| C-Trust  |
| I- Data on management tool for inductive coding                |
| Role of government   |
| E- CEO   |
| P-Inspector  |
| C- Coach   |
| I- Data on the role of government for inductive coding         |
| Service type   |
| Home care for older persons                                    |
| Home and foster care for children without parental care        |
| Home and foster care for older persons                         |
| Home and foster care for PWD                                   |
| Personal assistance for PWD                                    |
| Supervision of parental care for families in risk              |

Legend: E= Enforcement, P = performance, C= Co-production, I=Inductive coding

By using this scheme, segmented data was coded both deductively and inductively. In the deductive coding, which is illustrated in Figure 18 below, the patterns used were, as mentioned above, based on the conceptualization of ideal-type modes of implementation presented in the second chapter.




Figure 18 Illustration of deductive coding in first stage: extract from a document



As this part of the analysis was also used to identify and fill the gaps in the existing conceptualization of implementation modes and to describe the potential political capture of implementation, provisional pattern codes were used in an open manner. The coding units adding some new insights were, as illustrated in Figure 19, extracted and further coded with the use of more inductive types of descriptive and interpretative codes.




Figure 19 Illustration of inductive coding in the first stage: extract from an interview

The repeated regularities arising from inductive codes were, with the final coding scheme presented in Table 17, formalized through new pattern codes assigned to those existing ones.

Table 17 Describing variation in modes of implementation: the final coding scheme

|  |
|--|
| Implementation activities  |
| Managing of the policy process (system level)                                |
| E- Making mandates explicit  |
| P- Creating framework for contracting  |
| C- Evoking joint responsibility  |
| D -Fostering local ownership, but keeping political control                  |
| Managing inter-organizational relations (organizational level)               |
| E -Providing resources and assignments                                       |
| P- Enhancing contract compliance   |
| C- Realizing partnerships  |
| D -Local politicians left with the possibility to pursue their own interests |
| Managing interpersonal contacts (individual level)                           |
| E- Realizing compliance  |
| P- Service orientation   |
| C- User empowerment  |
| D- Local political leaders leaving or politicizing micro-management.         |
| Management mechanism   |
| E-Rules  |
| P- Contracts   |
| C-Trust  |
| D- Trust vs. party patronage   |
| Role of government   |
| E- CEO   |
| P-Inspector  |
| C- Coach   |
| D- Enabler vs. clientelistic capo  |
| Service type   |
| Home care for older persons  |
| Home and foster care for children without parental care                      |
| Home and foster care for older persons                                       |
| Home and foster care for PWD   |
| Personal assistance for PWD  |
| Supervision of parental care for families in risk                            |

Legend: E= Enforcement, P=performance, C= Co-production, D=Distorted co-production

While the coding units referring to implementation activities in five services were clustered so to form two modes (performance embedded in enforcement and novel co-production) that could be aligned with what is conceptualized by the implementation literature, the interpretation of the codes related to one service resulted in the formation of the new, third implementation mode characterized by distortion of implementation with patronage practices. These three modes are elaborated in first three sections of chapter four.

### **3.3.2 Data Analysis: verifying the predictions of the causal model**

Three implementation modes that were established in the first stage of study, in the second stage were treated as a variation on dependent variable (Miles and Huberman 1994). The validation of the hypothesized and the search for other factors that could account for the established variation relied on the integration of a case-oriented with a variable-oriented approach. This strategy guided the creation of the coding scheme (Table 18) that structured the iteration between understanding the case dynamics and determining the effects of the institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform, and power and the representation of service users on the reform process and results.

Table 18 Verifying the predictions of the causal model: the coding scheme

|   |
|---|
| <b>Service type</b>   |
| Home and foster care for children without parental care           |
| Home and foster care for the elderly                              |
| Home and foster care for persons with disabilities                |
| Home care for the elderly   |
| Personal assistance for persons with disabilities                 |
| Supervision of parental care                                      |
| <b>Mode of implementation</b>                                     |
| Novel consistent co-production                                    |
| Novel distorted co-production                                     |
| Performance embedded in enforcement                               |
| <b>Pre-existing institutional setting of service provision</b>    |
| Formal rules and regulations                                      |
| Dense web   |
| Scant   |
| <b>Working rules and standard procedures</b>                      |
| Rules-in-form referred by actors                                  |
| Rules-in-form rarely or not referred by actors                    |
| <b>Professional codes or bodies</b>                               |
| Present and active  |
| Not present nor active  |
| <b>The power and representation of service beneficiaries</b>      |
| The presence of an active individual or groups of users           |
| Present   |
| Absent  |
| <b>The involvement of domestic or international organizations</b> |
| Present   |
| Absent  |
| <b>I -Elite decisions on the reform content</b>                   |
| <b>I - Reform process: metagovernance</b>                         |

As the goal of the second stage of the research was to validate and modify the proposed explanation of factors whose combination accounts for the variation in the implementation modes that the reform resulted in, pattern codes were used as the key codes. Inductive types of codes were assigned to those units providing new insights or adding new dimensions to predictions of the causal model. These two coding paths are illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 21, and results of analyses are presented in chapter four.




Figure 20 Illustration of deductive coding in second stage: extract from an interview





Figure 21 Illustration of inductive coding in the second stage: extract from an interview

### 3.3.3 Data Analysis: building the mechanism of captured metagovernance

In the third stage of the research, the collected data was processed by the qualitative analyses that mounted to build a plausible causal mechanism through which the reform led by patronage-driven politicians can lead to the distortion of implementation with patronage practices in services qualified with non-existent or minimal institutional setting and weak or unrepresented beneficiaries. To enable the structured analysis, the theorized process of political metagovernance operationalized as a mechanism comprised of set of six parts (see Figure 9) was used as grid for data segmentation. In this initial step, as shown in Figure 22, extract paragraphs from interview transcripts and documents were segmented in relation to their alignment with the constitutive and directional governance on the system, the organizational and individual action scale.



| Name   | Description | Sources | References |
|--|-------------|---------|------------|
| 0. Conditions  |             | 6       | 8          |
| 1. Institutional redesign                                |             | 25      | 101        |
| 2. Reforming the (inter)organisational setting           |             | 37      | 123        |
| 3. General rule-making for policymaking                  |             | 34      | 187        |
| 4. Re-shaping the policy content                         |             | 18      | 58         |
| 5. Ensuring support and situation bound rule application |             | 9       | 32         |
| 6. Operational governance (OV)                           |             | 27      | 263        |
| Other  |             | 0       | 0          |

Figure 22 Data segmentation in the third stage of the research

This segmented data was then coded with the use of a more specified scheme of codes (Table 19) in which pattern codes resembled the theorized activities of NPG-inspired constitutive and directional governance on the system, the organizational and individual action scale.

Table 19 Building the mechanism of captured metagovernance: the initial coding scheme

|   |
|---|
| <b>Presence of scope conditions</b>                               |
| NPG reform ideas  |
| Powerless status of the elderly in need for care                  |
| Week tradition of service provision                               |
| <b>Causal Factor (X)</b>  |
| Patronage-driven interest of political leaders                    |
| <b>Institutional redesign</b>                                     |
| Endorsing NPG reform and constituting an interactive policy arena |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>Reforming the (inter)organizational setting</b>                |
| Codifying mandate and securing the arena's representativeness     |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>Ensuring internalization of core norms</b>                     |
| Fostering internalization of NPG vision and constitutive norms    |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>General rule-making for policymaking</b>                       |
| Framing policy-making and endorsing the negotiated solution       |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>Re-shaping the policy content</b>                              |
| Participating in the negotiated decision-making process           |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>Ensuring support and situation bound rule application</b>      |
| Fostering acceptance of policy and interactive rule application   |
| Inductive coding  |
| <b>Mode of implementation (Y)</b>                                 |
| Managing policy process   |
| Managing inter-organizational relations                           |
| Managing interpersonal contacts                                   |
| Management mechanisms   |

As the aim of the process-tracing study was to complement the existing conceptualization of political metagovernance and to describe the potential political capture of implementation; the coding units segmented as referring to either one of the three levels of governance but that did not fit into provisional codes were subsequently extracted and further coded. Just like in previous stages, by using the initial coding scheme, segmented data was coded with provisional



pattern codes and with more inductive types of codes used to new pattern codes through several cycles of coding. Each of these two coding paths is exemplified in following two figures.




Figure 23 Illustration of deductive coding in third stage: extract from a document



Figure 24 Illustration of inductive coding in the third stage: extract from an interview

In the last coding cycle, the repeated regularities arising from inductive codes were formalized through new pattern codes assigned to the existing ones and included in the final coding scheme (Table 20) that enabled the inferences on the existence of parts of a plausible hypothetical mechanism to be presented in chapter five.

Table 20 Building the mechanism of captured political metagovernance: final coding scheme

|   |
|---|
| <b>Presence of scope conditions</b>   |
| NPG reform ideas  |
| Powerless status of the elderly in need of care   |
| Week tradition of service provision   |
| <b>Causal Factor (X)</b>  |
| Patronage-driven interest of political leaders  |
| <b>Institutional redesign</b>   |
| Designing a new institutional setting for community-based elderly care                          |
| Detaching a new setting from interlocking the rules of a traditional social care system         |
| <b>Reforming the (inter)organizational setting</b>  |
| Devolving mandate-committing resources to communities in need                                   |
| Ensuring political primacy in the selection of participating communities                        |
| <b>General rule-making for policymaking</b>   |
| Establishing flexible framework for the formation of local elderly care policies                |
| Constituting dysfunctional accountability forums and procedures                                 |
| <b>Re-shaping the policy content</b>  |
| Empowering administrative leaders to nurture established partnerships                           |
| Leaving local political executive with possibility to pursue own leadership style and interests |
| <b>Ensuring support and situation bound rule application</b>                                    |
| Inviting care givers and users to co-create the service during its delivery                     |
| Reinforcing users' dependence   |
| <b>Mode of implementation: Clientelistic coproduction of elderly care (Y)</b>                   |
| System: Fostering local ownership but keeping informal political control.                       |
| Organization: Leaving local executives with the possibility to pursue their own interests       |
| Individual: Local political leaders leaving or politicizing micro-management.                   |
| Individual: Direct provider decides on service content with users                               |

## CHAPTER FOUR

### COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: REFORM RESULTS AND FORCES BEHIND RESULTS

This chapter presents the results of the comparative analysis of collected data in six selected social services. In the first section and its three subsections, the chapter describes and categorizes three modes of implementation that were produced by the reform of the management of service provision. Established implementation modes are, in a second section, treated as the variation on the dependent variable and their occurrence is analyzed with reference to factors that were hypothesized as influential in the shaping of the reform results. In third section, findings of comparable case study are discussed in the light of explanation proposed by the model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context.

#### **4.1 Reform results: three distinctive modes of implementation**

The analysis of data referring to the implementation of selected services has indicated the existence of three distinctive modes of implementation. Supportive services for families at risk and long term accommodation services for the elderly, persons with disabilities (PWD), and children without parental care fit in the first and personal assistance for PWD in the second, undistorted implementation mode. Home care for the elderly, on the other hand, proved to be a case of distorted implementation management in which reform was misused for the development of patronage practices. The implementation activities prevalent in each mode are summarized in the Table 21, while each mode is separately elaborated in the text that follows it.

Table 21 Summary of findings on reform results

| <b>CASE</b>   | <b>Documented reform results</b>   | <b>Characterization of resulting mode</b>             |
|---|--|---|
| <b>Long-term care in homes and foster homes for the elderly (accommodation)</b>                     | Modernized version of the implementation mode prevailing before the reform | Performance embedded in pre-existing enforcement mode |
| <b>Long- term care in homes and foster homes for children without parental care (accommodation)</b> |  |   |
| <b>Long- term care in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities (accommodation)</b>      |  |   |
| <b>Psychological and social support for families at risk</b>  |  |   |
| <b>Personal assistance for persons with disabilities</b>  | Novel implementation mode consistently reflecting reformist ideas          | Novel and consistent co-production mode               |
| <b>Home care for the elderly</b>  | Novel implementation mode distorted with party patronage                   | Novel and captured co-production                      |

### **4.1.1 Novel and captured co-production mode**

Home care, as indicated in the analysis of documents and interviews at hand, has represented one of the most developing, but also the most heavily fragmented social services over the past decade. Not only was this service locally supported and organized by a countless variety of actors at the time when research data was collected, but it was also nationally coordinated through two completely disconnected trajectories. Two trajectories are relevant for this dissertation; they were the ones functioning as national programs in the year 2013, encompassing over 16,700 beneficiaries, which was 2.3 per cent<sup>7</sup> of the elderly population in Croatia at the time.

While the service was provided within the traditional state social care system in the first trajectory, in the second one the provision relied on the ‘system of intergenerational solidarity’ in which home care was nationally coordinated, but managed by county and local governments. During 2013 and 2014, when data for the study was collected, both trajectories were coordinated by the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth, but until 2012 the second one was run separately by the Ministry for Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS). After the change of government and the abolishment of MFVAIS, the second trajectory was placed under the umbrella of the new Ministry of Social Policy in 2012. Even though this institution also coordinated the home care within the social care system, the integration and restructuring of the arrangements for the provision of services for senior citizens was postponed until the full enforcement of a new Act on Social Care adopted at the beginning of 2014.

As the analysis of documents and interviews has indicated, both trajectories preserved their structure in the meantime, as well as the activities and techniques developed by the previous government. The evidenced features of the home care implementation management are summarized in Table 22 and further elaborated in text that follows it.

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<sup>7</sup> According to census data from 2011, 758.633 persons older than 65 lives in Croatia

Table 22 Implementation management of the home care provision: the final pattern codes

| <i>CASE</i>                 | <i>Label of implementation mode</i>                                      | <i>Management of policy process</i>   | <i>Management of inter-organizational relations</i>  | <i>Management of inter-personal contacts</i>   | <i>Central mgmt. mechanism</i>                                      | <i>Role of government</i>      |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--|--|---|--------------------------------|
| HOME CARE FOR OLDER PERSONS | Novel clientelistic co-production overshadowing pre-existing enforcement | Parallel arrangements for service provision, with the domination of the new trajectory in which government was fostering local ownership, but kept informal political control | In the novel dominating trajectory, local political executives left with the possibility to pursue their own interests and to use their own capacity in arranging care provision | Local political leaders authorizing home care coordinators or politicizing micro-management. Direct provider decides on service content with users | Trust and the golden thread vs. party patronage overshadowing rules | Enabler vs. clientelistic capo |

In the first, traditional, trajectory, the state maintained monopoly over assignment of the right to home care service and mandated it to the de-concentrated network of public bodies – to the Centers for Social Work (CSWs). Since the beginning of 2000s service provision itself was organized through contracts which CSWs were signing with Centres for Nursing and Care or Social Welfare Homes for the elderly. Even though the framework for subcontracting was allowing both private and non-profit actors to act as providers, contracting choices reflected the Ministry's inclination toward public institutions. In the year 2012<sup>8</sup>, for 73 per cent of the beneficiaries encompassed by this program, home care was outsourced to thirty-three Social Welfare Homes, all founded by county governments and subsidized by the central state. For the remaining 23 per cent of beneficiaries, care was provided by twenty nine Nursing Centres, institutions specialized for elderly care and founded either by municipal governments or non-profit organisations such as the Caritas and the Red Cross.

In relation with the CSWs, the central government preserved the director role and was providing them with resources and assignments defined by strict rules and protocols outlined in the thick social care regulation. With contracted providers, the state took up the role of a regulator and an inspector, while shifting its focus toward ensuring contract compliance. Contracts signed between CSWs and Welfare Homes or Nursing Centres were hence not so much about the stipulation of rules of conduct as they were about the specification of expected performance and outputs of service provision. Even though the CSWs had no mandate to interfere in the operative decisions made by contracted providers, the control over service delivery was ensured with the codification of quality standards and related overseeing authority of the state inspection.

The contractual provision of home care with was marked by flexible, but at the same time standardized organization of service provision. On the other hand, the assignment of the right to the service to individual beneficiaries proved to be not as flexible. Acting as case managers, the CSWs were applying strict means which were testing the approval of the right to home care. As emphasized by a professional providing home care, the combination of strictness in the

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<sup>8</sup> Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Youth (*Katalog prava i usluga za starije i odrasle osobe. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih*).



approval and flexibility in implementation resulted in a nicely designed service that was rather resistant to any kind of manipulation, but was rarely used.

*“Home care is nicely designed and providers follow standards, but the fact is that this service is relatively rarely assigned based on the approval of the CSWs. The census prescribed by the Social Care Act is really low and not many citizens can pass the means test. Older citizens which could even be eligible, are either not aware of its existence or do not know how to get it.”(Interview 45, manager in Centre for Social Welfare)*

Official data confirms this statement and, as Figure 25 shows, in the year 2013, home care within this trajectory was provided only to seven per cent of the total number of beneficiaries encompassed by two national home care programs.

More flexibility in implementation arrangement and a much wider outreach was accomplished with arrangements developed in the course of the reform by the Ministry of the Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS) which in 2004 established a pilot of home care services and expanded it to a nation-wide program in the year 2007. As Figure 25 shows, by the year 2013, this program completely overshadowed the traditional home care and with more than 15.500 users and a 93 percent share in number of overall national home care beneficiaries, became the most comprehensive, most expensive, and was treated as prevailing trajectory among all home care services in the interpretation of findings due to this fact.




Figure 25 Users of 'old' and 'new' home care trajectory: trends over the past 10 years

Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Annual Statistical Reports and various reports by the Ministry of Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity: *Rezultati evaluacije programa "Pomoć u kući stariji osobama" 2004. godina. 2005. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Programi "Pomoći u kući" i Dnevni boravak" Izvješće za JIM. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih, Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008 do 2011 godine. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Programi Uprave za međugeneracijsku solidarnost (Prikaz programa ugovorenih 2015 godine), Izvješće Ministarstva obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti za Ministarstvo uprave, Godišnja statistička izvješća o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj. Ministarstvo za demografiju, obitelj, mlade i socijalnu politiku.*

The declared objectives for the introduction of the new arrangement for home care provision were to mobilize community stakeholders towards a joint care for elderly citizens and foster the wider inclusion of elderly citizens, their empowerment and enhanced involvement in service delivery. This was also emphasized in the Program's preamble (Program for Development of Services for Elderly Citizens in the System of Intergenerational Solidarity, 2007: 3)<sup>10</sup>:

“Activities of intergenerational solidarity are contributing to the creation of conditions for a dignified living of elderly citizens, protection of their human rights, insurance of their independence, social inclusion and active participation in the decision-making about their life and the life of their community, awareness-raising among younger generations about aging and the need of their elderly family members, neighbors and community members, and engagement of young and elderly citizens in programs that meant to enhance mutual understanding, the sharing of knowledge and joint action that should bring benefit to all. Solidarity among generations at all levels; in family, neighborhood, local community, regional and state level follows the United Nations' devotion to the creation of a society for all generations.”

To attain the declared objectives, the government decided to rely on more horizontal types of steering and to promote the inclusion of a wide spectrum of actors in the implementation process. Both novelties in the management of home care were introduced by means of co-production—with the national government signing an agreement on co-funding and cooperation with the units of regional/local self-administration, which then in turn organized the provision themselves or together with non-profit organisations and homes for the elderly. Agreements were signed for two versions of partnership arrangements: solo home care and home care that was complemented with the state's support to local units that wanted to open a day care center in their community.

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<sup>10</sup> *Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007.*

While the program was managed by the MFVAIS, decisions on the funding of home care service were done through an open call and the process of competition among counties and municipalities which expressed interest for service provision. For the combined care, as the interviewed actors involved program coordination explained, funding was not decided based on open calls, but agreements were signed with those municipalities that demonstrated devotion and results in implementing home care:

*“Combined day care and home care was more than the employment and management of service providers. It was also an infrastructural investment in the day care center. In order to ensure a sustainable investment and service provision, we placed the focus on more evolved municipalities. So the decision was not made through public calls, but we were observing the progress of municipalities which had received funding for home care and the best ones were invited to expand their home care services with the day care element.” (Interview 4, managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy)*

While fostering counties and municipalities to engage in the collaborative organisation of service provision, the MFVAIS acted as the enabler. The analysis of qualitative and quantitative data referring to the implementation of the program revealed that this role, however, was merged with the role of a clientelistic capo in practice, while the realisation of a co-production was followed by the distortion of implementation with patronage practices of the ruling party. The choices on the state funding, as the political official in the Ministry of Social Policy highlighted, reflected the real needs, but political links were employed as well:

*“The financing of home care within intergenerational solidarity is mainly centralized—counties and municipalities are participating in the costs with approx. 23%. As to, well, how to say, the management of the Program during the previous Government - cooperation agreements with counties and municipalities were not only reflecting the need to expand the network of services in certain communities, but were also a matter of discretionary decisions made by politicians.” (Interview 1, Assistant Minister)*

The perception of additional political criteria employed in the decision-making process was also present among counties and municipalities that competed for financial support:

*“We couldn’t get the funds because, to be quite honest, politics played a role here – we just have a different party in power. We contacted the Ministry of Intergenerational Solidarity and the Minister. Even more than that, the former county mayor and I went to Zagreb and reached an agreement with program coordinators...but we just could not reach the point of signing the contract. Unlike us, one municipality in our county area was able to get the signature, but the fact is that the local government there was formed by HDZ. That is why they were able to ensure the signature. That municipality does a great job with home care, no doubt about that, but we regret the fact that our home care, which, by the way, we had developed even before the Ministry launched the program, did not get a chance for co-funding. So we decided to continue our work without the help from the Ministry.” (Interview 32, senior civil servant in regional/ local government).*

Here it is important to qualify that the affiliation of the mayor or the political profile of city/commune council most plausibly acted just as an additional, but not the only decision-making criterion. As emphasized by the interviewed actors, for counties and municipalities that had a different political profile than the national executive it was still possible to receive funding:

*“We contacted the Ministry in 2006 and offered cooperation. The Ministry soon invited our representatives to a meeting and a few months later we signed the contract. In the beginning we thought that the funding decision is exclusively political - but as our county government was formed by a different political option, the Ministry demonstrated to us that we were wrong.” (Interview 29, senior civil servant in regional/ local government)*

Nevertheless, the fact that municipalities not fitting the political criteria were still able to receive funding does not dismiss the account of many an interview participant on the biased selection of actors participating in the implementation network. This account was also supported by the

statistical analysis on the structure of fund recipients. By the end of 2011, which was the year in which HDZ lost the national election, the number of signed agreements for home care services encompassed fifty nine counties and municipalities, out of which 89 per cent had a mayor who was a member of political parties in government - HDZ and its coalition partners – even though HDZ and its partners were in power in only 66 per cent out of 576 Croatian counties, cities and communes (see Figure 26).




Figure 26 New home care: structure of fund recipients in the period 2010- 2013

Sources: Ministry of Social Policy and Faculty of Political Science<sup>11</sup>.

In comparison, combined home and day care agreements were signed with 30 municipalities, 70% of which were ruled by HDZ and partners. Combined care in which funding was primarily a matter of a discretionary decision made by higher civil servants, not politicians, reflects a wider perspective of party power share much more than the solo home care funding. After the Program

<sup>11</sup> *Područja i provoditelji Programa "Pomoć u kući starijim osobama" u 2011 godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih and Čular, Goran. 2013. Data base of results of county and municipal elections in 2009.*

was placed under the new Ministry for Social Policy, there were no more open calls for solo home care. However, as the result of a strong opposition of supported localities to the restructuring of the program, partnership agreements from the end of 2011 were just re-signed at the beginning of 2012 and 2013.

In the second half of 2013, when data on implementation management was collected, local actors included in the implementation network were still strongly opposing any changes in program management. In their interviews, they emphasized the fear of losing national funding and their devotion to keeping their authority over the actual organisation of care provision as the main reasons behind this opposition. The MFVAIS and its elected officials granted the latter role to local governments, but kept tight control over the selection process. Moreover, once the partnership agreements were signed, the central government would actually leave the local political executive with the possibility to pursue their own interests and to use their own capacity for making autonomous operative decisions. National civil servants acting as program coordinators were given the task of nurturing the realisation of the established implementation partnerships accordingly.

Collaboration and local ownership instead of subordination and reliance on the national initiative were to be steered through managerial reliance on trust as well as by the ‘golden thread’ that implied steering through controlling the budget and personnel. Partnership agreements would specify the expenses and personnel for care provision on the basis of 100 or 200 beneficiaries. As an illustration, home-care services for 100 beneficiaries were meant to be provided by teams with six members (geronto-hostess, a nurse and assistant worker) and a team-leader. The government could, to some extent, monitor how many people are circuited as through the budget, but the number of beneficiaries that one team worked with could not be checked. So although reports sent to the Ministry by counties and municipalities were pointing that standards outlined in partnership agreement were met by all municipalities, interviews with actors indicated that practice varied significantly in reality:

*“In our home-care program the city government provides co-funding and doesn’t interfere in service provision. It is my responsibility, as a team leader, to coordinate and monitor the work of geronto-hostesses. I meet with them weekly and they write daily reports on services they have provided,*

*beneficiaries they have visited and materials they have spent.....I am also writing reports to the Ministry. But I know about more than one case in which home care team-leaders are not the ones creating the narrative and financial reports. Municipality mayors are not letting them do so... They just say: "What do you care, just sign the financial report" ... and those team leaders sometimes may not even know what is written in that report." (Interview 53, home care team coordinator in a non-profit organisation)*

Due to the lack of nationally-applied oversight mechanisms and loose vertical couplings between civil servants in the Ministry and the funded units of regional/local self-administration, the actual application of co-production was dependent on the leadership style of local and national political executives. As a result, while in some counties and municipalities politicians left the micro-management to home care team leaders or community organisations, in others local governments decided to manage the care provision directly and politicize it. The latter choice in most cases implied that the decisions on recruitment of home care staff were made not only based on a candidate's competences, but also in accordance with her/his party affiliation.

In this way, trust as a management mechanism was often replaced by party patronage. As one local public manager described, in the localities in which this scenario took place, the recruitment of party supporters as service providers became the biggest concern for the local political executive and, when election time comes, so did the monitoring of their compliance with the clientelistic bargain:

*"In our county area, it was often the case that the biggest fuss was about the recruitment of direct service providers. The most important question was who will get the job, and in answering that question, party affiliation or connection with the party was crucial. Then, before the local election, the party would watch closely who was actively lobbying for whom." (Interview 28, senior civil servant in regional/local government)*



As often indicated by the interviewed actors, politicized hiring of home care staff was more present in communities in which home care was designed as the municipal program with care givers as municipal employees. Despite the fact that since the Program was expanded into a nation-wide initiative in the year 2007, program coordinators were frequently reminding counties and municipalities that the practice corresponding with the Program's premises would be to give up the recruitment and management of home care teams, out of a total of 1045 caregivers that in 2012 acted as service providers, 39% of them were still directly employed and coordinated by local governments.<sup>12</sup>

In the communities included in the implementation network, the inclusion of beneficiaries in service provision was not associated with means' testing, but was guided by general indicators such as age, the existence of a family support network, health condition<sup>13</sup>, and left to the discretion of home care teams. As the program guidelines were just framing the basic elements of service, such as cleaning the house or making lunch, direct service providers were the ones designing the specific combination of these elements and adjusting it to the needs of each beneficiary. Although the interviewed actors were often criticizing such a high level of discretion, they have nevertheless emphasised that the flexible implementation setting enabled the creation of relevant, accessible and user-centred service for the elderly.

*“This program reached beneficiaries who might have had an income slightly above the income census but did not have the service network available and were thus in need. What is more, as users of home care are passive by default and often not able to pursue their rights, the fact that the service was coming*

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<sup>12</sup> *Područja i provoditelji Programa "Pomoć u kući starijim osobama" u 2011 godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih (List of Localities and Contracted Actors for the Implementation of Home Care Program in 2010-2013.)*

<sup>13</sup> *Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007.*

*to them gave solutions for obstacles which the social care system fights with because of its immobility”. (Interview 19, researchers/consultant)*

However, in communities branded by patronage practices, as vividly illustrated by a former program coordinator, staff recruitment choices were sometimes made in direct opposition to user needs or wishes:

*“We received complaints from the field that mayors were misusing their powers. For example, after the recent local election, the party that was running the government changed in City X. As soon as he/she gained power as the new mayor, he/she changed the whole home care team. Although we act as program coordinators, we had no mandate to give them orders. All we could do was to ask the mayor not to do that, but that had no effect. Unfortunately, after the old team was fired, beneficiaries were really sad and deprived because they grew attached to their former geronto-hostesses. But with politics there is no mercy.” (Interview 6, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy)*

#### **4.1.2 Novel and consistent co-production mode**

The second service analyzed—personal assistant for PWD—was also created in the course of reforms as a special project of MFVAIS. It was designed in order to provide people with the most severe type and degree of disability help in their everyday activities such as personal hygiene, shopping, cooking, as well as assistance in children upbringing, travel and work-related activities. Similarly to the new home care, as Figure 27 shows, personal assistance started as a pilot project in 2006 with 78 beneficiaries and gradually grew into a nationwide program encompassing 631 PWDs in the year 2012.




Figure 27 The growth of the personal assistance program over the years

Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Youth<sup>14</sup>

After the change of government and the abolishment of MFVAIS in 2011, the program was—just like home care—placed under the umbrella of the new Ministry for Social Policy. The analysis of documents and interviews indicated that till the year 2013 the program kept its structure, activities and techniques in the form similar to what was developed by the previous government. The evidenced features of the personal assistant implementation management are summarized in Table 23 and elaborated in the text that follows it.

<sup>14</sup> *Inicijalno izvješće Republike Hrvatske o provedbi Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom Ujedinjenih naroda- 2011. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih, Izvješće o provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine u 2011. godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih, Izvješće o provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine u 2012. godini. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.*

Table 23 Implementation management of the personal assistance service: the final pattern codes<sup>15</sup>

| CASES   | <i>Label of implementation mode</i> | <i>Management of policy process</i>   | <i>Management of inter-organisational relations</i>   | <i>Management of (external and internal) inter-personal contacts</i>  | <i>Central mgmt. instrument</i>    | <i>Government role</i> |
|---|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| PERSONAL ASSISTANT FOR PERSONS WITH DISSABILITY | Novel consistent co-production      | Establishing shared values and responsibility with associations representing disabled persons | Civil servants nurturing implementation partnerships with associations acting as autonomous service providers | Ensuring professionalism in everyday work and a user-centered approach. Beneficiary autonomously decides on the service content | Trust, voluntary quality standards | Coach                  |

<sup>15</sup> Analysis presented in this section and elements of section were used in a published article co-authored by the author of this dissertation: Howlett, Michael, Anka Kekez i Ora Poocharoen. 2017. “Understanding Co-Production as a Policy Tool: Integrating New Public Governance and Comparative Policy Theory.” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 19 (5): 487–501. DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2017.1287445.

The *National Strategy for Equalizing Opportunities for People with Disability*<sup>16</sup>, was the policy base of the new service by means of which the government embraced collaborative arrangements with persons with disabilities (PWD) and their associations, while prioritizing services that fostered their independence, effective participation and inclusion in the society. The framework for this was provided by the grant scheme through which associations of persons with disabilities and other non-profit organizations were invited to propose programs envisioning independence and social inclusion of PWDs<sup>17</sup>. When designing this grant scheme, political and administrative leaders followed the spirit of the National Strategy and acted primarily as facilitators and evokers of joint responsibility.

As regards the management of the policy process, this implied putting focus on establishing shared values, done through the usage of quality standards which, among others, emphasised accessibility and appropriateness of service, encouraged a holistic approach to problem-solving and service delivery, and stressed the importance of enhancing users' engagement in service provision<sup>18</sup>. These standards had a voluntary character, but the approval of projects within this grant scheme was attached to the expectation of the willingness and ability of associations to integrate these principles into service provision<sup>19</sup>. In order to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility, the government was inviting associations to propose their own design of a personal assistance

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<sup>16</sup> *Nacionalna strategija izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine*, NN 63/07.

<sup>17</sup> *Poziv za prijavu trogodišnjih programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije osobama s invaliditetom u Republici Hrvatskoj za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. godine. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.*

<sup>18</sup> *Pravilnik o standardima kvalitete socijalnih usluga*, NN 143/2014.

<sup>19</sup> *Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za osobe s invaliditetom u RH za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.*

program, to establish their own network of local partners, and to create an implementation structure that would be sustainable after the grant expires.

Application assessment criteria reflected this focus. What is more, of a maximum of 100 points per applicant, an association could score 25 for financial and management capacities for program implementation, 25 for relevance of proposed program, 25 for quality of implementation structure, 15 for sustainability, and 15 for budget and efficiency of their project proposals<sup>20</sup>. Such grant scheme design raised standards for the entrance in the network of service providers to rather high level. However, in practice, standards proved to be too high for many associations, especially for those coming from less developed or rural areas. Moreover, as was highlighted by a representative of the manager of an organization of associations for PWD, the fact that the program functioned as a grant scheme and not as a right granted by law was impeding its potential for bigger outreach and sustainability.

*“The project was formed as the pilot project, but the idea was that it was soon supposed to become formulated as the legal act and the service would become a legally granted right. That has not yet happened, and not many associations can meet the criteria set by the grant scheme. Moreover, many small cities, villages and islands do not even have associations that could run such a program. Any person with a higher degree of disability should have right to this service, no matter if he or she lives in Split, or in Meden Dolac, Lastovo or any other small place. It is true, associations from bigger cities can and do apply for the grant to provide beneficiaries that live in areas reachable to them, but then again, this is not systematic solution”. (Interview 18, Representative of the umbrella organization of associations for PWD)*

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<sup>20</sup> Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za osobe s invaliditetom u RH za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.

Statistical data complemented this account as in the year 2011 the application on the grant was approved to 40 associations all registered in cities, and most of these cities were bigger or more development ones<sup>21</sup>. Nevertheless, the same data indicated that the described design of the grant scheme also resulted in a rather politically balanced structure of fund recipients. As Figure 28 shows, out of these 40 associations, 48 percent were from cities that had a mayor who was a member of political parties acting as national incumbents, while national incumbents were at that time ruling in 54 out of a total of 127 Croatian cities.




Figure 28 Personal assistance service: structure of fund recipients in 2011<sup>22</sup>

Source: Ministry of Social Policy and Faculty of Political Science.

<sup>21</sup> *Popis odobrenih programa u natječaju za osiguravanje usluge osobnog asistenta 2011-2013. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih (List of approved grants for personal assistance service.)*

<sup>22</sup> *Popis odobrenih programa u natječaju za osiguravanje usluge osobnog asistenta 2011-2013. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih and Čular, Goran. 2013. Data base of results of county and municipal elections in 2009.*

In addition, as interviewed actors were also emphasizing, the grant scheme was constantly improving so since 2013 it awarded funds for a period of three years instead just one year as was the initial case. As a managerial civil servant working on this program highlighted, this enhanced the prospects for sustainability of service and its results.

*“As this is now a multi-year grant scheme, associations are truly developing their capacities and the Ministry can count on them for the provision of the personal assistance service after the grant period expires. When it was just a one year program, it was really making associations feel insecure about next year’s funding, and it was impacting their focus and general atmosphere. The goal is that this program becomes a part of the Social Care Act, but we need to make condition for that- both in relation to budget and capacities for service provision in the communities.” (Interview 3, managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy)*

Even though grant arrangement did not mean complete weakening of vertical connections, in this service the Ministry relinquished a substantial part of its control. In line with that, in managing inter-organisational relations, the focus was placed on practicing and fostering partnerships. As assessed by those interviewed, the Ministry was giving grantees a space for discretion in managing the service.

*“We have autonomy in running the service, the Ministry treats us as equals and, more importantly, as equally responsible for achieving the outcomes. We have ability to arrange service provision to complement is with other services that we are providing to our members and to adjust it to the specific needs of the users of personal assistance. ....it is really flexible arrangement...and sometimes I even feel that the space for autonomy is too big, as we have to autonomously deal with many new issues that arise in everyday implementation and that are not codified or standardized by programmatic documents.” (Interview 54, Coordinator of personal assistants in an association for PWD)*



Using trust as an important management mechanism, civil servants limited formal control to reports in which associations reported their expenditures, outputs and progress in the achievement of results. On an annual basis, Ministry representatives visited grant recipients, but these visits were more of the coaching nature than that of an oversight. Acting as a coach, the Ministry was also steering joint action in communities by validating more projects relaying on partnerships with other direct institutional service providers and/or counties/municipalities<sup>23</sup>.

The partnership approach also marked the management of interpersonal contacts which was done by local associations whose members were also users of the service. An important aspect of service provision was the combination of professionalism and a user-centred approach. On the one side personal assistants acting as service providers had defined working hours (20 hours weekly - 80 monthly) and activities which include 1) assistance with the core set of self-care activities; (2) maintenance of personal hygiene and basic health services, (3) assistance with legal or administrative tasks and (4) company during different social activities<sup>24</sup>. On the other side, the way the service was provided was determined primarily in partnership with beneficiaries. According to an Ethics Code designed especially for this service, the beneficiary of personal assistance was autonomously deciding on the content of the service while respecting the integrity and rights of his/her assistant. As stated by an interview service user, persons with disability have become subject of action, and not the object of help.

*“I have had a personal assistant for few years now and we decide jointly everything that she will do, when, for how long, how... it is a very close relationship... in which we make sure that both of us are satisfied with how our collaboration works... and thanks this service I*

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<sup>23</sup> *Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za osobe s invaliditetom u RH za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.*

<sup>24</sup> *Etički kodeks za osobnog asistenta i korisnika usluga. 2008. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.*

*am able to do so much more than before... I am not sure how I could imagine my life without my personal assistant.”(Interview 65, user of personal assistance service)*

### **4.1.3 Enforcement upgraded with performance mode**

The provision of remaining four services which include supervision of parental care for families in risk and the accommodation in homes (or foster homes) for older citizens, children without parental care and persons with disabilities, takes place within the social care system, defined by a detailed regulatory framework. Analysis of this framework and interviews with policy actors engaged in its implementation revealed a layered character of the setting for provision of all four services. In the course of the reform managerial focus on performance proved to have dominant influence, while traditional input-based control was complemented with reformist output-based measurement and management. Nevertheless, the governmental monopoly and hierarchal structure of traditional social care system were not replaced but only upgraded with adding elements of contracting out type of provision. This reform brought about proliferation of service forms and providers, as the analysis highlighted, but the dominance of state-founded or state-subsidized institutions is still visible:

*“Although outsourcing has become the new fashion in social policy, in all accommodation of services, the state still plays the main role... Well, there might be differences between accommodations for different users’ groups, for example – contracting of non-state providers is more dominant in the homes for elderly persons than in, let say..., homes for persons with disabilities. But, even then, the state is still heavily involved in the organization of service provision.” (Interview 17, researcher/ consultant)*

Key features of this hybrid implementation mode are summarized in Table 24 and elaborated in the text that follows it.

Table 24 Implementation management of the supervision of parental care and accommodation services: the final pattern codes<sup>25</sup>.

| <i>CASES</i>   | <i>Management of policy process</i>  | <i>Management of inter-organizational relations</i>  | <i>Management of (external and internal) inter-personal contacts</i>                                    | <i>Central mgmt. instrument</i> | <i>Role of government</i>            |
|--|--|--|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accommodation in homes and foster homes for older citizens, children without parental care, persons with disabilities, and the supervision of parental care for families in risk | Ensuring explicit mandates and creating a framework for contracting with general inclination to public care providers.<br>The exception are long term care for children without the parental care where the most preferred providers are foster families | Providing subordinate bodies with resources and assignments while ensuring contract compliance of service providers<br><br>Vertical lines are loosened in relation with organizations contracted for service provision | Service providers are guided with standard operating procedures<br><br>Emergence of service orientation | Rules and contracts             | Director vs. regulator and inspector |

<sup>25</sup> Analysis presented in this section and elements of section were used in a published article co-authored by the author of this dissertation: Kekez, Anka i Daniela Širinić (2017) „Neposredna implementacija javnih politika u zajednici: modeli u praksi hrvatske socijalne politike“ (Implementing Public Policy in Community: Models in the Practice of Croatian Social Policy). In *Gradani, javna uprava i lokalna samouprava: povjerenje, suradnja, potpora*, Edited by Ivan Koprić, Anamatija Musa and Teo Giljević, Teo, 423- 36. Zagreb: Institut za javnu upravu.

Among these four services, long-term care and accommodation for both elderly and persons with disabilities in 2013, for example, was primarily provided by social welfare homes which, if they were in line with national normative standards<sup>26</sup>, could be founded not only by state but also by county and local governments, private companies and the non-governmental sector, in particular the Caritas and the Red Cross.

The reformist wave in 2001 brought the idea of decentralization of social and educational services with homes for elderly becoming first, and so far, the only county-owned welfare residential institutions. However, functional decentralization was not accompanied with the fiscal decentralization, and county homes continued to be heavily subsidized by the state. Since the ‘decentralization’ took place, state continued to transfer significant funds annually to counties for this purpose and is accompanying this transfer with the specific guidelines for allocation of funds<sup>27</sup>.

At the same time, institutional accommodation for the elderly became the fastest growing type of long-term care, attracting considerable interest of the private sector. In 2013, as Table 25 shows, there were 130 homes for the elderly accommodating 2 per cent of the overall population of older persons in the country<sup>28</sup>. Although about 63 percent of these institutions were privately owned, county-founded public homes still accommodated 69 percent of all elderly care home residents.

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<sup>26</sup> This relates to Social Care Act: *Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi*, NN 157/13, 152/14 and a number of lower level acts operationalizing it.

<sup>27</sup> *Godišnja odluka o minimalnim financijskim standardima, kriterijima i mjerilima za decentralizirano financiranje domova za starije i nemoćne osobe.*

<sup>28</sup> According to census data from 2011 in Croatia lives 758 633 persons older than 65 years, while state, county and other homes are jointly accommodating 15 488

In the case of homes for children and adults with disabilities<sup>29</sup>, the dominance of public institutions in service provision is even more visible. Here, the state in 2013 acted as the founder of 68 per cent of 41 social welfare homes targeting this population and in 2013 state facilities were accommodating 78 per cent of all residents.

Table 25 Accommodation for older persons and persons with disabilities in residential facilities

| <b>Type of facility by owner</b>            | <b>Number of facilities and users in 2013</b> |              |
|---|---|--------------|
|   | <i>Facilities</i>                             | <i>Users</i> |
| State homes for older persons               | 2   | 164          |
| County homes for older persons              | 45  | 10666        |
| Non-state homes for older persons           | 83  | 4658         |
| State homes for persons with disability     | 28  | 1864         |
| Non-state homes for persons with disability | 13  | 534          |

Sources: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> Analysis of official statistical data about users of service for persons with disabilities was guided by an official state categorisation and it, thus, encompassed children and adult persons with physical, intellectual and sensory disabilities.

<sup>30</sup> Reports are: *Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2013. godini*; *Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2013. godini*.

Secondary providers of accommodation for both target groups are foster families and family homes that have emerged in the course of reform as alternative, non-institutional, forms of long-term care. In 2013 family homes functioned as a hybrid between foster family and standard homes. It usually provided care for five to 20 adult persons, or four to ten children which, just like with foster family, live with the family of the service provider.

Even though family homes and –even more- foster families were by emphasized in several strategic documents<sup>31</sup> as the solution for the lack of capacity and flexibility within the public sector, majority of interviewed actors have in 2013 assessed that when it comes to services provided to older citizens and persons with disability these homes still have only compensatory or supplemental role when compared to the importance of institutional long-term care. This assessment comes through clearly in the following remarks by a manager in the Centre for Social Welfare:

*“The accommodation of adult persons, be it elderly citizen in need for long term care or person with disability, in foster families or family homes still functions only as a compensating option. In the last ten years I can remember several situations where our Centre was facing big challenges when we had to accommodate an older person, but there was no available capacities in homes we had contract with...For persons who several years ago had no available family support, who could not stay at their home and wait for the place in a county home, and who had no financial means to go to private homes that are, to be*

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<sup>31</sup> These documents are: *Plan deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne skrbi i drugih pravnih osoba koje obavljaju djelatnost socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj 2011- 2016 (2018). 2010. Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi; Nacionalna strategija izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine, NN 63/07.*

*frank really really expensive – we had to combine options with hospitals. Now in a similar situation we use foster families or family homes, but – especially in a case of an older citizen – we are referring beneficiaries to these providers only when other options are exhausted”. (Interview 48, manager in the Centre for Social Welfare)*

Official data are supporting this account. As the the Table 26 and Figure 29 show, in 2013 family homes and foster families for both older persons and persons with disabilities had three times smaller capacity than social welfare homes. Interviewed actors and statistical data have equally showed that long-term care for both these groups was also provided by non-profit, religious or private organizations that were not registered either as home or foster family, but were allowed to accommodate either older citizens or persons with disabilities. While in the accommodation for persons with disabilities this kind of service arrangement was primarily encompassing long term care traditionally provided by the religious organizations, in the accommodation for older persons the actors providing such care were mainly for-profit organizations.

Table 26 Key numbers on accommodation services provided to all three target groups in 2013

|                           | <b>Persons with disability</b> |                                       | <b>Older persons</b>   |                                       | <b>Children without parental care</b> |                                       |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
|                           | <i>Number of users</i>         | <i>Share in total number of users</i> | <i>Number of users</i> | <i>Share in total number of users</i> | <i>Number of users</i>                | <i>Share in total number of users</i> |
| <b>State home</b>         | 1864                           | 54%                                   | 164                    | 1%                                    | 697                                   | 24%                                   |
| <b>County home</b>        | /                              | /                                     | 10666                  | 59%                                   | /                                     | /                                     |
| <b>Non-state home</b>     | 534                            | 16%                                   | 4658                   | 26%                                   | 221                                   | 8%                                    |
| <b>Other legal entity</b> | 115                            | 3%                                    | 193                    | 1%                                    | 114                                   | 4%                                    |
| <b>Family home</b>        | 77                             | 2%                                    | 341                    | 2%                                    | 24                                    | 1%                                    |
| <b>Foster family</b>      | 844                            | 25%                                   | 2171                   | 12%                                   | 1867                                  | 64%                                   |
| <b>Total</b>              | 3434                           | 100%                                  | 18193                  | 100%                                  | 2923                                  | 100%                                  |

Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.



In the long-term care for children without parental care and children in risk of losing parental care, the relation between institutional and non-institutional care is reversed, as foster families in 2013 were providing care for almost two thirds of children in this target group. The one third of children without parental care were living in 22 institutions, among which the primary role was held by 14 state homes that were caring for 24 per cent of service users. Apart from state facilities, institutional care was provided by two non-state homes<sup>32</sup> and six institutions established by religious organization that were not formally established as a home but were still considered as institutional care givers by the state.

The choice of foster families as main care providers for children without parental care was also established in key strategic documents<sup>33</sup> that were emphasizing commitment to de-institutionalization of care for this target group since late 2000s. This strategic orientation was also confirmed by policy-makers in interviews.

*“Children without adequate parental care are our priority group for the de-institutionalization process. This process implies the substitution of institutional accommodation with the alternative care that is provided in communities. Our plan is to achieve this by enabling and supporting the reintegration of children with their biological families. When or while that is not possible, then the first alternative option is placement in foster*

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<sup>32</sup> Both of these homes are founded by SOS Children’s Villages that provides a special type of family based care with the special role of ‘SOS mothers’ and accommodation provided in houses located in a specially designed village. Nevertheless, such arrangement of service provisions in Croatia is categorized as the institutional care.

<sup>33</sup> Even more, these documents were envisioning that by 2013, 80 per cent children would be accommodated in alternative forms of care and only 20 percent in institutional.

Documents are: *Zajednički memorandum o socijalnom uključivanju, Plan deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne skrbi za razdoblje od 2011. do 2018. godine, Nacionalni plan aktivnosti za prava i interese djece od 2006. do 2012., Strategija za zaštitu i pomicanje prava djece u Republici Hrvatskoj od 2014. do 2020.*

*family.....and there is the option of organized living of up to five users, primarily youth, who would be accommodated in living units and supported by professional staff of our homes.” (Interview 8, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy)*

The devotion to de-institutionalization was also stated by the documents outlining policy for persons with disabilities, only here it implied the focus on the placement of beneficiaries in units for assisted, but self-reliant, community living managed by associations or transformed homes. While for accommodation for persons with disability, the trend toward de-institutionalization in 2013 was still in a pilot stage and not even included in official statistics, for long-term care for children without parental care it was in a much more advanced stage.

Therefore, foster care was since 2011 recognized by the Social Care Act as the only option of accommodation of children younger than seven years, and as the most preferred option for children older than seven years<sup>34</sup>. Due to that, during 2013 and 2014 several state homes<sup>35</sup> were transformed into Centers for children and while others were designing their transformation plans. In the new form, state institutions were not meant to function as institutional care providers, but as hubs for community living units and as support centers for foster families, youth that have left the care and for families in risks.

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<sup>34</sup> According to Social Care Act adopted in 2011 (*Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 57/11*), the new placements of children in other forms of accommodation were allowed only in extraordinarily situations. Similar stipulations were included in new versions of the Social Care Act that were adopted in 2012 (*Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 33/2012*) and, then, again in 2013 (*Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14*).

<sup>35</sup> Example was state home “Svitanje” that was during 2013-2014 transformed into a Center for Children of Koprivničko-križevačka county.




Figure 29 Compared shares of accommodation providers for all three target groups

Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.

As in 2014 the availability of such institutions in all parts of the country was still far from realized, and was more a vision than reality, the support for families in risk was primarily provided by the Centers for Social Welfare through a measure called supervision of parental care. This service was defined by the Family Act<sup>36</sup> as a measure for the protection of the rights and well-being of the child. In 2013 this measure was assigned to 2 384<sup>37</sup> parents for which Centers for Social Welfare had identified mistakes and shortcomings in parenting or the need for particular care in the upbringing of a child. The help given to families in risk through this service is of pedagogical and counseling in nature, and is provided by professionals working in the Centers for Social Welfare or by their external associates. In this kind arrangement, as was illustrated by managers of an association working for and with children, Centers for Social Welfare often acted as both managers and providers of the service.

*“So, the implementation of the supervision measure goes like this- when the Center for Social Welfare assigns the measure, it needs to find individuals that will act as the measure leaders and that will work with family providing supervision and assistance to parents and children...these individuals can be their colleagues - professional from some other Center for Social Welfare or they can be psychologist, pedagogues or even individuals –like teachers- from professions that are not helping professions but have competences that could important for family that the person would work with. In practice, teams in Center for Social Welfare that are assigning the measure tend to be keener on choosing professionals from Center for Social Welfare as they know them. Selected professional form Center for Social Welfare then works with the family in own extra-paid time. The only thing is that professional that is*

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36 Obiteljski zakon NN 116/03, 17/04, 136/04, 107/07, 57/11, 61/11, 25/13

<sup>37</sup> Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013

*contracted cannot work for the Center for Social Welfare that is assigning the measure, they have to be employed in the other Center for Social Welfare” (Interview 15, representative of the umbrella organization of associations for children).*

The described combination of state-based and other types of arrangements for the provision of all four services, was in 2013 clearly reflected in the management of the implementation process in which the coordinating Ministry was combining traditional focus on ensuring the explicit mandates with novel managerial orientation towards the creation of a framework for contracting service delivery. In the provision of support to families in the risk, the explicit and densely codified mandate was given to Centers for Social Work who were often simultaneously managing and conducting the supervision of parental care.

In accommodation services these Ministry’s arm length bodies were in charge of assigning the right to fully paid or subsidized accommodation in homes and of assigning rights for placement into foster family. While persons with disability and children without parental care were entitled to these rights no matter of their social status, census existed for elderly persons who could, if they failed to pass a census, self-finance own accommodation in public welfare homes. Less explicit legal provisions were used for the creation of ‘interfaces’ or frameworks for contractual relations with organizations that were managing the provision of accommodation services.

That interface was most straightforwardly designed in the relation with about twenty religious or non-profit organizations that were providing accommodation for persons with disabilities or children without parental care. As already established care providers, these organizations were more or less directly included in the state network of homes and could be used for outsourcing in situations in which state capacities were exhausted. The framework for contracting the service provision to foster families was, on the other hand, more comprehensive and it encompassed the process of licensing, education, and supervision of contracted providers. This framework was in 2007 codified with a first Act

on Foster Care<sup>38</sup> which, as the framework became more sophisticated, was replaced by the new one in 2012<sup>39</sup>.

The most complicated framework was designed for the accommodation of older persons where contracts, in the course of reform, had become the main management mechanism. To enable contractual relations, Ministry for social policy was in regular intervals over several years adopting the act named Network of homes for older persons in which it was identifying capacity that would be fully or partially covered by the state. Along with the state and county homes, the Network was also specifying potential private providers that the service could be contracted to. The creation of Network, as indicated by interviewed actors, was not very structured nor transparent process.

*“Even though the law was stipulating public tendering procedures for the creation of the network of providers of the accommodation for elderly, public tendering never took place. The stipulation about tendering procedure was never operationalized, and one sentence in the law was not sufficient to ensure it. ...I cannot tell if decisions about which homes will be included in the network were expert or political decisions, because list of institutions included in the network is adopted behind closed doors on higher levels of decision-making. All I know is that when we would receive the Network with the list of providers to which service could be outsourced to, our actual contracting decisions would be based on expert opinion.” (Interview 2, managerial civil servant in the Ministry of Social Policy)*

Nevertheless, interviewed actors did not recognize decision on outsourcing to private actors in the role of political clients as a common practice, but more as a risk. As highlighted by one manager of the county home, contracts with the state are not as lucrative and running a

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<sup>38</sup> *Zakon o udomiteljstvu, NN 79/2007*

<sup>39</sup> *Zakon o udomiteljstvu, NN 90/11, 78/12*

home for elderly requires investments in technology and expertise, which decreases its attractiveness as tools for political patronage in potential clientelistic bargains.

*“The proper management of a private home that has a contract with the state requires a facility that fulfils all standards, qualified staff, quality standards...also there is so much bureaucratic works that comes with the contract with the state.....that this constitutes too many prerequisites for good trade-off....and after all, or most of all, the state is not a great customer as the cost that it pays for their social beneficiaries is much smaller than the price on the private market.”* (Interview 43, manager in home for older citizens)

Moreover, in line with Ministry’s inclination toward public institutions, the entitlement for contractual provision is primarily given to existing county homes and just a small share of funds for contracted accommodation services is allocated to the private sector. As Figure 30 shows, among 2177 persons for whom the state was in 2013 fully or partially covering the cost of accommodation in homes for older citizens, only one third was living in homes that were not funded by the county or by the state.




Figure 30 Distribution of beneficiaries whose accommodation was covered by the state in 2013

Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.

The fact that the support for families in risk and all accommodation services were in 2013 still embedded in the social care system reflected the inter-organizational character of subordination, but the emerging contractual nature of service provision loosened up vertical couplings. In relation with its executive bodies – the Centers for Social Welfare – the central government preserved the role of a director and was providing them with resources and assignments defined by strict rules and protocols outlined in the thick social care regulations. Similar relation was with the state homes for all three target groups, but here the role of a director was accompanied with the role of an inspector. This dual role become



even more prominent when in 2014 Ministry adopted new operative documents<sup>40</sup> of the Social Care Act<sup>41</sup> that were promoting the focus on performance indicators and have outlined new quality standards. With contracted private or non-profit homes, family homes and foster families, the government took up the inspector role, while shifting its focus toward ensuring contract compliance. That was primarily done by overseeing activities related to the fulfilment of the normative standards. Control in relation to non-state providers was also ensured through contracts specifying the expected performance and outputs of service provision.

County homes for the elderly had somewhat ambivalent treatment. Firstly, due to their origins in state social care system and rather significant subsidizes from the state budget, Ministry for social policy tends to impose hierarchical relations on them. Secondly, as county administrations are in position of influence toward them, management of an institution is often accountable to two directors - political executive/higher servants in the Ministry and their counterparts in the county - which might not have the same policy priorities. The line of responsibility becomes even more blurred when, as emphasized by interviewed actors, county political executive perceives institutional resources (funds, jobs, accommodation capacity) as potential goods that could be used in a clientelistic exchange. Civil servants were then, together with the home management, placed in a very complicated position.

*“When mayor sees the county budget line of home for the elderly, ... they have ideas on how they would like to spend that money ... and often those ideas are not related with the needs of our older citizens.... because of this I am always under the pressure to follow mayor’s instructions when allocating funds. But the fact is that these funds are state money, and their spending is not flexible. In the annual decision on the funds that will be*

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<sup>40</sup> *Pravilnik o minimalnim uvjetima za pružanje socijalnih usluga, NN 40/2014 and Pravilnik o standardima kvalitete socijalnih usluga, NN 143/2014*

<sup>41</sup> *Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14*

*given to us for the coverage of home's expenses, Ministry gives very clear guidelines what can be purchased. So, I use that as the argument when responding to political pressures.”* (Interview 28, senior civil servant in regional government)

As emphasized by interviewed actors, political pressure for control over resources is counterbalanced with regulations and inspection oversight while interference into staff recruitment is often constrained by requirements regarding staff competence and performance outputs. The latter argument is even more weighted in light of the fact, often emphasized by homes' managers, that county homes, although heavily subsidized, more and more function on the open market, and after all, the big part of their revenue is collected via self-financing of beneficiaries.

In 2013<sup>42</sup> in all county homes 85 percent of beneficiaries were paying for service themselves, while the state covered, partially or fully, expenses for 14 percent of home residents. As represented in Figure 31, the share of self-financed beneficiaries<sup>43</sup> increased over the years and in 2013 has reached same figures as were the ones in private homes. For facility management that implies choice of good service quality and high performance over political demands.

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<sup>42</sup> Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for 2013.

<sup>43</sup> Important note here is that the price of accommodation in county's home is severally times cheaper than in private homes and the difference is subsidized by State in accordance with the annual decisions on the transfer of funds.




Figure 31 Share of beneficiaries in homes for older citizens that are financed by the state

Source: Ministry of Demography, Family, Youth and Social policy –Statistical Reports for the period 2005-2013.

Finally, the management of inter-personal contacts in the provision of all four services clustered in this group reflects most clearly the dual, even internally conflicted, nature of the implementation management. Actors engaged in the management of homes for all three target groups, thus, were often reflecting upon the tensions that in 2003/2014 emerged between human resource management regulations stipulated by the Labor Act<sup>44</sup> and the above-mentioned novel operative acts of the Social Care Act that were, among others, raising existing standards of quality. This tension was vividly illustrated by following remarks of a state home manager:

<sup>44</sup> *Zakon o radu, NN 93/14*

*“The work in our home is organized in accordance with the exiting regulation. The priority here are acts that are specifying the number of users per staff, elements and intensity of care, but when following this norm, we are placed under high pressure. The problem is that the number of professionals that we are allowed to hire and whose salaries are financed by the state is not matching the regulation on working hours. More specifically, our institution cares for users that need 24-hours attention, and we do not have enough staff – especially the nurses and care givers- to act in accordance with the Labour Act. As we do not have funds to pay them for over-time work, we are compensating the lack of resources by boosting up the team work and we are trying to lower the pressure by engaging volunteers, interns and by cooperating with civil society organizations. But this is not systematic solution, the system cannot rely on of homes’ managers in filling the gaps that are created by the system.” (Interview 45, manager in state home for persons with disability)*

In the homes for older citizens that were financed by the public funds but were at the same time functioning on the market, the pressure on staff had additional dimension. As described by a professional working in a county home, the hybridity of the arrangement for service provision brought co-existence, and sometimes even collision, of dual accountability; one the one side toward their superiors and the rules, and on the other toward their clients.

*“The demands for caring staff have become really high. We need to follow standards that Ministry has created, we need to listen to our bosses and ... we need to respond to requests of our beneficiaries, who are, after all, paying for their services. OK, in our county home the price might be lower than in the private home, but nevertheless, users are paying and have expectations from us.” (Interview 62, care provider in county home for older citizens)*

The tension between co-existing traditional and new management practice was visible also in the interpersonal contact with service users. While in contact with potential beneficiaries, the Centers for Social Welfare would still apply strict standards which tested qualifying conditions for the approval of the right on fully or partially covered accommodation, the contractual provision of accommodation was marked by standardized but flexible service.

Although still strongly relying on standard operating procedures, social workers in Centers for Social Welfare and professionals providing all four services did recognize the emergence of a user-centered approach. When doing so, professionals working in the system were mainly referring to the more and more widespread usage of individual plans for service provision that are meant to be created in consultation with service beneficiaries. However, as accessed by the expert in the child care, there was still a long way to go towards the internalization of adaptable user-centered approach.

*“When planning the service, be it supervision or accommodation, Centers for Social Welfare are now making individual plans that should be based on children’s specific needs and situation. These plans are becoming a part of the solution for the problems, but our analysis of are showing that in practice neither parents nor children are well informed about the plan, and neither are they really participating in its design. In case of assigning supervision measure to families in risk, for example, these plans have the character of operative plans that the measure leaders should follow through. What happens is that Center for Social Welfare team adopts a plan, informs parents about it, and parent signs it. The plan is then given to the leaders of the measure, who usually does not have proper tool to suggest substantial revision in the light of circumstances that he/she encounters when working with the family.” (Interview 18, Researcher/consultant).*

## **4.2 Forces at work in shaping the process and results of the reform**

The analysis of the reform results set out above showed how reforms of six researched social services in Croatia, in a policy-making context characterized by the presence of clientelistic exchange, resulted not only in non-congruent management when it came to the provision of the same service, but has also triggered the emergence of three rather distinctive modes of implementation. On the one hand, in the cases of supportive service for families at risk and the accommodation services for older persons, persons with disability and children without parental care, reform has resulted in the implementation mode in with performance perspective on managing implementation was added on the pre-existing enforcement perspective.

On the other hand, the ‘new’ home care and personal assistance services emerged during reforms as new initiatives directed toward the co-production of public services. The outcome of these new initiatives, however, proved to have quite several distinctive features. Thus, while the introduction of personal assistants led to co-production which resulted in substantial engagement of users and their organizations in service delivery, in the case of home care the ruling party used the idea and elements of co-production as a cover for the distortion of implementation of reform and for using delivery of services for introducing patronage practices.

In the Table 27 and text that follows it, these findings are merged with findings of the cross-case analysis of the effect of factors affecting the process and results of management reform; pre-existing institutional setting of service provision and the power and representation of a target group of each service.

Table 27 Cross – case analysis: merging findings on reform results (Y) and hypothesized factors affecting the reform (X)

| Initial conditions for service management reform   | CASES  | Institutionalization of social services provision prior to the reform (X1) |   |                               | The power and representation of the population that is the target group of a policy (X2) |  | Reform effects on the implementation management (Y) |                              |
|--|--|--|---|-------------------------------|--|--|---|------------------------------|
|  |  | Formal rules and regulations   | Working rules and standard procedures   | Professional codes or bodies. | The presence of an active individual or groups of users in service design or delivery    | The involvement of domestic or international organizations that promote the interests of service beneficiaries | Modes of implementation                             |                              |
| National-level: civil sector politicization, domination of state by the party whose strong and wide territorial organization needed to be maintained through patronage, persistence of administrative ‘double talk’, centralized state structure and decentralized job placement system. | Accommodation in homes and foster homes for the elderly  | Dense web of rules-in form   | Rules-in-form referred to by actors     | Present                       | Minimal  | Minimal  | Performance upgraded on the enforcement             |                              |
|  | Accommodation in homes and foster homes for children without parental care   | Dense web of rules-in form   | Rules-in-form referred to by actors     | Present                       | Moderate   | Significant (UNICEF especially)  | Performance upgraded on the enforcement             |                              |
|  | Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities  | Dense web of rules-in form   | Rules-in-form referred to by actors     | Present                       | Significant  | Significant (UNDP especially)  | Performance upgraded on the enforcement             |                              |
|  | Supervision of parental care for families at risk  | Moderate web of rules-in form  | Rules-in-form referred to by actors     | Present                       | Moderate   | Significant (UNICEF especially)  | Performance upgraded on the enforcement             |                              |
|  | Home care for the older persons  | Scant rules-in form  | Rules-in-form not referred to by actors | Absent                        | Minimal  | Minimal  | Novel and captured co-production                    |                              |
|  | Personal assistance for persons with disabilities  | Minimal rules-in-form  | No rules-in-use                         | Absent                        | Significant  | Significant (UNDP especially)  | Novel   | and consistent co-production |
|  | Social-policy level: presence of reform drivers: demographic and socio-economic pressures and the influx of new management ideas promoted by international actors. |  |   |                               |  |  |   |                              |

Among all six services, the one with the least institutionalized pre-existing implementation setting was personal assistance for persons with disabilities. This service was created as completely new during the reform with no regulatory or professional foundations of any kind. In the beginning of 2000s, when reforms were launched, quite the opposite situation was the case in three accommodation services that were deeply embedded in the traditional social care system. Even though foster care in Croatia has a long tradition, and even though since the early 1990s non-state actors could provide residential care for older persons, accommodation services for children and adults prior to the reform were still mainly provided by the state institutions.

In the overall organization of service provision, the Centers for Social Welfare acted as the State's focal points, strictly applying rules when deciding on the eligibility of actors that could act as care providers and beneficiaries of state-funded accommodation services. The actual provision of services in such a system was, as pointed out by many interviewed actors and in some previous research, marked by a combination of formalism and the domination of experts, features inherited from the socialist era welfare policy (Stubbs and Maglajlić 2012; Dobrotić 2016).

The positions in between these of these two extremes were taken by the supervision of parental care and home care for older persons, two services introduced in the social care system during the 1970s<sup>45</sup> as means of preventing institutionalization of vulnerable children and older citizens. The coordination of both services was handed to Centers for Social Welfare, whose professional employees were envisioned as key service providers in the case of supervision of parental care. On the other hand, home care was subcontracted from the very beginning.

After a very slow growth and with less than 200 users in the first half of 1980s, the development of institutional capacities for the provision of supervision was intensively

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<sup>45</sup> The home care was introduced by means of the Social Care Act adopted in 1979 (*Zakon o socijalnoj zaštiti*, NN 19/1969), and the supervision was introduced via the Marriage and Family Act from 1978 (*Zakon o braku i porodičnim odnosima*, NN 11/1978).



supported through education of Center's for Social Welfare professionals, the creation of protocols and joint analysis of exemplary work with families at risk (Ajduković and Laklija 2015). As Center's for Social Welfare professionals felt more comfortable to assign, provide or contract provision to their external associates over time, during first years of the 2000s supervision was provided to over 1.500 families at risk (Hrabar and Korać 2003). At that point, as interviewed professionals, and researchers with expertise in this field have indicated, the service provision functioned as an integral part of the social care system. Just like accommodation services, its management was also accessed as rather bureaucratic, but insufficiently adjusted to the real needs of users.

Home care, on the contrary, had a fairly insignificant role in the general system of social care at the beginning of 2000s. In the year 2001 it encompassed only 499 older citizens (Puljiz et al. 2003). One group of factors that could account for its marginal institutional position and limited reach was aligned to the tradition of strong inter-generational family support due to which the use of home care service was associated with the stigma of abandonment. The other group, even more often emphasized by interviewed actors and in previous research, included managerial issues such as state reluctance to finance and support the development of the service network, and the lack of the Centers for Social Welfare initiative and local capacities for the organization of service provision in rural and less developed urban communities (Dobrotić 2016; Podgorelec and Klempić 2007)

In practice, despite the fact that the allocation of right to access to service provision was guided by very strict rules, the organisation of service provision was only vaguely outlined by the general Social Care Act and was not operationalized through any lower level act or standard operating procedure. As the lack of rules-in-form was not compensated by the work of professional or educational organizations, the actual management of care provision and the work of care givers was minimally institutionalized and varied from one case to another. This was indicted in following remarks by a main nurse in one county home:

*“The staff that works in homes for elderly, and in other homes of course, are professionals whose competences are defined, taught through specific education programs and work often licensed and supervised by professional associations, such is the Croatian chamber of nurses. The*

*profession of care givers in the home care services is still undefined, there is no formal education program in which people can acquire needed skills there is no association of care givers. Last few years, there has been some progress, so there are more and more trainings offered by Croatian Employment Bureau or some private schools. But this is still in developmental stage, so in practice everyone can act as a provider of this service.” (Interview 51, coordinator of service provision team in county home for older persons).*

If these findings are merged with the cross-case analysis of data collected on the implementation modes management reform resulted in, it becomes visible that limitations to political pressures for control over the service provision were posed in the supportive services for families at risk and long-term accommodation services, all of them characterized by the highly regulated and bureaucratic institutional setting in which these services were delivered in the period preceding the reform.

This connection was also indicated by the actors interviewed. Moreover, interview analysis showed that while strictly codified eligibility of actors that could provide or receive these four services made their provision hardly suitable for exploitation in patronage purposes, the bureaucratic state system for social care that these services were a part of proved to be very resistant to any rapid or overly comprehensive change. Due to that, the change of arrangements for service provision that did take place was very incremental and occurred as a part of the overall reform of the traditional social care system, without much public visibility and political attention. The crucial role in this process was played by senior civil servants that saw the development of cheaper and better alternative accommodation forms as a way to ease the strains on the system of facilities for residential care. This is the reason why the reform process did not attract much political attention and the main role in the transformation of implementation management was taken by civil servants and experts in social care.

*“Accommodation services were never interesting for politicians. It is massive system and very resistant to big changes. Even more, effects of*

*reforms cannot be quickly visible ...due to that these services were rarely on the radar of political officials in our Ministry... so most of the changes were mainly initiated by us, civil servants who followed external trends and knew what service provision looks like in reality and what changes are feasible and what are not.” (Interview 7, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy)*

In the choice of the specific reform course, civic servants were guided by general “reform packages” through which international organizations such as the World Bank, United Nation Development Program, UNICEF and the European Union promoted the shift from traditional preferences for hierarchical or government-based public services towards performance-based or user-based orientation in Croatian social policy. Nevertheless, when making operative decisions through which the new management ideas were turned into practice, public servants often acted as representatives of institutional service providers. Due the bureaucratic character and prevailing domination of professionals engaged in the service design and delivery, both users and organizations advocating their interests had only limited ability to influence or monitor the reform of the service delivery modes in these four services. This came through vividly in following remarks by a researcher, engaged in the reform of policy toward children.

*“This measure of the supervision of parental care is, in the light of the Convention for the Right of the Child, a really important measure. However, the provision of measure in last decade was only slightly changed in line with the novelties in the approaches to the child care and children’s right protection. In 2008 UNICEF supported domestic experts which are not working in the social care system to cooperate with Centers for Social Welfare in order to create tools for systematic planning, monitoring and reporting about the way measure was implemented. We tried to introduce the codebook or protocol for the initial assessments of the children’s safety and risks, but with only limited success. This tool would create a sort of a baseline which would improve the outsourcing practice, as Centers for Social Welfare would be able to monitor the progress of interventions. But this kind of novelty requires*

*comprehensive reform which includes not just the changes of regulation but the re-organisation of the Centres for Social Welfare...Of course, the tool encountered resistance and its application was considered as another burden on professionals that are already overloaded with tasks. I am sorry that the Association of Social Workers and other professional associations are not more agile in advocating the change of working conditions of their members which would, in turn, induce better treatment of users' needs.” (Interview 18, researcher/consultant)*

In the resulting transformation of implementation management, governmental monopoly, and the enforcement perspective on managing service provision were not replaced, but only upgraded with performance management and contracting out elements. Even though introduction of outsourcing in the practice of care provision loosened up hierarchical chains of accountability, the attractiveness of exerting political influence over the contracting choices was minimized with the high cost of meeting norms that served as prerequisites for establishing long-term care institution and the low price offered by the state for service provision. With the layered nature of the reform process, political or any other kind of pressure for control over the resources was not only counterbalanced by the traditional inspection oversight but also with the introduction of the output-based monitoring practice, as senior civil servant vividly illustrated:

*“When a service is contracted, the inclusion of all beneficiaries and all payments is attached to the individual operative act adopted by the Centre for Social Welfare. Payment cannot be completed prior to the service having been completed.” (Interview 50, manager in Centers for Social Welfare).*

While demonstrating the strength of the traditional implementation setting, reforms of the supervision service for families at risk and the accommodation services for the elderly, persons with disabilities and children without parental care did not result in changes assessed as necessary by the actors interviewed, but more in the implementation mode which reduced the space for widespread political capture.

In other two services, home care and personal assistance, which had a minimal and no pre-existing institutional setting, the strength of institutional and regulatory constraints was diminished by the establishment of a completely new Ministry and the programs in which politicians in government took a very proactive role and provided reformist efforts with tight guidance. By declaring commitment to collaborative arrangements of service provision, in the design of both services they detached their implementation from the social care system and invited local communities to engage in the production of flexible and user-centered services.

Although the creation of both services was inspired by the same set of ideas, the way these principles were integrated into implementation management differs significantly. While the development of partnership arrangements for a new home care meant focus on local level governments, in personal assistance government proved to be keen on developing partnership with associations of persons with disability. More importantly, while the national and local political executive acted as a unified action center pursuing interests of a spoil-seeking party in the development of home care for the elderly, in the design of a personal assistant decision made by political executive was scrutinized by the actors representing the interests of the target population.

The latter scenario was possible because, although both persons with disability and the older persons in need of care were treated as vulnerable and dependent segments of society in communist-era policies, persons with disabilities had gradually developed their mobilization potential and had enhanced their political strength. As the interviewed actors and previous research indicated, over the past fifteen years, some of the associations representing disabled persons have transformed from obedient service providers into persons with disabilities rights' advocates. With the assistance of international organisations such as the United Nation Development Program, World Bank and the European Union, whose approval was an important element of the HDZ's reformist program, domestic associations were able to induce the transformation of disability policy goals and instruments from the medical to the human rights model in which persons with disabilities are not just recipients of help, but also empowered citizens (Petek 2011; Kekez-Koštro, Urbanc, and Salaj 2013; Urbanc 2006). This transformation was materialized, among other

tools, via the introduction and the use of a personal assistant that lies at the core of the human rights model.

On the other hand, even though elderly citizens potentially may be a powerful target group in general as they make up 18% of all population, beneficiaries of long-term care services are perceived as apolitical and often socially constructed as vulnerable members of society that are left alone and thus in need of protection. In turn, as was highlighted by the representative of pensioner's union, they lack potential for political mobilization and joint action among themselves.

*“Sometimes I feel that we are fighting like Don Quixote. Nobody takes us seriously. First, younger generations still do not recognize that the situation for older citizens in our county is very bad. They think that we have our pensions, and that that is enough...and that there are people in our society which are in much worse situation...but it is not like that, there are so many unaddressed need, so many older persons whose rights are in this moment jeopardized. ...but listen, there is one other even more problematic thing. Older citizens are not a homogeneous group, and never will be. To put it frankly, we are big group of voters, but we are not using that potential and we are not united in asking fulfillment own rights and interests. On a contrary, we are most heterogeneous and most silent voters in the country....and politicians are using that. The more we are disunited and disorganized, it is better for them as they do not need to take us seriously. They do not need put our needs in their calculations and they do not need to listen us.” (Interview 13, umbrella organization for pensioners).*

Additionally, unlike people with disabilities, the elderly in need of care had not been in the focus of the advocacy efforts of national civil society organisations and international organisations over the last decade. Only marginal involvement of external actors was that of the World Bank and the European Union who generated incentives for the reform of the overall social care system that the long term institutional care was a part of.

Due to the lack of potential of the elderly population to politically mobilize and absence of strong advocacy groups acting on their behalf in the implementation of home care service management - as was often emphasized by civil servants working with the elderly population - both national and local ruling politicians were the primary decision-makers whose actions could be disputed neither by implementers nor beneficiaries. Strong political engagement in the re-organization of service provision enabled rapid growth of service usage, but has at the same time induced a biased selection of actors participating in the implementation network and the distortion of extremely soft steering mechanisms, such as trust and the golden thread, which network management was based on. Both mechanisms, as reported by one of the program managers, proved to be less effective in fostering cooperation than in enhancing local politician's ability to pursue their own interests while organizing the service provision.

*“We have to admit that local units are not controllable. After I have become in charge for the coordination of this program, when it was transferred to the Ministry of Social Policy, I soon realized that I have no means to actually control the local units that were funded through the program. The program is not a part of Social care system act, nor is included in the Social Care Act. ... and nothing that is prescribed in that act can be used here. So, while social care system has its own inspection that inspection does not have mandate over this service...also, even though I control the program, it is local political executive who makes decision on the funds allocation and about the hiring of the staff. If they want to replace the whole home care team, they can do whenever they want. All I can do is to give them suggestions, but these suggestions are not binding for them.... So to put it in short, in this service we do not have effective control mechanisms and practice is constantly demonstrating that we do need them.” (Interview 6, managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy).*

Local politicians inclined to engage in politicization or rent-seeking activities used this space to turn the mandate given for the organisation of service provision into an opportunity for the employment of local party members or supporters as service providers. Even though

patronage practices were not fully present in all communities granted with national funds, the possibility that this can happen proved to be a systemic governance failure. As civil servants in the coordinating ministry and officials in the social system inspectorate had no real oversight power over the actual service management, the choice between the clientelistic and programmatic strategy was dependent on the leadership style of local executive and their relationship with their national counterparts. In that way, the reform path toward horizontal steering and collaborative implementation for elderly care in Croatia resulted in the empowerment of political parties for clientelistic capture of service provision instead of in the empowerment of communities and users.

Due to the effective pressure of advocacy organizations representing the interests of persons with disabilities, civil servants engaged in the coordination of this service reported quite a different meta-governing experience than their colleagues engaged in the provision of home care services:

*“The service was the initiative of the Croatian Union of Associations of Persons with Disabilities and other NGOs. The Ministry’s elected officials accepted it but left its implementation out of reach for local politicians. They knew that NGOs were prioritizing this service and that they were able to place potential implementation problems on both the media and the political agenda... Also, the Ministry executive recognized that personal assistance was a good instrument for social inclusion that started to dominate among the goals of disabilities policy, so they accessed they gain more by allowing us to do our job with the help of NGOs”. (Interview 7, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy)*

By reaching a balance of power with the political executive, NGOs of disabled persons were able to act not only as co-creators, but also as co-implementers of the service. In their doings, the NGOs induced substantive engagement at the individual level, so the beneficiaries effectively took charge of the content of the service, which is what turned this service into an exemplary case of co-production in Croatia. By the end of 2011 when HDZ lost power,



beneficial effects of the personal assistant were so widely acknowledged that even though new political officials in the Ministry of social policy wanted to detach themselves from as many of the ‘pilot initiatives’ developed by Ministry of Family, Veterans' Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity as possible, they decided to keep and, moreover, to expand this service. On the contrary, the home care program ended on the new government’s list for complete restructuring.

### **4.3 Back to the model of service reform: institutions and actors do matter**

The presented comparative case study has confirmed the importance of both institutions and actors, and more specifically, of the pre-existing institutional setting of service provision and the power and representation of service target group. Furthermore, as the cross-case analysis of six analyzed services enabled formation three modes of implementation that the reform resulted with and specification of meta-governing role that was taken by administrative and political leaders, model could be refined with more specific insights on the reform process and results. More refined version of the Model of service reform in clientelistic policy-making setting is presented in Figure 32 and elaborated in text that follows it.




Figure 32 Refined model of social service reform in clientelistic policy-making context

As the Figure 32 shows, in the reform of services whose provision was prior the reform well rooted in the traditional system of social care, as the cases of supervision of parental care and accommodation for vulnerable social groups showed, did not prove as attractive or prone to clientelistic capture. Among the institutional features of social care system, limitations to political pressures for control over implementation were posed not only by a dense web of legal acts that were set in place in the period of socialism, but also by numerous standard operating procedures that have over the years materialized rules-in-form in a very bureaucratic manner. As the effects of rules were at street-level practice complemented with the effects of professional status and professional norms of professions engaged in the service provision, political executive was left with limited number of institutionally available options for the interventions in the hiring of service providers.

In addition, the institutional conditions for the provision of these services also narrowed the space for the exertion of citizen pressure for management change. As the analysis of the implementation management showed, in services which were prior to reform provided in a well-established, formalized, implementation setting, experts still had a dominant position and users were provided with little opportunities to impact the creation or delivery of services they receive. This, in turn, significantly decreased the chances for integration of participatory instruments of the New Public Governance into the management of service provision.

Due to limited interest of political actors and minimized space for the influence of users, the changes of operational management were induced by the need to ease the strains on the system, or were promoted by international organizations. In both cases changes were led by senior civil servants which in their meta-governing exercise demonstrated hesitation to abandon reliance on central steering and were reluctant to engage in any comprehensive transformation of the arrangements for service provision. When introducing changes, they proved to be keen on management ideas and tools that can be related with either New Weberian State or New Public Management models. Nevertheless, reformist ideas and tools were never fully integrated in the system, but just attached to the existing management activities and techniques. As a result, a decade after the reformist initiatives were launched, performance perspective on managing provision of social services functioned mainly as an addition to previously existing, and still prevailing, enforcement perspective.

In cases that were, on the other hand, characterized with non-existent or minimal institutional setting, the comparative study confirmed the importance of the target group potential to politically mobilize, or to have strong advocacy groups acting on their behalf. The presence of active individuals or organizations which advocate or represent the interest of target population in the introduction of personal assistant service reduced attractiveness of patronage strategy for the ruling party. As the service had no institutional roots that could limit the scope of the reform, elected office holders were incentivized to join their administrative counterparts in meta-governing efforts and, while doing that, to appeal to service beneficiaries with an offer of a programmatic package based on comprehensive innovations in service provision. Due to substantive engagement of civil society actors in the reform process, the design of the new arrangement for service provision was inspired by collaborative ideas and management instruments behind the New Public Governance reform model. In that way, introduction of a new service within the reform resulted in a novel implementation mode for Croatian context, characterized with a co-production perspective on implementation management.

On the other hand, in the case of home care service that was prior to reform characterized by minimal institutional framework and politically weak and non-represented target group, the comprehensive transformation of the arrangements for service provision was used to enhance political control over the implementation. Free from limitations of institutional rules or opposition of a politically potent target group or advocacy actors acting to protect users' interests, political actors took over the reform process and politicized their meta-governing role. By deforming ideas and soft steering tools offered by New Public Governance model they were able to build political patronage practices into reformed management of home care provision. As a result of the reform, the management of interpersonal relations became distorted with party patronage practices. Also, distorted application of reformist tools in the reform of emerging home care service, such as trust or informal network management, resulted in clientelistic variant of co-production.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### PROCESS-TRACING ANALYSIS: CAUSAL MECHANISM AT WORK

By building on the findings from the comparative study, this chapter further investigates the home care as a service in which reform led to the clientelistic distortion of implementation management. By using process-tracing techniques, chapter addresses the causal mechanisms through which, in a clientelistic policy-making setting, the reform governed by patronage-driven politicians led to distorted implementation, in line with patronage practices. In the first section and its five subsections, the chapter describes the captured metagovernance mechanism that was found in the reform of elderly care in Croatia. In the second section, chapter offers conceptualization of politicized metagovernance mechanism.

#### **5.1 Process tracing analysis: the captured metagovernance mechanism**

In the empirical analysis, the presence of reform drivers, a powerless status of the elderly in need of care, and the weak tradition of service provision prior to the reform were found to function as policy-specific scope conditions in which metagovernance of the elderly care reform took place. In the iterative crafting of causal mechanism linking the patronage-driven interest of a ruling party (X) and the captured co-production of home care service in Croatia (Y), the theorized political metagovernance mechanism was found to be present but merged with new parts that served patronage purposes.

Qualitative data analysis showed that in the Croatian elderly care reform, two parts of the theorized mechanism related to activities on the individual scale were merged, while in each part of the mechanism political leaders engaged not only in activities corresponding to the notion of political metagovernance, but were at the same time conducting activities through which they were politicizing their metagoverning role. This Politicized metagovernance mechanism is illustrated in Figure 33 and described in the text that follows it.




Figure 33 Politicized metagovernance mechanism of the elderly care reform in Croatia

### 5.1.1 Part 1: Institutional redesign

The reform of the home care services, as the analysis of reformist documents and interviews with actors revealed, was initiated in 2003 as a top-down process of institutional design with the establishment of a new Ministry for Family, Veterans and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS). This institution existed during the two terms of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) government and was abolished in 2011 after HDZ lost the national election to a Social Democratic Party-led coalition.

Often referred by interviewed actors as “the Ministry of Pilot Projects”, MFVAIS launched a pilot program of home and day care services in the year 2004, presenting it as the new institutional setting for community-based elderly care and as an alternative to state-based programs that already existed within the social care system. As the last two words of the former umbrella ministry’s title suggest, the declared objectives for the constitution of this alternative governance arena were to mobilize local political leaders and community stakeholders towards a joint care for elderly citizens, as well as to foster a wider inclusion of elderly citizens, their empowerment and enhanced involvement in service delivery. This was also emphasized in the Program’s preamble (Program for Development of Services for Elderly Citizens in the System of Intergenerational Solidarity, 2007: 3)<sup>46</sup>.

“Awareness of the need of additional care for family and the elderly, as well as the need for better connectedness, mutuality and solidarity among generations resulted in the forming of the ministry responsible for family, veterans of war and intergenerational solidarity in the year 2003. Up until that point, state care for family or family members was mostly directed towards socially-protective and interventions based on family acts and the like. However, by forming the ministry in charge of intergenerational solidarity, the Government of the Republic of Croatia wishes to affirm its dedication to special care for the elderly and highlight the intention of

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<sup>46</sup> *Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007.*

mutual connectedness between younger and older generations. The ministry in charge of intergenerational solidarity incites projects with the scope of improving the quality of life for the elderly, proposes measures for inciting families to keep the elderly and frail family members within the family circle, initiates the development of services for the elderly and non-institutional forms of care for the elderly, whilst performing other tasks related to elderly care.”

To mobilize the under-utilized local resources, as was emphasized by documents outlining the Program, the provision of new home care services was detached from the de-concentrated network of bureaucratized social care institutions and organized via partnerships between state and local, typically non-profit community actors. To stipulate a better reach of citizens in need, eligibility for service usage was not associated with the testing of means, but was framed in a much more flexible manner<sup>47</sup>. The introduction of both governance novelties, however, was limited only to the new home care trajectory, while the provision of traditional home care services was left out of the political and reformist focus. Such constitutive decisions resulted in a situation of institutional parallelism problematized by most interviewed actors and vividly illustrated by a highly ranked civil servant engaged in the governance of the traditional social care system at the time:

*“Home care services are heavily fragmented as they are nationally provided within two parallel systems that do not talk to each other. In the older one, the home care is institutionalized through the Social Care Act and a nuanced set of regulation that stipulates users’ eligibility, the content of the service and the key role that the Ministry for Social Care and its arm’s length bodies—the Centres for Social Welfare—play in the organization of service provision. In the second one, the content of the*

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<sup>47</sup> Izvješće o provedbi programa pomoći u kući za Ministarstvo uprave. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti (Interni dokument).



*service is quite similar to that in the old one, but the arrangements for provision include both state and society actors. Instead of defining rules, the Ministry for Intergenerational Solidarity provides with guidelines which can be interpreted rather broadly.” (Interview 5, managerial civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy)*

By creating a new institution and the alternative trajectory of service provision within it, political leaders have liberated own constitutive actions from the tangle of interlocking rules that was making traditional social care system difficult to fundamentally change. In that way, they have gained a large leeway for choosing the reform package that could not only induce an interactive and user-centered organization of home care provision, but could also accommodate political or even spoil-seeking interests of the ruling party.

### **5.1.2 Part 2: Designing an (inter)organizational setting**

The ability of political leaders to combine policy with political aims while structuring new arrangements for home care provision was further institutionalized with the two sided-design of (inter) organizational setting. On the one side, the mandate was devolved to local actors and financial resources committed to communities in need by means of partnership—with the MFVAIS signing an agreement on co-funding and cooperation with the county or municipal government—which then would organize the provision themselves or together with community organizations and homes for the elderly.

On the one side, the devotion to inducement of meaningful participation and collaboration of local actors was declared through official announcements and documents outlining criteria for the selection of the recipients of national funding that were emphasizing the need to develop a service network in the most deprived areas as well as guiding local governments to demonstrate in their applications the willingness and ability to participate in service

funding with more than 10% of its costs as well as to elaborate a devotion toward partnership approach in service provision<sup>48</sup>.

On the other side, the integration of the political dimension in the constitution of (inter)organizational setting was fostered via more internal procedures through which elected officials of the MFVAIS ensured political primacy over the selection of participating communities and actors. According to these procedures, not only were members of the committee for scoring applications and creating the funding ranking list appointed by the Minister<sup>49</sup>, but the Minister was also appointing the members of selection committee and approving their funding decisions. In that final step, as indicated by one member of selection committee, additional political criteria would be applied on the top of the formal ones:

*'So when we had an open call for home care, the committee would make a ranking list of counties and municipalities that had applied. It was done according to the criteria set by the Open Call and the Program. That ranking was then to be approved by the Minister....well, before doing that, she/he would mark those municipalities which were to jump higher on the ranking list. Alternatively, if there were two municipalities from the same area among applicants, and with a similar need for the service, she/he would choose the one in which HDZ was in power - that would happen even in the case when committee assessed the other applicant with slightly higher scores. And that was it: the ranking list proposed by the*

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<sup>48</sup> Odluka o Kriterijima za ocjenu i predlaganje suradnje na Programima međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2006. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Poziv za uključivanje jedinica lokalne samouprave u program međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.

<sup>49</sup> Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva za praćenje provedbe Programa međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.

*committee then had to be changed'. (Interview 68, managerial civil servant in Ministry of Social Policy)*

In order to ensure the inclusion of their county or municipality in the Program, local politicians were often complementing formal application for funding with the informal lobbying and persuasion efforts targeting their national counterparts. When in 2008 the Program was rapidly growing, the practice of a direct communication between the Minister and political executive of local units that were trying to become a new member of the implementation network was even internally formalized. As demonstrated in the Figure 34 (and 35) representing the internal document that was issued by the MFVAIS's civil servant to a MFVAIS's Minister, while the counties and municipalities that were already engaged in the program were guided to communicate with program managers, those that wanted to initially apply for funding were instructed to send their applications directly to Minister.

MINISTARSTVO OBITELJI, BRANITELJA  
I MEĐUGENERACIJSKE SOLIDARNOSTI  
Uprava za međugeneracijsku solidarnost  
Tel. 6177 450  
Fax: 6177 451

Zagreb, 05.02.2008.

- interno -

POTPREDSJEDNICA VLADE RH I  
MINISTRICA OBITELJI, BRANITELJA I  
MEĐUGENERACIJSKE SOLIDARNOSTI

Predmet: Zamolbe Općine [REDACTED] i Općine [REDACTED]  
- očitovanje, dostavlja se.

Poštovana,

Temeljem zaprimljenih zamolbi Općine [REDACTED] i Općine [REDACTED], dostavljamo Vam sljedeće očitovanje:

Općina [REDACTED] i Općina [REDACTED] započeli su s provedbom Programa međugeneracijske solidarnosti u 2007. godini.

Općina [REDACTED], čiji potpisnik Ugovora o suradnji je bila [REDACTED] županija, započela je s provedbom Programa „Dnevni boravak i pomoć u kući“ u veljači 2007. nakon uređenog prostora Dnevnog boravka za starije u Općini [REDACTED]. Budući da je provoditelj programa Općina [REDACTED], otežano slala izvješća i zamolbe zbog dobivanja potpisa iz županije (jer je potpisnik Ugovora uvijek odgovoran Ministarstvu), dogovoreno je da bi od ove godine Ugovor o suradnji bio potpisan između Ministarstva i Općine [REDACTED]. Kako je Općina [REDACTED], odnosno načelnik Općine, dobio jasnu uputu da to iskaže u svojoj Zamolbi, jer Povjerenstvo za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti donosi prijedloge i odlučuje samo na temelju pisanih prijedloga, očito je da se načelnik krivo izrazio „tražeći uključivanje Općine [REDACTED] u Program“ jer oni su već uključeni, dakle trebaju promjenu potpisnika Ugovora radi lakše organizacije posla.

Općina [REDACTED], također je od 01. srpnja 2007. započela s provedbom Programa „Pomoć u kući“. Općina traži proširenje Programa na Dnevni boravak i izražava ostale potrebe za provedbu Programa. Ovaj zahtjev trebao je biti naslovljen na Upravu za međugeneracijsku solidarnost (kako im je i rečeno) jer o takvim promjenama u Programu odlučuje Povjerenstvo na temelju pisanih zamolbi.

Slijedom navedenoga, jasna je uputa jedinicama lokalne i regionalne uprave da za uključivanje (novih) u Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti trebaju uputiti pismo namjere ili zamolbu na Vas, a sve izmjene i dopune, odnosno promjene u već postojećim Programima, trebaju uputiti na Upravu za međugeneracijsku solidarnost, odnosno na Povjerenstvo koje će razmatrati zamolbe.

S poštovanjem,

[REDACTED]

Figure 34 Internal statement by the MFVAIS – original version

MINISTRY OF FAMILY, WAR VETERANS  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

Directorate for Intergenerational Solidarity  
Tel.: 6177 450  
Fax: 6177 451

Zagreb, 5 February 2008

- internal use -

VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
AND MINISTER OF FAMILY, WAR VETERANS  
AND INTERGENERATIONAL SOLIDARITY

Subject: Request by the Municipality of [REDACTED] and Municipality of [REDACTED]  
- Statement, issuance thereof.

Dear Madam,

Based on the requests by the Municipality of [REDACTED] and the Municipality of [REDACTED], the following statement is hereby issued:

The Municipality of [REDACTED] and the Municipality of [REDACTED] started the implementation of the Programme of Intergenerational Solidarity in the year 2007.

The Municipality of [REDACTED] – with the [REDACTED] County being the Municipality's signatory for the Contract on Cooperation – started with the implementation of the Programme „Day and Home Care for Senior Citizens“ in February of 2007, upon the preparation of Senior Day Care at the Municipality of [REDACTED]. Since the Programme is being implemented by the Municipality of [REDACTED], and the Municipality has been facing difficulties sending reports and requests as signatures from the County have been difficult to obtain (the Contract signatory is always responsible to the Ministry), it has been agreed that as of this year the Cooperation Contract would be signed between the Ministry and the Municipality of [REDACTED]. Since the Municipality of [REDACTED], that is, its local mayor, was given a clear instruction to state it in his Request – as the Intergenerational Programmes Committee gives its proposals and decides based on written suggestions – it is evident that the mayor used an incorrect term by „requesting the inclusion of the [REDACTED] Municipality in the Programme“ as the Municipality is already included and it therefore needs the change of the Contract signatory so as to organise the work tasks more easily.

The Municipality of [REDACTED] has also started implementing the Programme „Home Care“ as of 1 July 2007. The Municipality seeks the expansion of the Programme to include the Adult Day Care and expresses other needs related to Programme implementation. This request should have been addressed towards the Directorate for Intergenerational Solidarity (as they had been informed) since such changes in the Programme are decided upon by the Committee based on written requests.

Given the aforementioned, a clear instruction to units of local and regional government was issued that it is to Your name that they should address their letter of intent or their request for the inclusion (of new parties) to the intergenerational solidarity programmes; all alterations and appendices, i.e., changes to programmes already in place, should be directed towards the Directorate for Intergenerational Solidarity, that is, to the Committee which will take those requests into consideration.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

Figure 35 Internal statement by the MFVAIS – translation on English

Such usage of additional political criteria and communication lines in the constitution of a new governance arena impeded the arena's integrity and representativeness. While the prevalence of politicized rules-in-use over programmatic rules-in-form challenged the capacity of administrative leaders for managing constituted partnerships, biased selection of fund recipients resulted with, in the chapter four described, overrepresentation of localities politically aligned with the ruling party.

### **5.1.3 Part 3. General rule-making**

Within this twofold setting, collaboration and local ownership was to be fostered through the establishment of a flexible framework for the formation of local elderly care policies. To do so, the MVFAIS's efforts for the development of community-based home care system were in the first three years framed as a pilot initiative that was, as the analysis of documents revealed, structured mainly through internal procedures or the Minister's decisions. In 2007, when the pilot grew into a nationwide program, the MVFAIS's inducements for the development of the local programs of intergenerational solidarity were outlined in a strategic document that envisioned the regulation of the new home care system as its long-term goal<sup>50</sup>.

In a shorter run, the mobilization of local actors and resources, instead of subordination and reliance on the national initiative, was to be achieved through the employment of soft management tools such as shared values, trust and the "golden thread", with the latter including steering through controlling budget and personnel. Partnership agreements with supported localities were specifying desired expenses, the profile of the home care team and basic milestones in regard to the number of beneficiaries that the team should care for, while

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<sup>50</sup> *Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008. do 2011. godine, NN 90/2007.*

the monitoring of operative conduct was to be done primary on the basis of the reports that the localities were supposed to be sending to the national program coordinators.

In the spirit of trust, these reports did not have to be accompanied with the invoices or expenditures receipts and the national program coordinators were not assigned with overseeing power when paying visits to home care sites. As the provision of care was detached from the traditional social care system and its inspection, at the beginning of the each year, the Minister would appoint the up to five civil servants and external experts to act as the ad hoc Committee for the Monitoring of the Program that would access local reports and recommend their endorsement or rejection<sup>51</sup>. While basing the assessment on information provided by fund recipients, the Committee was mainly acknowledging that financial and personnel conditions and basic milestones set by MVFAIS were met by all supported sites<sup>52</sup>. Interviews with actors, as the analysis presented in previous chapter showed, indicated that constituted accountability forums and procedures proved to be dysfunctional in quite a few localities as localities-elected officials were shrinking their reporting duty.

#### **5.1.4 Part 4. Reshaping the policy content**

While MVFAIS's elected officials kept tight control over the selection of communities participating in the new home care network, after the partnership agreements were signed, national-level executive politicians would rarely directly engage in the formulation of local elderly care policies. To make sure that local solutions did not depart from the overall goals

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<sup>51</sup> *Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva za praćenje provedbe Programa međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti, Poslovník o radu povjerenstva za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.*

<sup>52</sup> *Minutes from Committee's meeting in 2010. Zapisnik s 2. sjednice Povjerenstva za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti.*

of the Program, they had made the Ministry's administrative leaders responsible not only for nurturing the realization of established partnerships, but also for negotiating the policy content with local governments and other community actors. When assigned with the former task, administrative leaders were empowered to go beyond enforcement and stipulated to rely on soft steering. In their new role of network facilitators, as was emphasized by the former program coordinator, they were particularly focused on fostering a sense of ownership and responsibility among local governments:

*“When communicating with local governments with whom we had partnership agreements, we were constantly repeating that the Ministry was providing guidance and support, but that they were the ones holding responsibility for the organisation of elderly care in their community.”*  
(Interview 69, senior civil servants in Ministry of Social Policy)

In assigning administrative leaders with negotiation tasks, however, political principals did not authorize them for the endorsement or rejection of a specific solution but decided instead to leave the local political executive with the space to pursue their own leadership style while shaping local home care programs. Accordingly, as the analysis presented in chapter four showed, while in some counties and municipalities politicians were keen on designing home care in collaboration with community organizations or homes for the elderly, in others, local governments decided to monopolize the given mandate for the organization of service provision and turn it into an opportunity for the employment of local party members or supporters as service providers.

### **5.1.5 Part 5. Ensuring internalisation and interactive rule application**

The integration of a clientelistic strategy into the selection of organizational and individual actors that would participate in the elderly care network had rather ambivalent effects on the users of home care service. On the one hand, to capture a wider population in targeted communities, the inclusion of beneficiaries in service provision was flexibly framed and guided by general indicators such as age, the existence of a family support network, of health conditions. Situation-bound application of these criteria was left to the discretion of home



care teams that were even encouraged to reach the citizens that needed the service but lacked information about it. After joining the Program, citizens were invited not only to use the service, but also to guide their caregivers in the definition of intensity, regularity and elements of the care they would be receiving. In that way, elderly citizens that were lucky enough to live in the communities encompassed by the program were offered with a chance to co-create the service and adjust it to own needs.

On the other hand, the politicized nature of the overall implementation management affected the position of beneficiaries to whom, as indicated by a participants in the interviews conducted, local politicians often presented home care services as direct material incentives for electoral behaviour.

*“Politicians were often using home care in pre-election campaigning, they were presenting it as their achievement with the sub-message: if you choose me, you will have this service, if you don’t choose me, the program will probably be abolished. Even the informative brochure that was created about the program was more about listing the cities included than about explaining the content or the way it could be expanded on some new communities.” (Interview 73, senior civil servants in regional and local government)*

This tendency to reinforce user dependence instead of empowerment was especially present in localities characterized by patronage practices. In that way, instead of in the empowerment of communities and users, the reform path toward horizontal steering and collaborative implementation for Croatian elderly care resulted in the empowerment of political parties for the clientelistic capture of service provision.

## **5.2 Crafting the mechanism: from political to politicized metagovernance**

The process presented in process-tracing study has demonstrated that the notion of political metagovernance can be very useful in the analysis of reform processes and for explaining of its effects, but has also revealed challenges that should be taken into consideration when conceptualizing it. The study has also showed that metagovernance role which New Public Governance reform model assigns to political leaders requires both their willingness and ability to use it. If this is lacking or is underdeveloped, the effectiveness and efficiency of metagovernance responsibility can be amplified if also exercised by public managers, but the democratic credentials of collaborative policy implementation and service delivery can only be secured if elected politicians are motivated to do so.

If the motivation is missing and, as the case of home care reform showed, if metagovernance is to be performed by politicians incentivized to engage in rent-seeking activities and if political system and political competition operates in a way where they are not held accountable to citizens and the electorate for the quality and quantity of services provided, the reform inspired by New Public Governance might be used for political capture of the public service delivery. The mechanism though which, in services characterized by prior minimal or non-existent institutional setting of service provision and with politically weak beneficiaries, patronage-driven interest of executive politicians can lead to distortion of implementation with patronage practices is presented in the Figure 36 and elaborated in the text which follows it.




Figure 36 Politicized metagovernance: two sides of a coin

When engaging in the exercise of constitutive meta-governance, patronage-driven political executive may use ideas behind New Public Governance reform model not just to allocate policy functions to local communities and societal actors, but to do it in a politicized manner. On a system scale, politicized (re)design of governance arena may imply both introduction of flexible setting for policy-making, as well as the institutionalization of large degree of political discretion. This discretion can be used and further operationalized with the two sided-design of (inter) organizational setting in which selection of actors that are authorized to act as designers and implementers of a policy is done through parallel usage of formal and informal procedures and combination of prescribed and partisan or ascriptive criteria.

Politicized exercise of directional meta-governance continues with two-sided activities. On the one side, the New Public Governance's quest for mobilization of local communities and users is operationalized through the establishment of a flexible framework for the interactive formation of policy content, particularly the policy content negotiated and adopted by the local governments. On the other side, opportunities to use state resources for advancing political objectives are created through constitution of dysfunctional accountability mechanisms and procedures. Within this framework, the (re)shaping of policy content and the (re)organisation of service provision in local communities is devolved to local politicians, who can use the control of the policy to create an opportunity for the employment of local party members or supporters as service providers. Finally, politicized meta-governing activities on the individual level involve invitation of street-level workers and beneficiaries to co-create the service during its delivery. This invitation is, nevertheless, often overshadowed with the tendency to reinforce the dependence of service providers and users on politicians and changes in their will election results may produce.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

Theorizing and studying different public management reform models, particularly New Public Management and New Public Governance, has often proven to be laden with normative propositions about the design of management practices in the delivering of public services. This normative focus guided research of New Public Management and New Public Governance towards mapping of managerial practices designed to improve efficiency of service delivery, rather than towards identifying the effects of each model on the implementation process, the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms, representation of citizens' policy preferences, and consequently on democracy itself (Eikenberry 2007).

Although research focused on New Public Management is also heavily tilted towards normative prescriptions, frequent and wide practical application of the New Public Management strategy has nevertheless uncovered that the approach exhibits significant negative side effects on coherence and coordination in implementation of public policy (Pierre 2012). On the other hand, in normative discussions the effects of New Public Governance are still most commonly identified as strength of NPG model in acting as an amplifier of interactions between actors and facilitator of knowledge-sharing in the policy process, as well as ensuring that governmental actions are more legitimate in the eyes of citizens (Buuren, Klijn, and Edelenbos 2012).

This dissertation illustrates the usefulness of a joint use of public policy, public management, and political governance perspectives in describing and analyzing the public management reform process and the effects it produces. The comparative analysis presented in this dissertation has demonstrated how New Public Management, Neo Weberian State ideas and New Public Governance have inspired reform paths of six social services delivery analyzed here in a very diverse manner. Comparative analysis also revealed how features

of institutional setting and the interactions of actors involved in re-organization of service provision helped explain the success, and failure, of reform initiatives, especially with respect to their expected political objectives, including objectives directed at the establishment of partisan patronage networks and expectations of political parties that the outcome of reform will have positive effects on office or vote seeking strategies.

Although reform of ‘supervision of parental care and accommodation services for children, elderly and persons with disability’ brought about new focus of service managers on performance measurement-based control in services delivery and on holistic focus on meeting citizens’ needs, it did not replace traditional focus on regulatory and oversight functions and reliance on central steering by state agencies, i.e. ministries. While succeeding in limiting the ability of political parties to integrate political patronage in the implementation management, this mixture of hierarchical and market-driven accountability failed to bring about mobilization of under-utilized resources within local communities, including civil society networks, in the organization of service provision. Moreover, since in services in question New Public Management, or Neo-Weberian State ideas and tools, were added on the pre-existing bureaucratic management of service delivery, the reform has yielded a fairly non-congruent mix of enforcement and performance perspectives on managing of implementation.

By contrast, an influx of New Public Governance reform ideas guiding the creation of a “new” home care, did bring changes directed toward more interactive horizontal management with use of extremely soft steering mechanisms. However, the change that took place in this case has also brought to light New Public Governance blind spots. These blind spots include blurring of accountability lines, increase in inequality and divisiveness of policy processes; enhancing local elite domination in deliberations about policy solutions; fostering of displacement of reason with passion and persistence in pursuing particularistic agendas; heightening of distrust in and disrespect of public officials (Eikenberry, 2007; Christensen and Laegreid, 2012; Lynn, 2012; Rouban, 1999).

Managerial reliance on trust instead on contracts or rules, as this case showed, can lead to an engagement of a wide spectrum of actors in the implementation processes. However, it can also place rent-seeking politicians in the position of control of the process and enable them to use the process to insert political interests into the selection of actors that will act

as service providers or users. In other words, it can enable politicians to create opportunities and resources for political patronage and to use these opportunities and resources for advancing political objectives.

As clientelist patronage relies on the exploitation of public jobs, the best opportunities for collecting this form of rents are created through politicization and misuse of policy implementation management. The distortive impact of such rent-seeking practices can encompass not only individual-level management, but can also creep into implementation management at the system and organization level. At the system level, in administrative and policy settings which are highly politicized, weakly institutionalized organization of the implementation of the policy objectives and service delivery can become adversely affected by the commitment of policy makers directed toward expanding of discretionary powers they have in the implementation process.

At the organization and individual level, this can be observed through the misuse of the trust of key management mechanism and the mismatch between rules-in-use and rules-in-form where formally adopted fiscal, legal and discursive conditions of street-level work are not enforced in practice. The mismatch can disturb job placement and carrier management systems very severely, so much so that these become distorted by the usage of partisan and ascriptive criteria in recruiting and promoting public servants. In this way, co-production as the implementation mode might operationalize not only New Public Governance vision of an inclusive and flexible public sector, but also reveal its weaknesses with respect to accountability and oversight.

In the newly created services or those services where implementation is minimally institutionalized, the bulwark against political capture of the New Public Governance reform ideas can emerge in the shape of empowered or represented beneficiaries. As the personal assistance case demonstrated, if the creation or substantive re-design of the arrangements of service provision includes a substantial involvement of users and their advocacy groups, the governing party politicians are incentivized to switch toward the programmatic re-election calculus which not only allows, but also fosters the fulfillment of authentic objectives of reform and the co-production of the public service.

In such a scenario, as was also demonstrated by findings of previous studies, placement of citizens in the position of participants in the design and delivery of services they receive can have both therapeutic and empowering effects. When users act as experiential experts, the service has more chances to effectively deal with the real needs of users and service provision is more likely to be accompanied with the development of user accountability (Bovaird, 2007; Ostrom, 1996).

This case has also showed that, when reform is jointly metagoverned by political and administrative leaders, it will have the best chance to result in a mode of implementation that reflects not only the reformist ideas, but the real needs of the communities and beneficiaries. Such findings support the evidence of studies of governance practices in rent-seeking regimes, which revealed that involvement of citizens and advocacy organizations plays an important role in improving accountability and effectiveness of government operations. However, the most successful transformations of service delivery are achieved when civic efforts are supported or even induced by the state (Tendler 1998; Tendler and Freedheim 1994; Leonard 2010).

In the case of personal assistants, the consistency in the adoption of New Public Governance premises implied managerial reliance on voluntary quality standards and confidence in the committed work of associations of disabled persons which acted as partners in the delivery of service. While managerial reliance on trust and shared responsibility is said to discourage competitiveness and irrational hostility among participating organizations, partnership approach to implementation management can work as amplifier of knowledge sharing and mobilizer of underutilized community resources (Poocharoen and Ting, 2013; Sorensen, 2012). These soft mechanisms were nevertheless supplemented with New Public Management tools such as performance indicators, annual reports and visits by civil servants. Even though the usage of these tools was more directed at coaching than on oversight, their presence in the implementation management of personal assistants suggests that effective and sustainable co-production in practice might be fostered by the appropriate mixture of managerial tools which balance accountability with inclusiveness and flexibility.

Findings on the mixed nature of tools and management mechanisms that are found surrounding design and implementation of analyzed personal assistance case suggest that



co-production is equally dependent on both top-down and bottom-up forms of management. Intrinsic co-operation relies on trust and reciprocity, as well as on shared values and norms which function as a glue holding actors in cooperative forms of coordination (Rhodes, 2012). However, effectiveness of a bottom-up interaction is also dependent on a skillful top-down governance, or, in other words, metagovernance (Sorensen, 2012), which is capable of framing concerted action among different types of actors and interests in ways which are balancing accountability and flexibility.

In a broader perspective, dissertation has demonstrated that, despite often emphasized beneficial effects it has on citizens and governments, the New Public Governance reform model functions primarily as a theoretical model and an empirical experiment with non-traditional governance arrangements. Full effects of New Public Governance, and in particular its weaknesses and problems, are yet to be fully uncovered and explained in an empirical analysis. Moreover, the findings from both comparative and process tracing study support cautious warnings that theorizing and studying New Public Governance is quite often affected by normative and prescriptive considerations (Eikenberry 2007).

Idealized assumptions regarding the actual implementation of New Public Governance in practice emphasize the role of a facilitator which is assigns to executive politicians. While New Public Management left elected officials with the authority over goal-setting, New Public Governance removed politicians away from deciding the substance of government policy and place them in the position of an actor in charge of the facilitation of a collaborative process –which should ideally generate common interest and solutions (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000). This rather prescriptive shift has been already challenged from two perspectives. First, it is not highly likely that politicians will be giving up authority over policy-content that easily, and willingly limit themselves to the role of process moderators (Politt and Bouckaert 2011). Second, even if that happens, politicians could act more as ‘spoilports’ than as ‘playmakers’ (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000).

They could use the role of guarantors of compromise deals between multiple stakeholders they have within the framework of New Public Governance in order to advance their own interests and objectives. As process tracing analysis of the captured home care reform

showed, political exercise of metagovernance can induce development and implementation of contextualized creative solutions and generate engagement of a wide spectrum of actors in the implementation process, but if performed by elected officials which are incentivized to engage in rent-seeking practices, the metagovernance role can also be adjusted to serve particular political interests.

For political executive inclined to engage in politicization or rent-seeking activities, New Public Governance-inspired re-design of the governance arena and policy-making process might provide opportunities for manipulating the design of rules governing this process in order to attain greater discretion over the selection of actors that will participate in the implementation network and act as public service providers. However, it also has to be noted that the analysis also showed that the politicization of the metagovernance process and of co-production might have positive effects. These include wider encompassment of citizens in targeted communities or the recruitment of organizationally underdeveloped, but politically important local units into a network of service providers.

On the other hand, as public resources are often very limited, politicization might result in an unequal availability of the service, as well as in the perception that a transfer of funds to selected providers and the delivery of service to individual users are being used as direct material incentives directed at shaping electoral behaviour. This perception need not apply to all providers and beneficiaries of the service, but it can nevertheless seriously damage its sustainability prospects when the clientelistic party loses power and new political actors take over. If provision of services is heavily politicalized, change of governing party can result in a deliberate gutting of a policy or service provision directed at limiting resources available to actors affiliated with the previous governing party, or, in order to free resources for party patronage available to a new governing party.

Due to that, after the 2011 national elections in which HDZ lost power, the home care program immediately ended up on the new government's list for complete restructuring. After the several failed attempts, in the New Public Management inspired integration of the "old" and "new" home care that took place in April 2014, local units were removed from the implementation loop and Centers for Social Welfare became focal points in communities. To ensure better control over the implementation, partnership agreements

were replaced by licensing and contracting, mean's test was re-introduced and service content prearranged for each category of users. Such restructuring fostered development of the perception that values of accountability, equal treatment and efficiency have been protected, but at the same time it reversed the course of service development by causing significant reduction in the number of service users and the inability of direct service providers to accommodate user's full needs.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A List of analysed documents

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Etički kodeks za osobnog asistenta i korisnika usluga. 2008. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Evaluacija Pilot projekta osobnog asistenta. 2008. Program ujedinjenih naroda u Hrvatskoj i Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2003. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2004. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2005. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2006. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2007. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2008. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2009. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2010. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2011. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2012. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o domovima i korisnicima socijalne skrbi u 2013. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2003. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2004. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2005. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2006. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2007. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2008. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2009. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2010. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2011. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2012. godini

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Godišnje statističko izvješće o korisnicima i primijenjenim pravima socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj u 2013. godini

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Inicijalno izvješće Republike Hrvatske o provedbi Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom Ujedinjenih naroda. 2011. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Izvešće o provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine u 2010. godini, 2011. Zagreb. Ministarstvo obitelji branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Izvešće o provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine u 2011. godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Izvešće o provedbi Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanje mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine u 2012. godini. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Izvešće o provedbi programa pomoći u kući za Ministarstvo uprave. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti (Interni dokument)

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Izvešće Ureda pravobraniteljice za osobe s invaliditetom za 2012. godinu, 2013. Ureda pravobraniteljice za osobe s invaliditetom

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Izvešće Ureda pravobraniteljice za osobe s invaliditetom za 2013. godinu, 2014. Ured pravobraniteljice za osobe s invaliditetom

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Katalog prava i usluga za osobe s invaliditetom 2013 Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Katalog prava i usluga za starije osobe 2013 Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Nacionalna strategija izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom od 2007. do 2015. godine. Narodne novine: 63/07.

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Nacionalni plan aktivnosti za prava i interese djece od 2006. do 2012.

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Obiteljski zakon NN 116/03, 17/04, 136/04, 107/07, 57/11, 61/11, 25/13, 05/15

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Odluka o Kriterijima za ocjenu i predlaganje suradnje na Programima međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2006. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Odluka o minimalnim financijskim standardima za decentralizirano financiranje djelatnosti domova za starije i nemoćne osobe u 2012. godini, NN 52/12 i 111/12

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Odluka o osnivanju i imenovanju Povjerenstva za praćenje provedbe Programa međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Odluka o Pozivu za uključivanje jedinica lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave u Program međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Okvir za praćenje provedbe Nacionalne strategije izjednačavanja mogućnosti za osobe s invaliditetom 2007.-2015., 2010. Zagreb: Ministarstvo obitelji branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Plan deinstitucionalizacije i transformacije domova socijalne skrbi i drugih pravnih osoba koje obavljaju djelatnost socijalne skrbi u Republici Hrvatskoj 2011- 2016 (2018). listopad 2010. Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi.

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Područja i provoditelji Programa "Pomoć u kući starijim osobama" i DBPUK u 2011 godini. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Poslovnik o radu povjerenstva za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Poziv za prijavu trogodišnjih programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije osobama s invaliditetom u Republici Hrvatskoj za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. godine. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Poziv za uključivanje jedinica lokalne samouprave u program međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Pravilnik o minimalnim uvjetima za pružanje socijalnih usluga, NN 40/2014

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Pravilnik o standardima kvalitete socijalnih usluga, NN 143/2014

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Program razvoja usluga za starije osobe u sustavu međugeneracijske solidarnosti od 2008 do 2011 godine. 2007. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnost

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Programi "Pomoći u kući" i Dnevni boravak" Izvješće za JIM. 2012. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih

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Programi Uprave za međugeneracijsku solidarnost (Prikaz programa ugovorenih 2015 godine), Izvješće Ministarstva obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti za Ministarstvo uprave

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Rezultati evaluacije programa "Pomoć u kući stariji osobama" 2004. godina. 2005. Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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Strategija za zaštitu i pomicanje prava djece u Republici Hrvatskoj od 2014. do 2020.

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Upute za prijavu trogodišnjeg programa udruga koje pružaju usluge asistencije za osobe s invaliditetom u RH za financijsku potporu iz Državnog proračuna i dijela prihoda od igara na sreću za razdoblje od 2013. do 2015. 2013. Ministarstvo socijalne politike i mladih.

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Uredba o unutarnjem ustrojstvu Ministarstva obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2004. Vlada Republike Hrvatske

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Zajednički memorandum o socijalnom uključivanju ožujak 2007 Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi.

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Zakon o braku i porodičnim odnosima NN, 11/1978

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Zakon o potvrđivanju Konvencije o pravima osoba s invaliditetom i Fakultativnog protokola uz Konvenciju o pravima osoba s invaliditetom. Narodne novine: Međunarodni ugovori 6/07

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Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14

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Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 157/13, 152/14

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Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 33/2012

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Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 33/2012

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Zakon o socijalnoj skrbi, NN 57/11

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Zakon o socijalnoj zaštiti, NN 19/1969

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Zakon o udomiteljstvu NN 90/11, 78/12

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Zakon o udomiteljstvu, NN 79/2007

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Zapisnik s 2. sjednice Povjerenstva za Programe međugeneracijske solidarnosti. 2010.  
Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti

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## **Appendix B Protocol for semi-structured interviews within comparative case study**

### **ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES PROVISION IN CROATIA**

#### **- Doctoral Research -**

#### **Protocol for semi-structured interviews**

Name of interviewed person:

Organisation:

Day and hour on the interview:

#### **At the beginning**

- Introduce the research: The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. In this doctoral dissertation a comparison is undertaken between reform practices and the management of services concerning three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. The following services are analysed herein:
  1. Long-term care and accommodation for the elderly
  2. In-home assistance for the elderly
  3. Long-term assistance and accommodation for persons with disabilities
  4. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities
  5. Accommodation for children with inadequate parental care
  6. Supervision of families at risk
- Ask permission for recording (give the Statement of ethic)
- Emphasise that all data collected by means of individual interviews will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs.

- Ask interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar with and work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees.

| QUESTIONS  | NOTES |
|--|-------|
| Current provision of the service   |       |
| <p>1. Which among these six are related to your work?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accommodation in homes and foster homes for elderly,</li> <li>• Home care for elderly,</li> <li>• Accommodation in homes and foster homes for children without parental care,</li> <li>• Supervision of parental care for families in risk,</li> <li>• Accommodation in homes and foster homes for persons with disabilities and</li> <li>• Personal assistance for persons with disabilities.</li> </ul>         |       |
| <p>2. How is/are that/these services related to your work?</p>   |       |
| <p>3. Who are the actors engaged in the organisation of provision of these services? Who can act as service provider?</p>  |       |
| <p>4. What are activities prevalent in the management of the policy process?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Making mandates explicit</li> <li>• Creating ‘interfaces’</li> <li>• Appealing for responsibility</li> <li>• Something else</li> </ul>   |       |
| <p>5. What are the activities prevalent in the management of inter-organizational relations?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creating clarity on tasks and competences</li> <li>• Taking care of sufficient resources</li> <li>• Enhancing contract compliance</li> <li>• Realizing partnerships</li> <li>• Something else</li> </ul>   |       |
| <p>6. What are the activities prevalent in the management of external and internal inter-personal contacts? What is the role of users in service provision?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhancing motivation and internalization and leadership and training on the job</li> <li>• Realizing compliance to standard operating procedures and enhancing and maintaining service orientation, rewarding target compliance</li> <li>• Enhancing professionalization and organizing response</li> </ul> |       |

|  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Something else</li> </ul>   |  |
| <p>7. What role the government takes in the implementation management of service?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CEO</li> <li>• Inspector</li> <li>• Moderator</li> <li>• Something else</li> </ul>  |  |
| <p>8. What are the central and adjutant management mechanisms in them management of the service provision?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws and other type of regulation</li> <li>• Contract. Quality standards</li> <li>• Trust, shared values,</li> </ul> |  |
| Introduction of service and the features of its provision in early of 2000s.   |  |
| 9. When and how service was introduced?  |  |
| 10. How did the provision of service look like in the beginning of 2000s?  |  |
| 11. How was it regulated?  |  |
| 12. Where those rules followed? How, on what base, you/or actors that were engaged in implementation making everyday decisions?  |  |
| 12. Were there any professional codes or active professional bodies?   |  |
| The role of users and other actors in the design and provision of the service in early 2000s.  |  |
| 13. At that time, what was position of service users in the service provision? How organised they were among themselves? Were there any active individual users speaking on a behalf of other users?   |  |
| 14. Did any domestic or international organizations that promote the interest of service beneficiaries?  |  |
| Service development in last 10 years: reforms and key actors   |  |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| 15. How would you describe the development of the arrangement for service provision in last 10-13 years? Were there any reforms? What were main ideas and tools promoted by the reform? |  |
| 16. Who were actors that promoted or supported the reform?  |  |
| 17. What was the role of executive politicians in the reform process?   |  |
| 18. What was the role of civil servants?  |  |
| 19. Would you like to add something that we did not jet mentioned, but is important for the reform and current management of the service?   |  |

THANK YOU☺

## **Appendix C Statement of ethics for interviews within comparative case study**

### **STATEMENT OF ETHICS (translation)**

#### **ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES PROVISION IN CROATIA**

##### **- Doctoral Research -**

#### **CONTACT INFORMATION**

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#### **RESEARCH SUMMARY**

The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. Doctoral research topic is the implementation of social policy in Croatia, with prof. Zdravko Petak, PhD, and Paul Stubbs, PhD, as mentors. In this doctoral dissertation a comparison is undertaken between reform practices and the management of services concerning three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. The following services are analysed herein:

1. Long-term care and accommodation for the elderly
2. In-home assistance for the elderly
3. Long-term assistance and accommodation for persons with disabilities
4. Personal assistance for persons with disabilities
5. Accommodation for children with inadequate parental care
6. Supervision of families at risk

Interviews with actors in the aforementioned policies form a crucial part of this doctoral research. The sample includes a large number of participants: civil servants at the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth who worked or presently work in the management of the said policies; employees at regional and local government bodies; experts dealing in social policies; founders and/or employees of organisations (public, private, non-profit) managing the provision of various social services; immediate services providers; and beneficiaries. The interviewing process will be conducted whilst adhering to the highest ethical standards in research and in full confidentiality. All data collected by means of individual interviews will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation – via categories generated through coding – without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs. Such an approach will be viable due to the large number of interviewees (around 80).

## DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS

Each interview is conducted individually and in a semi-structured manner, with the research undertaken on the entire Croatian territory. A set of framework question is provided, but neither the sequence of questions nor the content of sub-questions is defined in advance. Interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar with and work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. This interview consists of 4 groups of questions related to the following:

1. Governance practices and institutional framework for the governance of services before the year 2000
2. Actors and reform processes related to social services governance in Croatia from the year 2000 until today
3. Results of social services governance reform in Croatia from the year 2000 until today
4. Role of beneficiaries and their representatives in provision and reform of services.

Expected duration of interview is between 50 minutes and 1 hour. With interviewee's consent, the interview will be audio recorded; confidentiality is guaranteed and the



recording destroyed once it is transcribed. Interviewee identity is irrelevant for research results and will not be stated in any part of the research or annexes thereto. Both in analysis and results layout, interviewees are grouped based on their position related to – or their knowledge/experience of – the level of social services governance system; this is either central state level, level of relations between organisations, or the end-user level.

## STATEMENT

This research is conducted as part of a doctoral research within which reform and practices of governance over social services provision within three social policies, including the policy for elderly citizen in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. Participation in this research is voluntary and data confidentiality is guaranteed. For simpler data handling and analysis, the interview is audio-recorded with the interviewee's consent provided. Once the interview is conducted, the interviewer will transcribe the audio recording and will permanently delete its record 15 days after the interview at the latest. The interview and the attributed interviewee data will be coded and their name and surname will not be further used in the text, but will only be attributed with an appropriate code. It is thus known only to the interviewer that the said statements and quotes pertain to that particular interviewee alone. The transcript of the interview recording will be coded according to the selected research method. The interviewer will not disclose the identity of interviewees or any of their identity-related data to third parties. The interviewee is entitled to end their participation in the interview at any given moment.

**Researcher Signature:**  
**signature:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Interviewee**

**Date and Place:** \_\_\_\_\_

## ETIČKA IZJAVA

### ANALIZA UPRAVLJANJA PRUŽANJEM SOCIJALNIH USLUGA U HRVATSKOJ

#### - Doktorsko istraživanje-

#### KONTAKTNE INFORMACIJE

Ime i prezime istraživača/ice: Anka Kekez Koštro

Znanstvena novakinja- asistentica  
Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu  
Lepušićeva 6, HR 10 000 Zagreb  
Mob: + 385 91 8838 079  
Email: [akekez@fpzg.hr](mailto:akekez@fpzg.hr)

#### SAŽETAK ISTRAŽIVANJA

Intervjui se koje kao dio doktorskog istraživanja u okviru doktorskog studija Komparativna politika na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Tema doktorskog rada je implementacija socijalne politike u Hrvatskoj, a mentori su prof. dr. sc. Zdravko Petak i dr.sc. Paul Stubbs. U disertaciji uspoređujem prakse reforme i upravljanja pružanjem usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. Usluge koje analiziram su:

7. Dugotrajna skrb i smještaj za starije osobe
8. Pomoć u kući za starije osobe
9. Dugotrajna skrb i smještaj za osobe s invaliditetom
10. Osobna asistencija za osobe s invaliditetom
11. Smještaj za djecu bez adekvatne obiteljske skrbi
12. Usluga nadzora za obitelji u riziku

Važan dio doktorskog istraživanja su intervjui s akterima spomenutih politika. Uzorak uključuje veliki broj sudionica i sudionika: djelatnike/ce Ministarstva socijalne politike i mladih koji su radili ili rade na upravljanju navedenim politikama, djelatnike/ce jedinica područne i lokalne samouprave, stručnjake koji se bave socijalnim politikama, osnivače i/ili djelatnike/ce organizacija (javnih, privatnih, neprofitnih) koji upravljaju pružanjem

različitih socijalnih usluga, neposredne pružatelje usluga te korisnike. Proces intervjuiranja provodit ću uz maksimalno poštovanje istraživačkih etičkih standarda i povjerljivosti. Podaci prikupljeni individualnim intervjuima obrađivat će se zajedno, a u disertaciji će se nalazi prikazivati grupno - kroz kategorije dobivene procesom kodiranja - bez ikakvog spominjanja sudionika intervjua i njihovih pozicija/zaposlenja. To će biti moguće jer će u intervjuima sudjelovati velik broj aktera (oko 80).

## OPIS INTERVJUA

Intervju se provodi kao individualni polu-strukturirani intervju, a istraživanje se provodi na području cijele Hrvatske. Kod polustrukturiranog intervjua postoji set okvirnih pitanja, ali redoslijed pitanja i potpitanja nisu unaprijed određena. Sudionici odgovaraju na pitanja s obzirom na usluge s kojima su upoznati i koje su im u djelokrugu rada. Pri tome je naglasak je stavljen na iskustvo i stavove sudionika. Ovaj intervju sastoji se od 4 grupe pitanja koja se odnose na:

1. Upravljačke prakse i institucionalni okvir za upravljanje uslugama prije 2000-te godine
2. Aktere i proces reforme upravljanja socijalnim uslugama u Hrvatskoj od 2000-te do danas
3. Rezultate reforme upravljanja socijalnim uslugama u Hrvatskoj od 2000-te do danas
4. Uloga korisnika i njihovih predstavnika u pružanju i reformi usluge

Očekivano trajanje intervjua je 50 minuta do 1 sat. Uz suglasnost ispitanika intervju će radi lakše obrade podataka biti snimljen diktafonom uz osiguranje povjerljivosti te uništenje snimke nakon njenog prijepisa. Identitet ispitanika je nevažan za rezultate istraživanja te neće biti naveden niti u jednom dijelu istraživanja ili podržavajući dokumentacije. Ispitanici se u analizi i predstavljanju rezultata analize grupiraju prema njihovoj poziciji odnosno znanju/iskustvu u odnosu na razinu sustava upravljanja socijalnim uslugama- razina države, razina odnosa među organizacijama i razina krajnjeg korisnika.

## IZJAVA

Ovo istraživanje se provodi u okviru izrade doktorskog istraživanja u kojem se uspoređuju reforma i prakse upravljanja pružanjem usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. Sudjelovanje u istraživanju je dobrovoljno, a povjerljivost podataka garantirana. Uz pristanak sudionika/ce intervju se zvučno snima radi lakše obrade i analize podataka. Nakon provedbe intervjuja član voditeljica intervjuja će napraviti prijepis audio snimke, a snimku će trajno izbrisati najkasnije 15 dana nakon provedbe intervjuja. Intervju s pripadajućim podacima ispitanika će se kodirati te se njegovo ime i prezime neće koristiti u daljnjem tekstu, već samo dodijeljen kod. Na taj način samo intervjuer/ka znaju da spomenute izjave i citati pripadaju baš tom ispitaniku. Prijepis snimke intervjuja kodirati će se sukladno odabranoj istraživačkoj metodi. Voditeljica intervjuja neće trećim osobama otkriti identitet niti s identitetom povezane podatke o ispitanicima. Ispitanik/ca ima pravo prekinuti sudjelovanje u istraživanju u bilo kojem trenutku.

**Potpis istraživača/ice:**

**Potpis**

**ispitanika/ce:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Mjesto i datum:** \_\_\_\_\_

## **Appendix D Protocol for semi-structured interviews within process tracing study**

### **ANALYSIS OF THE HOME CARE REFORM IN CROATIA**

#### **- Doctoral Research -**

#### **Protocol for semi-structured interviews**

Name of interviewed person:

Organisation:

Day and hour on the interview:

#### **At the beginning**

- Introduce the research: The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. In this part of doctoral dissertation I am analysing the process of the reform of home care services in the last decade in Croatia.
- Ask permission for recording (give the Statement of ethic)
- Emphasise that all data collected by means of individual interviews will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs.
- Ask interviewees give their reply to questions based on the services they are familiar with and work on. Emphasis is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees.

| QUESTIONS  | NOTES |
|--|-------|
| When and how was the home care within the system of intergenerational solidarity introduced?                                     |       |
| Institutional redesign   |       |
| How would you describe the process of the design of the new setting for community based elderly care in the first half of 2000s? |       |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of executive politicians?                              |       |
| Reforming the (inter)organizational setting  |       |
| How and to whom was given mandate for the organisation of service provision?   |       |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of executive politicians?                              |       |
| Ensuring internalization of core norms   |       |
| Was the internalization of reform's vision and ideas fostered and how?   |       |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of executive politicians?                              |       |
| General rule-making for policy-making  |       |
| How were framed flexible legal, financial and discursive conditions for the formation of local elderly care policies             |       |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of executive politicians?                              |       |

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Re-shaping the policy content   |  |
| How did the decision-making about local elderly care policies looked like?  |  |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of national and local executive politicians?                |  |
| Situation bound rule application  |  |
| What was the role of care givers and service users in the design of the service   |  |
| Which actors were involved in this part of the process? What was the role of national and local executive politicians?                |  |
| How did the actual provision of the service looked like?  |  |
| What was the role of service users? Was anyone representing their interest during the development of new home care                    |  |
| Was the design of the service related with the social care system and its regulative framework?                                       |  |
| Would you like to add something that we did not jet mentioned, but is important for the reform and current management of the service? |  |

THANK YOU☺

## **Appendix E Statement of ethics for interviews within process tracing study**

### **STATEMENT OF ETHICS (translation)**

#### **ANALYSIS OF HOME CARE REFORM IN CROATIA**

##### **- Doctoral Research -**

#### **CONTACT INFORMATION**

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#### **RESEARCH SUMMARY**

The interviews are part of the doctoral research conducted within the framework of a Doctoral Program in Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. Doctoral research topic is the implementation of social policy in Croatia, with prof. Zdravko Petak, PhD, and Paul Stubbs, PhD, as mentors. In this doctoral dissertation a comparison is undertaken between reform practices and the governance of services concerning three social policies: the policy for elderly citizens in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. Among those services, special attention is given to the reform of the management of home care services in Croatia which is topic this interview.

Interviews with actors in the aforementioned policies form a crucial part of this doctoral research. The sample includes a large number of participants: civil servants at the Ministry of Social Policy and Youth who worked or presently work in the management of the said policies; employees at regional and local government bodies; experts dealing in social policies; founders and/or employees of organisations (public, private, non-profit) managing



the provision of various social services; immediate services providers; and beneficiaries. The interviewing process will be conducted whilst adhering to the highest ethical standards in research and in full confidentiality. All data collected by means of individual interviews will be processed cumulatively, with findings presented collectively in the dissertation – via categories generated through coding – without any mention of individual interviewees and their positions/jobs. Such an approach will be viable due to the large number of interviewees (around 80).

## DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS

Each interview is conducted individually and in a semi-structured manner, with the research undertaken on the entire Croatian territory. A set of framework question is provided, but neither the sequence of questions nor the content of sub-questions is defined in advance. Emphasis in the interviews is placed on experience and attitudes of interviewees. This interview consists of 3 groups of questions related to the following:

1. Refrom process
2. Refrom results
3. Influential factors

Expected duration of interview is between 50 minutes and 1 hour. With interviewee's consent, the interview will be audio recorded; confidentiality is guaranteed and the recording destroyed once it is transcribed. Interviewee identity is irrelevant for research results and will not be stated in any part of the research or annexes thereto. Both in analysis and results layout, interviewees are grouped based on their position related to – or their knowledge/experience of – the level of social services governance system; this is either central state level, level of relations between organisations, or the end-user level.

## STATEMENT

This research is conducted as part of a doctoral research within which reform and practices of governance over social services provision within three social policies, including the policy for elderly citizen in need of long term care; policy towards persons with disabilities; and policy towards children with inadequate parental care. Participation in this research is voluntary and data confidentiality is guaranteed. For simpler data handling and analysis, the interview is audio-recorded with the interviewee's consent provided. Once the interview is conducted, the interviewer will transcribe the audio recording and will permanently delete its record 15 days after the interview at the latest. The interview and the attributed interviewee data will be coded and their name and surname will not be further used in the text, but will only be attributed with an appropriate code. It is thus known only to the interviewer that the said statements and quotes pertain to that particular interviewee alone. The transcript of the interview recording will be coded according to the selected research method. The interviewer will not disclose the identity of interviewees or any of their identity-related data to third parties. The interviewee is entitled to end their participation in the interview at any given moment.

**Researcher Signature:**  
**signature:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Interviewee**

**Date and Place:** \_\_\_\_\_

## ETIČKA IZJAVA

### ANALIZA REFORME POMOĆI U KUĆI ZA STARIJE OSOBE U HRVATSKOJ

#### - Doktorsko istraživanje-

#### KONTAKTNE INFORMACIJE

Ime i prezime istraživača/ice: Anka Kekez Koštro

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#### SAŽETAK ISTRAŽIVANJA

Intervjui se koje kao dio doktorskog istraživanja u okviru doktorskog studija Komparativna politika na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Tema doktorskog rada je implementacija socijalne politike u Hrvatskoj, a mentori su prof. dr. sc. Zdravko Petak i dr.sc. Paul Stubbs. U disertaciji uspoređujem prakse reforme i upravljanja pružanjem usluga u okviru triju socijalnih politika, uključujući politiku za starije i nemoćne osobe, politiku za osobe s invaliditetom te politiku za djecu bez adekvatne roditeljske skrbi. U istraživanju je posebna pažnja posvećena refromi i rezultatima reforme upravljanja pružanjem uslule pomoći u kući, što je i tema ovog intervjuja.

Važan dio doktorskog istraživanju su intervjui s akterima politike za starije osobe u Hravtskoj. Uzorak uključuje veliki broj sudionica i sudionika: djelatnike/ce Ministarstva socijalne politike i mladih koji su radili ili rade na upravljanju navedenim politikama, djelatnike/ce jedinica područne i lokalne samouprave, stručnjake koji se bave socijalnim politikama, osnivače i/ili djelatnike/ce organizacija (javnih, privatnih, neprofitnih) koji upravljaju pružanjem različitih socijalnih usluga, neposredne pružatelje usluga te korisnike. Proces intervjuiranja provodit ću uz maksimalno poštovanje istraživačkih etičkih standarda i povjerljivosti. Podaci prikupljeni individualnim intervjuima obrađivat će se zajedno, a u disertaciji će se nalazi prikazivati grupno - kroz kategorije dobivene procesom kodiranja - bez ikakvog spominjanja sudionika intervjuja i njihovih pozicija/zaposlenja. To će biti moguće jer će u intervjuima sudjelovati velik broja aktera (oko 80).

## OPIS INTERVJUA

Intervju se provodi kao individualni polu-strukturirani intervju, a istraživanje se provodi na području cijele Hrvatske. Kod polustrukturiranog intervjuja postoji set okvirnih pitanja, ali redosljed pitanja i potpitanja nisu unaprijed određena. U odgovaranju na pitanja naglasak je stavljen na iskustvo i stavove sudionika. Ovaj intervju sastoji se od 3 grupe pitanja koja se odnose na:

1. Proces reforme
2. Rezultate reforme
3. Čimbenike koji su utjecali na reform

Očekivano trajanje intervjuja je 50 minuta do 1 sat. Uz suglasnost ispitanika intervju će radi lakše obrade podataka biti snimljen diktafonom uz osiguranje povjerljivosti te uništenje snimke nakon njenog prijepisa. Identitet ispitanika je nevažan za rezultate istraživanja te neće biti naveden niti u jednom dijelu istraživanja ili podržavajući dokumentacije. Ispitanici se u analizi i predstavljanju rezultata analize grupiraju prema njihovoj poziciji odnosno znanju/iskustvu u odnosu na razinu sustava upravljanja socijalnim uslugama- razina države, razina odnosa među organizacijama i razina krajnjeg korisnika.

## IZJAVA

Ovo istraživanje se provodi u okviru izrade doktorskog istraživanja u između ostalog, analiziram reformu i rezultate reform upravljanj pružanjem usluge pomoći u kući za politiku za starije. Sudjelovanje u istraživanju je dobrovoljno, a povjerljivost podataka garantirana. Uz pristanak sudionika/ce intervju se zvučno snima radi lakše obrade i analize podataka. Nakon provedbe intervjuja član voditeljica intervjuja će napraviti prijepis audio snimke, a snimku će trajno izbrisati najkasnije 15 dana nakon provedbe intervjuja. Intervju s pripadajućim podacima ispitanika će se kodirati te se njegovo ime i prezime neće koristiti u daljnjem tekstu, već samo dodijeljen kod. Na taj način samo intervjuer/ka znaju da spomenute izjave i citati pripadaju baš tom ispitaniku. Prijepis snimke intervjuja kodirati će se sukladno odabranoj istraživačkoj metodi. Voditeljica intervjuja neće trećim osobama otkriti identitet niti s identitetom povezane podatke o ispitanicima. Ispitanik/ca ima pravo prekinuti sudjelovanje u istraživanju u bilo kojem trenutku.

**Potpis istraživača/ice:**

**Potpis**

**ispitanika/ce:**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**Mjesto i datum:** \_\_\_\_\_

## **Appendix F Author resume**

Anka Kekez Koštro (born in Split in 1982), graduated from the Faculty of Political Science of the Zagreb University. She is currently enrolled in the doctoral program of Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science. Since 2010 she has been employed as a research-assistant at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb where she teaches seminars in the courses Introduction to Public Policy and Public Governance. Prior to her employment at the Faculty of Political Science, between 2005 and 2010, she worked as a consultant for MAP Consulting, responsible for evaluation studies and public policy analysis.

During her work at MAP Consulting and at the Faculty of Political Science, she took part in a number of academic and applied research projects focused on public policy formation and implementation. In her research, she is focused on public policy implementation, public administration reform and clientelism. She also specialized in the use of qualitative research methods in the analysis of public policy. Since January 2017 she has participated in a project about the reconciliation of work and family life (IPA), a project about political priorities in Croatia (POLIPTIH) and a project related to the development of skills and qualifications of political science and journalism students (HKO). She is a member of the Centre for Empirical Research in Political Science (CEPIS) at the Faculty of Political Science, and also, since 2015 she acts as a teaching assistant for qualitative data analysis at ECPR Winter and Summer schools in social science research methods.

## List of publications:

Howlett, Michael, Anka Kekez i Ora Poocharoen. 2017. "Understanding Co-Production as a Policy Tool: Integrating New Public Governance and Comparative Policy Theory." *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice* 19 (5): 487–501. DOI: 10.1080/13876988.2017.1287445.

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